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While these factors are indeed “relevant in assessing the voluntariness of a confession,” ¶ 15 (2013), we decline to affirm the suppression order based on these two factors alone.

¶ 19 (2013); see also Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 11.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 Viewing the evidence at the suppression hearing in a light most favorable to sustaining the order, ¶ 8 (2013), one morning in February 2019, an Arizona Department of Public Safety Trooper saw a gray sedan going eight miles over the speed limit on Interstate 40.

ield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177-78 (2016) (noting breath tests do not implicate significant privacy concerns); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (describing a blood draw as “an invasion of bodily integrity [that] implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy’” (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985))); ¶ 10 (2013).

“Consent can [] allow a warrantless search, provided the consent is voluntary.” ¶ 13 (2013).

¶ 13 (2013) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).

3.8.” ¶8 This court “review[s] a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” ¶ 9 (2016) ( ¶ 8 (2013)).

DISCUSSION ¶7 This court reviews “a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s rulings.” ¶ 9 (2016) ( ¶ 8 (2013)).

State v. Butler , , 87, ¶ 8, , 612 (2013).

We review the denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 8 (2013), but review the court’s legal conclusions de novo, ¶ 10 (App. 2006).

After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the blood draw was voluntary, “[c]onsidering the circumstances surrounding the arrest, the language in the [admin per se form], and the question posed to the defendant regarding consent” and the “” The blood test results were admitted at trial, and De Anda was convicted of the four charged DUI counts.

¶11 Citing Carrillo, Diaz argues that § 28-1321 “unquestionably imposes a consent requirement.” she contends that requirement “is governed not just by the statute, but also by traditional Fourth Amendment analysis” requiring that the consent be voluntary.

JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court: ¶1 We here consider whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, in a prosecution for driving under the influence ("DUI"), to admit blood evidence unconstitutionally obtained after State v. Butler , , but before State v. Valenzuela ( Valenzuela II )

DISCUSSION ¶13 As directed by the Arizona Supreme Court, this court “review[s] a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” ¶ 9 (2016) ( ¶ 8 (2013)).

The court determined the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because, after our supreme court's decision in State v. Butler , , no binding precedent supported giving the admonition.

¶ 11 (2017) (reviewing motion to suppress) ( ¶ 8 (2013)); n.1, ¶ 1 (App. 2000) (reviewing jury instructions) ().

He also claimed that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because his arrest occurred after the decision in State v. Butler

¶ 12 In her reply brief, however, Weakland also asserts that our supreme court's decision in State v. Butler , , which was issued between the arrest at issue in Valenzuela II and Weakland's arrest, set forth "unequivocally ...

WARNER/TROUPE Decision of the Court for search of “personal property, persons or items”), -105(37) (defining “property” as “anything of value, tangible or intangible”); ¶ 37 (2013) (describing search warrant as means for obtaining blood samples in DUI investigations).

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, ¶ 8, but review de novo its determination as to the existence of probable cause