Cited by

v. Hegyi, ¶ 21 (2014) (noting a proposed statutory interpretation “would be in tension with the fact the legislature, in enacting [the statute], rejected a proposed amendment” that would have followed the proposed interpretation).

v. Hegyi, ¶ 6 (2014); see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”).

v. Hegyi, ¶ 21 (2014) (rejecting an interpretation of a statute that would be “in tension with the 5 MOUNTAINSIDE, et al. v. FLAGSTAFF, et al. Opinion of the Court fact that the legislature .

v. Hegyi, ¶ 6 (2014), which is best expressed by the statute’s plain language, Premier Physicians Grp., ¶ 9 (2016).

v. Hegyi, ¶ 16 (2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), and “[t]he legislature also directed that the implementing legislation be liberally construed to preserve and protect the rights to which victims are entitled,” id.

v. Hegyi, ¶ 21 (2014) (rejecting court of appeals’ statutory interpretation in part as in tension with statutory purpose, when legislature considered and rejected proposed amendment).

v. Hegyi, ¶ 6 (2014) (“Words in statutes .

v. Hegyi, -41, ¶ 6 (2014).

v. Hegyi, -41, ¶ 6 (2014)); ¶ 6 (App. 2010).

v. Hegyi, ¶ 6 (2014) (explaining that, when interpreting a statute, the words “cannot be read in isolation from the context in which they are used”) (citing Adams v. Comm’n on Appellate Court Appointments, ¶ 34 (2011)).

v. Hegyi, –41 ¶ 6, –20 (2014).

v. Hegyi, , 40-41 ¶ 6, -20 (2014).

v. Hegyi, ¶ 6, (explaining that when determining a statute’s meaning, words “cannot be read in isolation from the context in which they are used”).

v. Hegyi, , 41 ¶ 6, , 1120 (2014).

v. Hegyi, ¶ 6 , (“Words in statutes ...

v. Hegyi, –41 ¶ 6, –20 (2014).