Cited by

.”); (“The standards for granting or denying a motion for JMOL and a motion for summary judgment are the same.”).

¶10 While Arizona cases have not directly opined on whether the denial of a Rule 50(a) motion is appealable, –63, 167, ¶¶ 7, 29 (2015), our supreme court reviewed the denials of both JMOL motions when the appealing party preserved its Rule 50(a) motion through a post-trial Rule 50(b) motion.

¶22 This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, ¶ 29 (2015), and “view[s] the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties.” ¶ 3 n.1 (2018).

–56 ¶¶ 7–8 (2012) (motion to dismiss); ¶ 29 (2015) (summary judgment); Lebaron Props., LLC v. Jeffrey S. Kaufman, Ltd., ¶ 6 (App. 2009) (interpretation of A.R.S.

We review such a ruling de novo, ¶ 29 (2015), viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light favorable to the nonmoving party, Warne Investments, Ltd., 219 Ariz. at 194, ¶ 33.

¶19 This court reviews the denial of a motion for JMOL de novo, ¶ 29 (2015), drawing all reasonable inferences and viewing the evidence in favor of the non-moving party, ¶ 25 (App. 2007).

We review the denial of a Rule 50 motion de novo, ¶ 29 (2015), viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, ¶ 25 (App. 2007).

If there is only one reasonable interpretation, we apply that interpretation, but if the language is ambiguous, we consider such factors as “the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” ().

of Pima, –96 ¶ 18 (2021) (“[W]hen the relevant text allows, we construe statutes to comply with constitutional requirements.”); ¶ 12 (2015) (“If the statute is subject to only one reasonable interpretation, we apply it without further analysis.”); ¶ 11 (2006) (“When the language is clear and unambiguous, and thus subject to only one reasonable meaning, we .

See Schwab, 207 Ariz. at 59 ¶ 15; ¶ 29 (2015) (“The standards for granting or denying a motion for JMOL and a motion for summary judgment are the same.”).

These “statutorily authorized regulation[s] [are] unambiguous [and] ‘we apply [them] without further analysis.’” ¶ 16 (2018) ( ¶ 12 (2015)).

–56 ¶ 8 (2006); ¶ 29 (2015).