Cited by

First, neither party cited the Third Restatement in their briefing, so deciding whether § 14 should be adopted under such circumstances would be “quite unusual and unwise.” ¶ 25 (2015).

at ¶¶ 9, 11; ¶ 7 (2015).

§ 13-3620 ¶25 “[D]uty in Arizona is based on either recognized common law special relationships or relationships created by public policy.” Quiroz, 243 Ariz. at 565, ¶ 14 ( ¶ 20 (2015); Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 144-45, ¶¶ 18, 23).

For example, in a case of a 1–86 ¶ 11 (2015), we “question[ed]” “to the extent it found a duty under Restatement [(Second) of Torts] § 323 without discussing whether that section encompasses economic harm.” Although § 323, companion to § 324A, contemplated liability not to third parties

¶ 7 (2018); ¶ 7 (2015); ¶ 10 (2010)

See, ¶ 7 (2015) ("'[D]uty' is 'an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.'") ( (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 42, at 325-26 (4th ed

See, ¶ 8 (2015) (stating foreseeability is no longer a factor in determining duty); Barkhurst v. Kingsman of Route 66, Inc., ¶ 17 (App. 2014) (citing Gipson and stating that foreseeability “is no longer the proper standard for determining duty in Arizona”).

Although public policy may support the adoption of a 5 SANDERS V. ALGER Opinion of the Court no-duty rule in some circumstances, ¶ 20 (2015), we decline to adopt a rule that patients categorically owe no duty of care to those who provide caregiver services.

“The first element, whether a duty exists, is a matter of law for the court to decide.” Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 ¶ 9, ; , 185 ¶ 7