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Although “the child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding,” ¶ 16 (2016), the court “must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination,” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150-51 ¶ 13 (citation omitted).

“When a current placement meets the child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” ¶ 12 (2016).

“When a current placement meets the child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” ¶ 12 (2016).

¶ 15 (2016) (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 34).

We will “accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” ¶ 9 (2016).

in a light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s findings.” ¶ 2 (2016) (citing Maricopa Cty.

It is 5 MATTHEW J. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court well-established that “a child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding.” - 5, ¶ 16 (2016) (citing Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

At that point, the court’s primary concern “is ‘protecting a child’s interest in stability and security.’” ¶ 15 (2016) (citation omitted).

See Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F. , , 4 ¶ 15, , 356 (2016) ; see generally supra ¶ 9.

¶ 9 (2016); Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

v. Oscar O., ¶ 6 (App. 2004); ¶ 16 (2016).

in a light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s findings.” ¶ 2 (2016) (citing Maricopa Cty.

“Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility, we accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and [we] will affirm a [termination] order unless it is clearly erroneous.” ¶ 9 (2016).

Because a best interests finding may be supported by benefits to the child resulting from a potential adoption that provides the child with stability, –4, ¶ 12 (2016), the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that termination was in A.W.’s best interests.

As such, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court’s best-interests finding, ¶ 2 (2016), and applying our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the court did not err in finding DCS failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that severance of Mother’s parental rights at this time is in A.R.’s best interests.

¶ 9 (2016); see also Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 18 (2018).