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¶94 “A legal father is one who was married to the mother between the time of conception and birth, has adopted the child, or has legally established paternity.” ¶ 13 (2016) (second emphasis added).

¶14 A potential father is “a man, identified by the mother in an affidavit, who is or could be the father of the child, but whose paternity has not been established.”

should be read together and harmonized.” ¶ 9 (2016).

Instead, he argues that, he is excused from that affidavit requirement and is a potential father.

(“A putative father is a man who is or claims to be the father of the child and whose paternity has not been established.”).

¶21 We reiterate that the statutes address “two categories of fathers who are entitled to notice of the filing of adoption proceedings,” ¶ 14 (2016), and emphasize the legislature’s addition of the putative fathers statute to the potential fathers statute.

¶ 14 (2016) (“A potential father is a man, identified by the mother in the affidavit, who is or could be the father of the child, but whose paternity has not been established.”); Juv.

“Statutes that are…of the same subject or general purpose [] should be read together and harmonized when possible.” ¶ 9 (2016) (citation omitted).

¶ 9 (2016) (“Statutes that are in pari materia—those of the same subject or general purpose—should be read together and harmonized when possible.”); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 252 (2012) (“Any word or phrase that comes before a court for interpretatio

Fund, ¶ 18 (App. 1999)); ¶ 7 (2017) (“In construing a specific provision, we look to the statute as a whole and we may also consider statutes that are in pari materia—of the same subject or general purpose—for guidance and to give effect to all of the provisions involved.” ( ¶ 9 (2016))).

Statutes that address the same subject or general purpose “should be read together and harmonized when possible.” ¶ 9 (2016).

¶19 The presumption of § 25-327, addressing when a modification or termination of support should generally become effective, must be read in harmony with the rest of that section, which provides that a support order “may be modified or terminated only on a showing of changed circumstances that are substantial and continuing.” ¶ 9 (2016) (related statutes “should be read together and 7 AMADORE v. LIFGREN Opinion of the Court harmonized when possible”).

¶ 7 (2017) ( ¶ 9 (2016); J.D.

See, ¶ 5 (2016) (addressing merits of motion to set aside adoption); Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

¶ 9, (“Statutes that are in pari materia—those of the same subject or general purpose—should be read together and harmonized when possible.”).

“We review an adoption order for an abuse of discretion, and issues of law, including statutory interpretation, de novo.” (citation omitted).