Cited by

Tr., (citation omitted).

Tr., ¶ 15 (App. 2002) (oral agreements still binding if they anticipate a written document memorializing the terms).

Tr., Jeffries v. First Fed.

Tr., (“What is operative is the objective manifestations of assent by the parties.”); Hartford v. Indus.

Tr., (“What is operative is the objective manifestations of assent by the parties.”); Hartford v. Indus.

Tr., (“[B]efore a binding contract is formed, the parties must mutually consent to all material terms.

See Hill-Shafer P’–74 (1990)

Tr., (describing mutual mistake and lack of mutual assent).

See Johnson v. Earnhardt’s Gilbert Dodge, Inc., ¶ 10 (2006) (“A contract is ‘a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.’”) (internal citation omitted); Hill-Shafer P’ (explaining that an agreement is not enforceable if its material terms are not certain).

("[M]utual assent is based on objective evidence, not on the hidden intent of the parties.").

because, even conceding its truth, it leads to an inevitable legal conclusion against its proponent.” Hill-Shafer P’

Comm’n, (citing Hill-Shafer P’).

An agreement is formed only when a manifestation of mutual assent occurs “based on objective evidence, not the hidden intent of the parties.” Hill-Shafer P’

See Hill-Shafer P’ (courts view evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in light most favorable to party opposing summary judgment).

See Hill- Shafer P’ (stating that parties to a contract “must mutually consent to all material terms” to form a binding contract).

HillShafer P’ , Unique Equip.