Cited by

See Stummer, 219 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 16 (“For example, in being ‘responsible for the abuse’ of the right to speak, write, and publish on ‘all subjects,’ one may be held liable for defamation, notwithstanding the right to ‘freely speak.’”); 82 (1991) (holding in a defamation action that Article 2, Section 6 “undeniably imposes responsibility on those exercising their rights to free speech for any abuse thereof”); Truax v. Bisbee Loc., No. 380, Cooks’ & Waiters’ Union, (holding that Article 2, Section

See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 6; (recognizing defamation as unprotected speech); Truax, 19 Ariz. at 394 (characterizing “abuse” as “harm of another” or harm to the public).

And opinions cannot support a defamation claim unless they “would reasonably appear to state or imply assertions of objective fact” as well as “the impression created by the words used as well as the general tenor of the expression, from the point of view of the reasonable person.” (citation omitted).

¶13 With respect to the statements challenged by McCarthy, we “carefully examine every alleged defamatory statement,” and analyze them within their proper context to determine their meaning, Rogers, 252 Ariz. at 342–43 ¶¶ 31–32; accord AMCOR Inv.

In this case, that would include considering the actual and full allegedly defamatory statements included in Defendants’ motions to dismiss, evaluated in their “content and context.”

¶ 1 (App. 2017); (“Given the rigorous scrutiny required by the first amendment,” the court must “carefully examine every alleged defamatory statement .

at 336 ¶ 72 (Cattani, J., dissenting) ().

¶ 1 (App. 2017); (“Given the rigorous scrutiny required by the first amendment,” the court must “carefully examine every alleged defamatory statement .

(describing "important" evidence at defamation trial was the testimony of reporter who interpreted the remark as a defamatory accusation and expert witness opinions "that the remark was susceptible to the interpretation"); cf. Rogers, --- Ariz. at ---, 2020 WL 7223312 at *8, ¶¶ 42-43 (holding that summary j

The “publication must reasonably appear to state or imply assertions of material fact that are provably false.” 4 ¶25 The First Amendment limits state law defamation actions with an organic and “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and 4 We assume without deciding that Young and the Agency are private persons for defamat

Yetman v. English , , 79, , 331 (1991).

¶11 Because this case raises issues concerning the right to free speech, we conduct an “enhanced appellate review” to assure “the foregoing determinations will be made in a manner so as not to constitute a forbidden intrusion of the field of free expression.” 204 (1993) (internal quotation omitted) (–76 (1991)).

¶35 our supreme court established a two-step analysis of when statements are actionable as defamation.

¶28 P.2d 323 (1991), our supreme court set forth the test to determine when statements are actionable as defamation.

(holding that a statement of opinion is protected only if: (1) it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual fact; or (2) it is not provable as false).

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614(2)

- 9 - may be held liable for defamation, notwithstanding the right to “freely speak.” cf. Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380, Cooks’ & Waiters’ Union, 19 Ariz. 379, 394, 171 P. 121, 127 (1918) (noting that Arizona’s constitution does not grant license to defame).

(defamation); , (physician-patient communications); , (election wager); Maricopa County Juv.

In support, , Reinstein; , In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT9065297

To support his argument, , as establishing this two-pronged test to deter *165 mine when statements are actionable as defamation.

See generally, Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, § 6

See, , , 77-78 n. 3, 81 n. 7, , 329-30 n. 3, 333 n. 7 (1991); Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.

328 (1991) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 , 104 S.Ct.