Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite City of Flagstaff v. Mangum, 793 P.2d 548.
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GALLERY v. K HOVNANIAN
Ariz. 2026
But “[l]egislative history is not a substitute for clear legislative language.” ¶ 15 (2022); (“Rejection by the house or senate, or both, of a proposed bill is an unsure and unreliable guide to statutory construction.”).
- State of Arizona v. Hon. marner/haniffa Ariz. 2026
- State of Arizona v. Hon. marner/haniffa Ariz. 2026
- Smith v. Fontes/make Elections Fair Ariz. 2025
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Smith v. Fontes/make Elections Fair
Ariz. 2025
at 408 ¶ 67 (Timmer, VCJ., concurring and dissenting in part) (“By deducting the signatures disqualified by the county recorders and also applying the invalidity percentage rate to the total number of eligible signatures initially identified by the Secretary, disqualified signatures are counted twice.”); (“We recognize that the method we have set forth will still result in a percentage of the invalid signatures in the random sample being deducted twice.”).
- State of Arizona v. Edwardo Serrato III Ariz. 2025
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State of Arizona v. Edwardo Serrato III
Ariz. 2025
cf. Scalia & Garner, supra ¶ 15, at 256 (“Statutory history—the statutes repealed or amended by the [enacted] statute under consideration”—“form[s] part of the context of the statute.”).
- State of Arizona v. Hon. James Marner; Hanees Mohamed Haniffa 560 P.3d 338 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
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State of Arizona v. Hon. James Marner; Hanees Mohamed Haniffa
560 P.3d 338
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
(“Where the legislature uses a term within one [subsection] and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded.”).
- Mountainside v. Flagstaff Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
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Mountainside v. Flagstaff
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
rejected a proposed amendment” that would support such an interpretation), (refusing to “speculate on the intent of the legislature in failing or refusing to adopt clarifying amendments [to a statute]” because “one could also argue that the legislature considered the proposed legislation unnecessary”).
- Ager v. a Better Today Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
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Ager v. a Better Today
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
While it is true that courts will not generally read a term into a statute where it is omitted from one provision and used in another, construing A.R.S.
- Carter Oil v. Ador Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
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Carter Oil v. Ador
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
("Where the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded.").
- Vangilder v. Pinal County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
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Vangilder v. Pinal County
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
“[L]egislative history and historical background of an enacted statute provides guidance in ascertaining the intent of the legislature[, but] this principal has no application to proposed, but unenacted, legislation.” ( ) (emphasis in original).
- City of Phoenix v. Orbitz Worldwide Ariz. 2019
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City of Phoenix v. Orbitz Worldwide
Ariz. 2019
(“Where the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded.”).
- Morales v. archibald/phoenix Urban project/bowers/fann 439 P.3d 1179 Ariz. 2019
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Morales v. archibald/phoenix Urban project/bowers/fann
439 P.3d 1179
Ariz. 2019
(stating “[w]here the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded”).
- J. Ball Trust v. Phx Orchard Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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J. Ball Trust v. Phx Orchard
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 15 (2017) ( (quotations omitted)).
- Marianne N. v. dcs/o.N./i.T./a.G. Ariz. 2017
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Marianne N. v. dcs/o.N./i.T./a.G.
Ariz. 2017
(“Where the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded.”).
- David Stambaugh v. Mark Killian 398 P.3d 574 Ariz. 2017
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David Stambaugh v. Mark Killian
398 P.3d 574
Ariz. 2017
(“Where the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded.”).
- State of Arizona v. Hon. hegyi/rasmussen 396 P.3d 1095 Ariz. 2017
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State of Arizona v. Hon. hegyi/rasmussen
396 P.3d 1095
Ariz. 2017
-99 (1990) (“Where the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded.”).
- Scenic Arizona v. City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment 268 P.3d 370 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
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Scenic Arizona v. City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment
268 P.3d 370
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
¶ 47 Normally, “[rjejection by the house or senate, or both, of a proposed bill is an unsure and unreliable guide to statutory construction.” City of Flagstaff v. Mangum, *434
- Ballesteros v. American Standard Insurance 222 P.3d 292 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
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Ballesteros v. American Standard Insurance
222 P.3d 292
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
“Where the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded.”
- Western Agricultural Insurance v. Chrysler Corp. 6 P.3d 768 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
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Western Agricultural Insurance v. Chrysler Corp.
6 P.3d 768
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
(‘Where the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded.”).
- State v. Medina 975 P.2d 94 Ariz. 1999
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State v. Medina
975 P.2d 94
Ariz. 1999
(“Where the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded.”).
- Cuvelier v. Schmitz 974 P.2d 995 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
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Distinguished
Cuvelier v. Schmitz
974 P.2d 995
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
¶ 6 , restricts voting for municipal initiatives to municipal elections.
- Sedona Private Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Sedona 961 P.2d 1074 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
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Sedona Private Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Sedona
961 P.2d 1074
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
a case which dealt with whether local initiative petitions had been timely filed.
- Alliance Marana v. Groseclose 955 P.2d 43 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
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Alliance Marana v. Groseclose
955 P.2d 43
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
§ 19-122(A) permits “any citizen,” not just those of the affected city, town, or county, to challenge the clerk’s refusal to forward petitions and to file suit to uphold a referendum petition, , for the proposition that, in the absence of local legislation prescribing the manner for exercising the referendum power, state law applies.
- Homebuilders Ass'n of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale 925 P.2d 1359 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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Homebuilders Ass'n of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale
925 P.2d 1359
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
(relief by appeal inadequate if it would result in delay beyond scheduled election).
- Saunders v. Board of Pardons & Paroles 847 P.2d 1124 Ariz. 1993
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Saunders v. Board of Pardons & Paroles
847 P.2d 1124
Ariz. 1993
(supreme court will consider moot issue "if significant questions of public importance are presented and are likely to recur”) (citations omitted); Big D Constr.
- First Phoenix Realty Investments v. Superior Court 841 P.2d 1390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
- First Phoenix Realty Investments v. Superior Court 841 P.2d 1390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
- State v. Helffrich 846 P.2d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992