Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Jett v. City of Tucson, 882 P.2d 426.

128 citing documents.

Circle K Stores, Inc. v. Apache County 18 P.3d 713 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Circle K Stores, Inc. v. Apache County 18 P.3d 713 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
City of Tucson v. Consumers for Retail Choice 5 P.2d 934 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
City of Tucson v. Consumers for Retail Choice 5 P.2d 934 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
“Mere commonality of some aspect of subject matter is insufficient,” and the ordinance and the statute must not be “capable of peaceful coexistence.” , vacated in part on other grounds, , -22 , -33 (1994).
Foster v. Irwin 995 P.2d 272 Ariz. 2000
Foster v. Irwin 995 P.2d 272 Ariz. 2000
DISCUSSION ¶3 In construing the statute, our “primary purpose is to effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision and, in the case of an [initiative], the intent of the electorate that adopted it.”
Babe's Cabaret v. City of Scottsdale 3 P.3d 1018 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Babe's Cabaret v. City of Scottsdale 3 P.3d 1018 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
A city may “exercise all powers granted by its charter, provided that the exercise is not inconsistent with either the constitution or general laws of the state.” Rineer, 193 Ariz. at 161-62 , 971 P.2d at 208-9
Calik v. Kongable 990 P.2d 1055 Ariz. 1999
Calik v. Kongable 990 P.2d 1055 Ariz. 1999
“Our primary purpose is to effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision and, in the case of an [initiative], the intent of the electorate that adopted it.”
Union Transportes De Nogales v. City of Nogales 985 P.2d 1025 Ariz. 1999
Union Transportes De Nogales v. City of Nogales 985 P.2d 1025 Ariz. 1999
(noting that preemption must be clear and can occur through state passage of a comprehensive regulatory scheme occupying the “field”).
City of Tucson v. Rineer 971 P.2d 207 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
City of Tucson v. Rineer 971 P.2d 207 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Whiteco Outdoor Advertising v. City of Tucson 972 P.2d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Whiteco Outdoor Advertising v. City of Tucson 972 P.2d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
In Re Cameron T. 949 P.2d 545 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
In Re Cameron T. 949 P.2d 545 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
City of Tucson v. State 957 P.2d 341 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
City of Tucson v. State 957 P.2d 341 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
More recently, , the supreme court reviewed a city charter provision allowing the council to remove a city magistrate to determine whether it was consistent with state law and found the removal of a city magistrate to be a matter of statewide concern.
Industrial Development Authority v. Maricopa County 944 P.2d 73 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Industrial Development Authority v. Maricopa County 944 P.2d 73 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Pima IDA argues that “this Court should focus its analysis upon the recognized public policy considerations, and the consequences of the alternative interpretations.” Our primary focus when interpreting a constitutional provision, however, is on “the intent of those who framed the provision.”
Soto v. Superior Court 949 P.2d 539 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Soto v. Superior Court 949 P.2d 539 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Our interpretation of a constitutional provision must achieve “the intent of those who framed the provision and, in the case of an amendment, the intent of the electorate *455 that adopted it.”
Hancock v. McCarroll 937 P.2d 682 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Hancock v. McCarroll 937 P.2d 682 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Our primary purpose when interpreting a constitutional provision is “to effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision.”
In Re Jett 882 P.2d 414 Ariz. 1994
In Re Jett 882 P.2d 414 Ariz. 1994
This incident triggered two different proceedings: (1) a hearing before the Tucson City Council, which resulted in the removal of Respondent from her office of Tucson City Magistrate and which is the subject of appeal in the companion case, , and (2) the disciplinary action that is the subject of this appeal.