Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Jett v. City of Tucson, 882 P.2d 426.
- Knight v. Fontes Ariz. 2025
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Knight v. Fontes
Ariz. 2025
d Equal Elections Clause has no federal analog and this Court has not previously interpreted the provision, our first task is to determine the meaning of our Constitution’s mandate that elections be “free and equal.” ¶19 “When interpreting the scope and meaning of a constitutional provision, we are guided by fundamental principles of constitutional construction.”
- Transparent Payson v. Town of Payson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
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Transparent Payson v. Town of Payson
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
Co., 170 Ariz. at 383; (“If the language is clear and unambiguous, we generally must follow the text of the provision as written.”).
- Shao v. Phoenix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
- Shao v. Phoenix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
- State v. Burke 553 P.3d 186 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
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State v. Burke
553 P.3d 186
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
¶15 Our primary goal in interpreting Section 36-2862(C)(1)(e) “is to effectuate the electorate’s intent in adopting it.” See Saban Rent-a-Car LLC, 246 Ariz. at 95, ¶ 21 ().
- Harold Vangilder v. ador/pinal County Ariz. 2022
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Harold Vangilder v. ador/pinal County
Ariz. 2022
(noting “publicity pamphlet” was prepared and distributed “to apprise the voters of the purpose and intent behind” the ballot measure).
- State of Arizona v. City of Tucson Ariz. 2021
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State of Arizona v. City of Tucson
Ariz. 2021
¶ 42 (2020) (“Our primary purpose when interpreting the Arizona Constitution is to ‘effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision.’” ().
- State of Arizona v. William Mixton Ariz. 2021
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State of Arizona v. William Mixton
Ariz. 2021
A. ¶28 Our primary purpose when interpreting the Arizona Constitution is to “effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision.”
- Stuart v. Scottsdale Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
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Stuart v. Scottsdale
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
In short, judicial construction is neither necessary nor proper.”
- State of Arizona v. Martin Raul Soto-Fong 474 P.3d 34 Ariz. 2020
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State of Arizona v. Martin Raul Soto-Fong
474 P.3d 34
Ariz. 2020
¶42 Our primary purpose when interpreting the Arizona Constitution is to “effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision.”
- State of Arizona v. David Lee Green 459 P.3d 45 Ariz. 2020
- State of Arizona v. David Lee Green 459 P.3d 45 Ariz. 2020
- Vangilder v. Pinal County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
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Vangilder v. Pinal County
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
-20 (1994) (recognizing the value of “a publicity pamphlet to apprise the voters of the purpose and intent behind the [ballot proposition]” in ascertaining its intended effect); ¶ 16 (1999)
- Brush & Nib v. City of Phoenix Ariz. 2019
- Brush & Nib v. City of Phoenix Ariz. 2019
- Piccioli v. City of Phx. 439 P.3d 830 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
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Piccioli v. City of Phx.
439 P.3d 830
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Indeed, the "city charter is itself of constitutional origin," Jett v. City of Tucson , , 120-21, , 431-32 (1994), because the Arizona Constitution creates the charter city alternative and authorizes adoption of charters.
- Saban Rent-A-Car LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue 434 P.3d 1168 Ariz. 2019
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Saban Rent-A-Car LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue
434 P.3d 1168
Ariz. 2019
See Jett v. City of Tucson , , 119, , 430 (1994).
- State v. Jones 424 P.3d 447 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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State v. Jones
424 P.3d 447
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶22 While consideration of the history and purpose of the AMMA is not necessary to apply its plain language, ¶ 9 (2008) (), an construed together as though they constitute one law.”) ( ¶ 10 (App. 2005)); see also A.R.S.
- State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of tucson/dewit 399 P.3d 663 Ariz. 2017
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State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of tucson/dewit
399 P.3d 663
Ariz. 2017
(removal of city magistrates from office); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 237 , Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 448 , -18 , (pay for police officers’ lu
- Chamber of Commerce v. Hon. kiley/state 399 P.3d 80 Ariz. 2017
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Chamber of Commerce v. Hon. kiley/state
399 P.3d 80
Ariz. 2017
(concluding that when the language of a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, “we generally must follow the text of the provision as written”).
- State v. McCcd Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- State ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa County Community College District Board 395 P.3d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- State v. McCcd Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- State ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa County Community College District Board 395 P.3d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- Hall v. Elected Officials' Retirement Plan 383 P.3d 1107 Ariz. 2016
- EMILY ANN McGUIRE v. STATE OF ARIZONA Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
- McGuire v. Lee ex rel. County of Pima 372 P.3d 328 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
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McGuire v. Lee ex rel. County of Pima
372 P.3d 328
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
“ ‘If the language is clear and unambiguous, we generally must follow the text of the provision as written.’ ” Id.
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EMILY ANN McGUIRE v. STATE OF ARIZONA
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
“‘If the language is clear and unambiguous, we generally must follow the text of the provision as written.’” Id.
- Debra Arrett and Shirley Lamonna v. Julie K. Bower 345 P.3d 129 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
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Debra Arrett and Shirley Lamonna v. Julie K. Bower
345 P.3d 129
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
These principles of construction apply to the interpretation of Arizona’s constitution, requiring us to interpret its provisions “to effectuate the intent of those who framed [them].” see also Tumacacori Mission Land Dev., Ltd. v. Union Pac.
- Hon. Fields v. Elected Officials Retirement Ariz. 2014
- Fields v. Elected Officials' Retirement Plan 320 P.3d 1160 Ariz. 2014
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Fields v. Elected Officials' Retirement Plan
320 P.3d 1160
Ariz. 2014
of the electorate that adopted it.”
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Hon. Fields v. Elected Officials Retirement
Ariz. 2014
of the electorate that adopted it.”
- Parker, Springer Jr., Anderson v. Committee for Sustainable Retirement in Support of Initiative 314 P.3d 100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013