Cited by

Comm’n, ¶ 10 (2000) (“Statutes must contain an express statement of retroactive intent before retroactive application may occur.”); ¶ 14 (1999) (“It is true .

.”); ¶ 73 (2018); ¶ 11 (1999).

See, (considering the effect of a later amendment of the same statute and stating that “to suggest that the 1995 Legislature knows and can clarify what the 1919 or 1974 Legislatures intended carries us past the boundary of reality and into the world of speculation”).

of Maricopa, ¶ 6 (1999) (“We .

County of Maricopa, –10, ¶ 31 (1999).

County of Maricopa, –05, ¶ 14 (1999) (“Declarations of intent may be helpful in interpretation, but the text of a measure must be considered first and foremost.”).

the constitutional application of the statute’s disqualification remedy.2 C. ¶25 The Committee next argues that, even if § 19-118(C) is constitutional, the trial court erred in refusing to quash the subpoenas because Petitioners failed to comply with the statute’s valid service 2 The Committee, –96 ¶¶ 37-40 (1999), asserts in a footnote that “[t]o the extent that A.R.S.

of Maricopa, -10, ¶ 31 (1999) (citing O’ abrogated on other grounds by, Hayes v. Cont’l Ins.

County of Maricopa, ¶ 15 (1999).

Of Maricopa, -10, ¶ 31 (1999) (quoting O’ abrogated on other grounds by Hayes v. Continental Ins.

¶ 6, (alteration in Murray).

Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, ¶ 10, in “some circumstances, a newly enacted statute may clarify ambiguities in an earlier version,” ¶ 30

“[Legislation may not disturb vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.” ¶ 15

And holding that one legislature understood and clarified another legislature’s intent — especially years later — would “carrfy] us past the boundary of reality and into the world of speculation.” ¶ 30 , (in banc).

¶¶ 12-14; ¶¶ 27-33 , -06 (App.2008) (distinguishing primary from secondary conduct for purposes of retroactivity analysis); , (“[Legislation may not disturb vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.”).

at 375 ¶ 6, 982 P.2d at 1289 ( ¶ 15, ).2 ¶14 Senate Bill 1449’s operative provision, in contrast, does not disturb vested rights.

"A vested right 'is actually assertable as a legal cause of action or defense or is so substantially relied upon that retroactive divestiture would be manifestly unjust.’ ” ¶ 15 , (quoting Hall v. A.N.R.

¶ 37 , accord Woods, 189 Ariz. at 276 , 942 P.2d at 435 .

¶ 15 Nonetheless, in support of their argument

Background ¶2 In 2004, Congress enacted the Arizona Water 1 The background facts and procedural history of the Gila River general stream adjudication are provided in several cases, ¶¶ 2-3, and In re Rights to the Use of the Gila River (Gila River I), -33, -45 (1992).