Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Linch v. Thomas-Davis Medical Centers, P.C., 930 P.2d 1304.

17 citing documents.

State v. Botch Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)
State v. Viste Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Flynn v. Hon starr/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
“A law enforcement stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and ‘must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.’” ¶ 7 (App. 2016) (-04 (1997)).
State v. Manzanares Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Generally, “evidence derived from an illegal search or seizure is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ and should be suppressed.” (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
State v. Gutierrez 381 P.3d 254 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
–04 (1997) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
State of Arizona v. Ronald James Sisco II 359 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
(disapproving prior jurisprudence which had stated that police officers who confront “ ‘strange or unusual activities ...
State of Arizona v. Dale Lee Evans 332 P.3d 61 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
¶7 A law enforcement officer’s investigatory stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and “must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” -04, -07 (1997), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (Sokolow II) (investigatory stop permissible when based on “a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that crimi
State v. Grossman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
or had already been committed.” -05, -08 (1997) (citations omitted).
State of Arizona v. Nelson Ivan Boteo-Flores 280 P.3d 1239 Ariz. 2012
Officers cannot act on a mere hunch, State v. Richcreek, 187 Ariz. 501, 505, but seemingly 5 innocent behavior can form the basis for reasonable suspicion if an officer, based on training and experience, can “perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct[,] which would
State v. Guillen 213 P.3d 230 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
(requiring suppression of evidence obtained from police encounter not Ibased on reasonable suspicion)
State of Arizona v. Billie Marie Fornof Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
(“When the blue lights on the patrol car begin to flash, the person being followed does not feel free to ignore them and drive on.”).
State v. Watkins 88 P.3d 1174 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
("[T]he [United States] Supreme Court has held that police officers may approach individuals at random in public places to ask them questions as long as a reasonable person would understand that he or she could refuse to answer.”).
State of Arizona v. Lenny M. Box Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
our supreme court clarified that, although the Fourth Amendment permits officers to engage individuals in Bostick-type questioning in public places in the absence of reasonable suspicion, officers may not stop a car in order to so question the driver, because “[w]hen the blue light
Tornabene v. Bonine Ex Rel. Arizona Highway Department 54 P.3d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Wyman 3 P.3d 392 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
State v. O'MEARA 4 P.3d 383 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
¶ 13 Finally, appellant argues that the duration of his detention while awaiting the dog’s arrival was unreasonable, P.2d 1304 (1997)
State v. Altieri 951 P.2d 866 Ariz. 1997
1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968); , citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct.

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