Cited by

ed on Husband’s “misrepresentations and/or omissions about CAM.” ¶9 Husband moved to dismiss the amended complaint, asserting that because the property division section of the PSA was merged into the decree, Wife’s “only avenue to pursue her purported fraud and misrepresentation claims is in the divorce court, not in this separate and new civil action.” the civil division held that the merger doctrine required Wife to seek relief in the family division, expressly noted that the family division “

–48 (1997); see also In re Matter of Scott, No. 1 CA-CV 24-0698 FC, 2025 WL 905112, at *1, ¶ 7–8 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar.

(citation 4 BROWN v. BROWN Decision of the Court omitted).

To be sure, “parties can modify their 5 DURAN v. TERRONES Decision of the Court independent contracts in any manner they choose and can separately enforce these modifications without regard to whether they would be enforceable via the dissolution decree itself.” –47 (1997).

¶14 The first alternative, when an MSA or provision is “set forth or incorporated by reference in” the decree, is “merger.” & n.1 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting § 25-317(D)); -19 (App. 1984).

¶12 When an agreement merges into the decree, it “is superseded by the decree, and the obligations imposed are not those imposed by contract, but are those imposed by decree, and enforceable as such.” ().

¶¶ 9–12 (1999) (because parol evidence rule does not apply to judgments, it cannot be applied to dissolution decrees); (stating that “‘incorporation’ and ‘merger’ are not synonymous” and addressing the legal consequences of each with respect to marital settlement agreements and dissolution decrees).

Because the MSA explicitly stated that it “shall not be set forth or merged” with the decree and “shall survive as an independent contract of the parties,” it “retain[ed] its independent contractual status and is subject to the rights and limitations of contract law.” Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. at 129, ¶ 10 (“contract law governs” an incorporated property-settlement agreement).

5 JONES v. JONES Decision of the Court Ariz. 243, 246, (“[T]he trial court does not have jurisdiction to modify property settlement provisions unless circumstances exist which justify reopening the judgment.”).

the spousal maintenance agreement retains its independent contractual status and is governed by principles of contract law.”) ().

§ 25-327(A); Schmidt, 168 Ariz. at 498; see Ariz. R. Fam.

Even when based upon consent, the prior agreement of the parties “‘is superseded by the decree, and the obligations imposed are not those imposed by contract, but are those imposed by [the] decree.’”3 ().

(discussing the distinction between terms that merge as contrasted with those that are incorporated); -19 , -38 (App. 1984) (same).