Cited by

¶ 13 (1998) (citing cases).

We review the denial of a new trial for a clear and manifest abuse of discretion, “recognizing [the superior court] ha[s] substantial latitude in deciding whether to upset the [jury’s] verdict.” § 12 (1998)

See Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 51 ¶ 26 (noting appellate court “do[es] not attempt to reweigh the facts” in addressing a superior court’s ruling on a motion for new trial) ( ¶ 23 (1998)).

have 'a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police department in the same circumstances,'" Hogue, 240 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 12 (-82 (1984) (duty may exist when acts by police have "narrowed the obligation owed to the general public into a specific obligation owed" to an individual)); -56, ¶ 26 (1998) (by creating 9-1-1 system, city accepted duty to 2 Beyond gross negligence by Geyser, attributed to the other defendants through respondeat superior, Bottomlee also alleged claims titled

State v. Superior Court (Donaldson), 4 reversed on other grounds, to support her argument that the City may be liable for simple negligence.

-53, 57, ¶¶ 1-10, 37 (1998) (9-1- 1 caller reported that ex-boyfriend had threatened to assault her and was on his way to see her) -50, ¶¶ 16-18 (2017); Austin, 140 Ariz. at 579-83.

¶ 14 (1998), ("[W]here there is a dispute in the evidence from which reasonable [persons] could arrive at different conclusions as to the ultimate facts, we will not disturb the findings of the trial court or the verdict of the jury .

In the State’s view, a new trial is appropriate “only where the verdict is objectively unreasonable, manifestly unfair, or so outrageous as to shock the conscience.” ¶ 23, (“The basic question [the trial judge] must ask is whether the jury verdict is so ‘manifestly unfair, unreasonable and outrageous as to shock the conscience.’”) (citation omitted).

Nevertheless, “[c]ourts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.” ¶ 27, (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry.

izona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1) (2016).3 DISCUSSION ¶6 We review the evidence “in a light most favorable to upholding the jury verdict” and will affirm the judgment, “if any substantial evidence exists permitting reasonable persons to reach [the] result.” ¶ 13 (1998).

- 84 ¶ 9 (App. 2016) ( ¶ 27 (1998)).

See Austin, 140 Ariz. at 579–80, 581–82, 684 P.2d at 151–52, 153–54; –53 ¶¶ 1–7, –51 (1998).

But “verdict size alone does not signal passion or prejudice.” ¶ 36

¶ 2 (App. 2005) ( ¶ 12 (1998)).

Further, we will affirm a jury verdict unless it is “so manifestly unfair, unreasonable and outrageous as to shock the conscience.” , 55 ¶ 23

Consequently, because the trial judge sits as the “ninth juror” in a civil case, ¶ 23, RANDALL et al. v. MARICOPA et al. Decision of the Court 449, 453 (1998), we defer to the court’s ruling, recognizing that the “judge sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of

¶19 Given this broader discretion, some cases describe the judge’s role as “the ‘thirteenth juror’ (the ninth juror in a civil case).” ¶ 23 (1998); Thomas, 104 Ariz. at 412; McBride v. Kieckhefer Associates, Inc., ¶ 20 (App. 2011).

10 DEEPWATER DIVERS, INC. v. WELLS FARGO Decision of the Court granted when the jury’s verdict is “excessive,” the “result of passion or prejudice,” or “not justified by the evidence or contrary to law.” ¶ 22, Ariz. R. Civ.