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And our supreme court has stated that it was enacted “to provide crime victims with ‘basic rights of respect, protection, participation and healing of their ordeals.’” (quoting 1991 Ariz. Sess.

It “extends only so far as necessary to protect rights created by the VBR” that are “unique and peculiar to crime victims.” Brown, 194 Ariz. at 343 ¶¶ 11–12 (citation omitted); n.2 (1998) (stating that the VBR “did not transfer to the legislature the power to enact all procedural and evidentiary rules in criminal cases”); (adopting VBR proponents’ view that legislative rulemaking authority extends only so far as necessary to protect victims’ V

of Maricopa, ¶ 20 (1998) (internal citation omitted).

of Maricopa, ¶ 16 (1998) (“[T]he expression of one or more items of a class indicates an intent to exclude omitted items of the same class.”).

P.2d 763 (1998), he argued he was entitled to interview each of them about statements the other victims may have made, as long as he did not “explore anything with respect to a particular witness’s alleged victimization.” Over the state’s objection, the respondent judge granted Ray’s motion “to allow [Ray] to int

The VBR and its implementing legislation were adopted “to provide crime victims with basic rights of respect, protection, participation” and to aid the “healing of their ordeals.” ¶ 20, (quoting 1991 Ariz. Sess.

The purpose of this provision of the Victims Bill of Rights is to protect the crime victims from having to be deposed or interviewed by the defendant or his representative, thus providing “crime victims with ‘basic rights of respect, protection, participation and healing of their ordeals.’” ¶ 20 , (quoting 1991 Session Laws ch. 229 § 2), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lee, 226 Ariz. at 240 n. 6, 245 P.3d at 923 n. 6.

6 In Champlin v. Sargeant, the Arizona Supreme Court observed that nothing in the VBR gives victims “a blanket right to be shielded from all contact with defendants or their attorneys.”

¶ 16, (“[T]he expression of one or more items in a class indicates the intent to exclude omitted items of the same class.”).

8 ¶13 Here, that purpose is stated clearly and succinctly in the opening language of the VBR: “To preserve and protect victims‟ rights to justice and due process.” the VBR and its implementing legislation were enacted “to provide crime victims with „basic rights of respect, protection, participation and healing of their ordeals.‟” Id., quoting 1991 Ariz. Sess.

Comm’n, (applying doctrine of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” meaning expression of one item implies exclusion of others).

Comm’n, , , (applying doctrine of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” meaning expression of one item implies exclusion of others).

¶ 16 , (statutes shall be construed to give meaning to each word so that no part will be superfluous, void, contradictory, or insignificant).

¶ 16, (discussing the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius – the expression of one item implies the exclusion of others).

¶ 16, (interpreting statutory language requires that the court give meaning “to each word, phrase, clause, and sentence within a statute so that no part will be superfluous, void, contradictory or insignificant”); see also 5

category of offenses to which a justification defense may be invoked.”) (alteration in original) ( ¶ 16 , ).

to provide crime victims with ‘basic rights of respect, protection, participation and healing of their ordeals.’” quoting the “Victims’ Rights Implementation Act,”1 1991 Ariz. Sess.

r the established rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “ ‘the expression of one or more items of a class indicates an intent to exclude all items of the same class which are not expressed.’”

See also Champlin v. Sar *231 geant

Subsequently, , 373 n. 2, n. 2 (1998), we further explained that the legislative rulemaking power under the VBR “extends only so far as necessary to protect rights created by the [VBR] and not beyond.” (Emphasis added.)