Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013.

125 citing documents.

Mayer Unified School and Gadsen Elementary School v. Winkleman, Az State Land Dept... Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Sensing v. Harris 172 P.3d 856 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Sensing v. Harris 172 P.3d 856 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
DISCUSSION ¶ 6 “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued by a court to compel a public officer to perform an act which the law specifically imposes as a duty.” ¶ 11 , (quoting Bd.
Yes on Prop 200 v. Napolitano 160 P.3d 1216 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Yes on Prop 200 v. Napolitano 160 P.3d 1216 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Forty-Seventh Legislature v. Napolitano 143 P.3d 1023 Ariz. 2006
Forty-Seventh Legislature v. Napolitano 143 P.3d 1023 Ariz. 2006
Although “we are not constitutionally constrained to decline jurisdiction based on lack of standing,” ¶ 24, “[c]oncern over standing is particularly acute” when “legislators challenge actions undertaken by the executive branch,” ¶ 20
Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa County 141 P.3d 416 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa County 141 P.3d 416 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
-70, ¶¶ 16-17 , -18 (1998) (denying the Searses standing because they “alleged only generalized harm rather than any distinct and palpable injury”).
Fillmore v. MARICOPA WATER PROCESSING 120 P.3d 697 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Fillmore v. MARICOPA WATER PROCESSING 120 P.3d 697 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
71 ¶ 24, ("[W]e are not constitutionally constrained to decline jurisdiction based on lack of standing.").
Bennett v. Brownlow 119 P.3d 460 Ariz. 2005
Bennett v. Brownlow 119 P.3d 460 Ariz. 2005
Our reluctance to waive the requirement stems in large part from the narrowness of the exception, P.2d 1013 (1998) (plaintiffs’ remote and generalized claim showed no distinct and palpable injury to plaintiffs themselves and did not allege harm of the nature required to achieve standing).
Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc. 108 P.3d 917 Ariz. 2005
Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc. 108 P.3d 917 Ariz. 2005
“To gain standing to bring an action, a plaintiff must allege a distinct and palpable injury.” ¶ 16, (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
Robert Schalkenbach Foundation v. Lincoln Foundation, Inc. 91 P.3d 1019 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Robert Schalkenbach Foundation v. Lincoln Foundation, Inc. 91 P.3d 1019 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
The “general rule is that if the action of a public officer is discretionary that discretion may not be controlled by mandamus.” , (refusing to compel mandamus “if the public officer is not specifically required by law to perform the act”).
Aegis of Arizona, L.L.C. v. Town of Marana 81 P.3d 1016 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Aegis of Arizona, L.L.C. v. Town of Marana 81 P.3d 1016 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
In *563 addition, that injury must be “distinct and palpable,” , such that the plaintiff has a “ ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’ ” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 , 95 S.Ct.
Bennett v. Napolitano 81 P.3d 311 Ariz. 2003
Bennett v. Napolitano 81 P.3d 311 Ariz. 2003
U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Commission 8 P.3d 396 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Commission 8 P.3d 396 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Martin v. Reinstein 987 P.2d 779 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Martin v. Reinstein 987 P.2d 779 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Further, standing is a matter of discretion, and although it is rare, we have waived the standing requirement “in cases involving issues of great public importance that are likely to recur.”