Cited by

¶11 To establish standing, a plaintiff generally “must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Bennett, 206 Ariz. at 525, ¶ 18 (citation omitted); ¶ 16 (1998) (recognizing that a generalized allegation of harm is usually insufficient to confer standing).

¶44 For decades we have steadfastly required a party seeking relief in our courts to “allege a distinct and palpable injury.” ¶ 16 (1998).

Ass’n, ¶ 25 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 16 (1998)).

Tax Liens, ¶ 18 (2023) ( ¶ 17 (2005)); ¶ 16 (1998) (“To gain standing to bring an action, a plaintiff must allege a distinct and palpable injury.” (citation omitted)).

Therefore, “we are not constitutionally constrained to decline jurisdiction based on lack of standing.” ().

The superior court dismissed this claim because “Plaintiffs allege no particularized harm caused by the alleged separation of powers violation.” ¶67 To establish standing in Arizona, plaintiffs must allege “a distinct and palpable injury” that is individualized and not “generalized harm” shared by “a large class of citizens.” ¶ 16 (1998).

¶ 11 (Ariz. 1998) (noting “mandamus [action] will only lie ‘to require public officers to perform their official duties when they refuse to act,’ and not ‘to restrain a public official from doing an act’”).

If such officer is not specifically required to perform the duty or has any discretion as to what shall be done, the writ does not lie.” (citation omitted)); ¶ 11 10 ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY V. RICHER Opinion of the Court (1998) (“Thus, the requested relief in a mandamus action must be the performance of an act and such act must be non-discretionary.”).

However, Arizona courts consistently have required as a matter of judicial restraint that a party possess standing to maintain an action.” ¶ 24 (1998).

The Arizona requirement that plaintiffs establish standing is prudential and constitutes an exercise of judicial restraint.” ¶ 14 (2005) (internal citation omitted) ( ¶ 16 (2003)); ¶ 16 (1998) (discussing “standing to bring an action”).

1; Ariz. Const. art. VI; see, ¶ 24 (1998).

.”); –70 ¶¶ 16–17 (1998) (showing of generalized harm insufficient to confer standing).

It is true that we do so “only in exceptional circumstances, generally in cases involving issues of great public importance that are likely to recur.”

a plaintiff must allege a distinct and palpable injury.” ¶ 16 (1998).

Aegis, 206 Ariz. at 562-63, ¶¶ 18-19 (citations omitted); ¶ 16 (1998).

¶31 To initiate a claim in Arizona, a party must have standing— that is, a plaintiff must allege a “distinct and palpable injury.” ¶ 16 (1998) (citation omitted); see also Workman v. Verde Wellness Ctr., Inc., ¶ 17 (App. 2016).

Sears v. Hull , , 71 ¶ 24, , 1019 (1998).

Sears v. Hull , , 69 ¶ 16, 71 ¶ 24, , 1017, 1019 (1998).

That framing is understandable because this Court has equated the special injury requirement with the plaintiff’s “standing to bring an action to enjoin a public nuisance.” Armory Park, 148 Ariz. at 5; ¶¶ 18–19 (1998).

County of Maricopa, ¶ 8 (2014) ("To have standing, 'a plaintiff must allege a distinct and palpable injury.'" ( ¶ 16 (1998))).

Opinion of the Court litigation itself [to satisfy Article III of the U.S. Constitution].”); Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990) (“[An] interest in attorney’s fees is, of course, insufficient to create a[] case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim.”) (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70-71 (1986)); ¶ 24 (1998) (noting that Arizona courts consistently require standing similar to that imposed by the U.S. Constitution “as a matter of judicia