Cited by

But a procedural statute has no such restriction if it “does not affect an earlier established substantive right.” (); see also Krol

But “the prohibition on retroactive application of statutes is not absolute.” ¶ 8 (2000).

¶ 7 (2000) (“Courts look to the date of the offense, rather than the date of adjudication, to determine retroactivity of application.”).

Although this definition provides an analytical starting point, “the precise dividing line between substance and procedure ‘has proven elusive.’” Seisinger, 220 Ariz. at 92 ¶ 29 ( ¶ 9 (2000)).

87 ¶ 8, (providing that an exception to the general prohibition on retroactive application of statutes is that “a statute does not have impermissible retroactive effect if it is merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right”).

¶ 9, (stating “a substantive law creates, defines, and regulates rights while a procedural one prescribes the method of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.”) (citations omitted).

¶¶ 11, 16, -98 (2000) (criminal statute “may be applied retroactively if it has no effect on the underlying offense or the resulting punishment for that offense” and does not affect “pre-existing substantive rights”); Key, 128 Ariz. at 421-22, 626 P.2d at 151-52 (unlike restoration of “fundamental” civil

court’s application of [the statute] was indeed retroactive, and if so, whether such application is permissible.” ¶ 4

¶ 29, the court stated, “The ultimate question is whether the statute enacts, at least in relevant part, law that effectively „creates, defines, and regulates rights,‟” id.

§ 1-244 under which a statute may nonetheless have “retroactive effect if it is merely procedural.” ¶ 43 , ( ¶ 8 , ).

¶ 29 Athough the basic constitutional principle of separation of powers is easily stated, the precise dividing line between substance and procedure “has proven elusive.” , 88 ¶ 9

¶14 “[A] criminal statute is generally deemed substantive if it ‘“defines a crime or involves the length or type of punishment.”’” quoting Lamb v. Kan.

¶22 “A precise distinction between substantive and procedural rights or interests has proven elusive.” ¶ 9

And, “[a] statute is not impermissibly retroactive if it is merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right.” Gum, , 153 P.3d at 424 , , , (although legislation generally will only apply prospectively, “the rule is otherwise where the legislation is merely procedural in nature and does not affect substantive rights”).

See Mauro, 139 Ariz. at 427, 678 P.2d at 1391; see also In re Shane B., 198 Ariz. 85, 87, ¶ 7, cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 291 (1994) (“Most statutes are meant to regulate primary conduct, and hence will not be applied in trials involving conduct that occurred before their effective date.”) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

Although “[a] precise distinction between substantive and procedural rights or interests has proven elusive,” 2 based on our supreme court’s P.2d 866 (1986), we conclude the relevant change to § 13-205 is substantive.

¶ 8 , affirmed as modified, , (When the juvenile court found a juvenile to be a first-time felony juvenile offender pursuant to statute, the issue was ripe for review even though the juvenile had not yet committed another offense.).

Relying on this court’s opinion in , aff'd as modified, we found no impropriety in retroactive application of the statute because, as in Shane B., the juvenile would face increased punishment only if he reoffended.