Cited by

¶ 21 (2000) (“We simply cannot adopt a rule that encourages lawyers, once their misconduct or inattention has made successful representation of a client unlikely, to abandon the client so that the client can later seek relief under” Rule 60(b)(6).).

Co. v. Cash, Sullivan & Cross, (Rule 37 “deals with the microcosm of discovery problems and permits the court to exercise its discretion in imposing a range of sanctions for the many varieties and degrees of discovery abuses.”), disapproved on other grounds, n.3 (2000).

See, ¶ 6 (2000) (Rule 60(c)(6) “applies only when our systemic commitment to finality of judgments is outweighed by extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice.” (quoting Bickerstaff v. Denny’s Rest., Inc., (internal quotation marks omitted))).

The equitable considerations need to outweigh the “public policy favoring finality of judgments.” ¶ 19 (2000).

But respect for the finality of judgments can give way only “in extraordinary circumstances.” Webb, 134 Ariz. at 186; ¶ 19 (2000) (“Although our trial courts enjoy broad discretion when deciding whether to set aside judgments under Rule 60(c), that discretion ‘is circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of litigation.’” (citation omitted)).

¶36 As an initial matter, we note that to obtain relief under Rule 60(c)(6), “the reason for setting aside [the judgment or order] must not be one of the reasons set forth in the five preceding clauses.” ¶ 6 (2000) (citation omitted).

85(C)(1)(f), (C)(2); ¶ 6, (interpreting Ariz. R. Civ.

‘is circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of litigation.’” ¶ 19, (quoting Waifersong, Ltd. v. Classic Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992)).

See, , 447 ¶ 17, Ariz. Title Ins.

Although this court recognizes the public policy of strong respect for the finality of judgments, Wife’s action under A.R.S.

A)(3)5; Campbell v. Deddens, 93 2 “To obtain relief under Rule 60(c), a movant must show that one of the reasons for relief described in clauses (1) to (6) applies, that she acted promptly in seeking relief, and that her claim was meritorious.” Bickerstaff v. Denny’s Restaurant, Inc., -46 n.3 ¶ 8, –02 n.3 (2000).

For instance, because agency law principles apply to the attorney–client relationship, ¶ 16, C&S’s knowledge about the allegedly abandoned easement may be imputable to DOS.

For instance, because agency law principles apply to the attorney–client relationship, ¶ 16, C&S’s knowledge about the allegedly abandoned easement may be imputable to DOS.

3 DOYLE v. BASHAS’ Decision of the Court harmless errors in favor of disposition on the merits.”); -47, ¶¶ 8-15, -03 (2000) (in the context of Rule 60(c) motion, defendant bound by attorney’s failure to act, even when attorney had arguably neglected and abandoned the case).

¶16 Even assuming prior counsel committed a gross breach of duty, relief is precluded by our Supreme Court’s ¶ 7

¶¶ 14-16, n.3, n.3 (2000).

Co. v. Cash, Sullivan & Cross, -11 , -7 (App.1991), ¶ 7