Cited by

See, ¶ 9 (2021) (discussing a multi-tenant commercial building premises liability claim); –03 (1983) (deciding what duties a municipality owes to pedestrians on its roads); ¶¶ 1–3 (2000) (deciding whether our comparative fault statute preserves vicarious liability for an independent contractor’s negligence on a roadway).

¶18 When a nondelegable duty exists, “the principal is ‘held liable for the negligence of [its] agent, whether [its] agent was an employee, or an independent contractor.’” ¶ 10 (2000) (quoting Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal.

-70 (2000) (explaining that a municipality’s duty to keep its streets reasonably safe for travel is nondelegable).

¶¶ 14–16 (2000); see also § 12-821.01(A) (recognizing that claims against public employers and their employees are distinct by requiring service of separate notices of claim on each).

See Chaney, 148 Ariz. at 573-74 (recognizing that, in respondeat superior cases, dismissal of the servant would prohibit an action against the master because “an act of a servant done in the course of his employment is legally the act of the master”); ¶ 13 (2000) (stating that in vicarious liability cases, fault is only imputed by operation of law).

Id.; ¶ 14 (2000) ("[W]here one has a non-delegable duty, the one with whom the principal contracts to perform that duty is as a matter of law always an agent for purposes of applying the doctrine of respondeat superior.").

of Ariz., Inc., ¶ 9 (2018) (explaining that respondeat superior renders the principal liable for the “negligent work-related actions” of his or her agents); ¶ 7 (2000) (distinguishing between employees and independent contractors for these purposes); see also Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr.

Wiggs v. City of Phoenix , , 371 ¶ 13, , 629 (2000) ; see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217B, cmt.

Vicarious liability results solely from the principal-agent relationship: “those whose liability is only vicarious are fault free - someone else’s fault is imputed to them by operation of law.” ¶ 13 (2000); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217B, cmt.

¶ 10 , (noting that a person who acts as an agent for another can be either an independent contractor or an employee).

¶¶ 16-17, (recognizing the family purpose doctrine as a “form of vicarious liability” that falls within the agency exception in § 12-2506(D)(2)); ¶¶ 13-14, (same regarding the common-law, non- delegable duty doctrine, which UCATA did not abolish).

See, 369 , Mil, 7, 627 (2000); Nelson v. Grayhawk Props.

§ 12-2506[] was limited to that class of joint tortfeasors whose independent negligence coalesced to form a single injury.” ¶ 13

3 delegable duty set forth in Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 198 Ariz. 367

Rather, it is based upon the principle that he must stand good for the wrong of another person.”); Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 198 Ariz 367, ¶ 13, (“[T]hose whose liability is only vicarious are fault free—someone else’s fault is imputed to them by operation of law.”).

¶¶ 18-19.8 ¶¶ 7-10, -28 (2000), in which the City of Phoenix was held vicariously liable for an independent contractor’s negligence in maintaining a streetlight based on the supreme court’s determination that the city had a nondelegable duty to maintain safe streets.

¶ 17 Instead, , State Farm argues that we should impute an agency relationship between Premier and Worldwide for purposes of § 12-2506(D)(2).

¶ 13 , (emphasis added).

¶ 23 “The general rule is that while an employer is hable for the neghgence of its employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is not hable for the neghgence of an independent contractor.” ¶ 7

In making this argument, State Farm principally relies on the supreme court’s

The Nelsons responded that (1) Grayhawk had a duty to safely improve and maintain the roadway after it dedicated the right-of-way, and (2) Scottsdale’s non-delegable duty did not immunize Grayhawk from liability for its own negligence under Wiggs v. City of Phoenix (Wiggs II)

“The general rule is that while an employer is liable for the negligence of its employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor.” , 369 ¶ 7