Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Silva v. Traver, 162 P.2d 615.

66 citing documents.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.W. Ariz. 2025
In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.W. Ariz. 2025
But the effect of a presumption is limited: “Whenever evidence contradicting a legal presumption is introduced the presumption vanishes.” ¶ 27 (App. 2005) (“Prima facie evidence of a particular fact raises a rebuttable presumption of, but does not conclusively establish, that fact.”).
Andrew Mullin v. Brown Chapa Fields Linden Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
Andrew Mullin v. Brown Chapa Fields Linden Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
500, (abolishing common law rule of nonliability for tavern owners for accidents caused by intoxicated patrons); (holding that “the mere presence of the owner in an automobile driven by another does not create any presumption of a master-servant relationship or joint enterprise,” P.2d 615 (1945)).
Golonka v. General Motors Corp. 65 P.3d 956 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Golonka v. General Motors Corp. 65 P.3d 956 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
(acknowledging that evidentiary presumptions can stem from policy and procedural convenience rather than from logic), overruled on other grounds
State v. Nihiser 953 P.2d 1252 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
State v. Nihiser 953 P.2d 1252 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
§ 142 at 321 n. 3, , overruled on other grounds
Norton v. Superior Court 829 P.2d 345 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Norton v. Superior Court 829 P.2d 345 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
1965, 1971 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (“A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts.”); -68 , (Prima facie evidence of a fact constitutes a rebut table presumption to be applied in the absence of contrary evidence.), overruled on *158 other grounds
Wallace Imports, Inc. v. Howe 673 P.2d 961 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Wallace Imports, Inc. v. Howe 673 P.2d 961 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
our supreme court said: It is conceded, and is of course the law in this state, that proof or admission of ownership is prima facie evidence that the driver of a vehicle causing damage by its negligent operation is the servant or agent of the owner and using the vehicle in the business of the ow
State v. Grilz 666 P.2d 1059 Ariz. 1983
State v. Grilz 666 P.2d 1059 Ariz. 1983
at 370 , at 617-18 (“[A] ...
Reed v. Hinderland 660 P.2d 464 Ariz. 1983
Reed v. Hinderland 660 P.2d 464 Ariz. 1983
Appellees respond that “proof or admission of ownership is prima facie evidence that the driver of a vehicle causing damage by its negligent operation is the servant or agent of the owner,” , -17 (1945).
Sheehan v. Pima County 660 P.2d 486 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
Sheehan v. Pima County 660 P.2d 486 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
Hille v. Safeco Insurance Company of America 543 P.2d 474 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Hille v. Safeco Insurance Company of America 543 P.2d 474 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
This is the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court in Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. State Automobile and Casualty Underwriters, supra, , 179 P. 53 (1919), and *355
Universal Underwriters Insurance v. State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters 493 P.2d 495 Ariz. 1972
Universal Under. Ins. Co. v. State Auto. & Cas. Under. 493 P.2d 495 Ariz. 1972
Universal Under. Ins. Co. v. State Auto. & Cas. Under. 493 P.2d 495 Ariz. 1972
Universal Underwriters Insurance v. State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters 493 P.2d 495 Ariz. 1972
Dairyland Insurance Company v. Richards 492 P.2d 1196 Ariz. 1972
Dairyland Insurance Company v. Richards 492 P.2d 1196 Ariz. 1972
Fish v. Industrial Commission 472 P.2d 97 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Fish v. Industrial Commission 472 P.2d 97 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
es including the following: , 185 P. 821 (1919); , 201 P. 95 (1921); , , , , , , In re Gary’s Estate.
Kovrig v. Vasquez 456 P.2d 947 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
Kovrig v. Vasquez 456 P.2d 947 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
it was stated that “* * * the presumption in question disappears entirely whenever evidence has been introduced which would justify a jury in finding the nonexistence of the presumed fact * * ( 63 Ariz. at 372 , 162 P.2d at 619 .)
Arizona Cotton Ginning Co. v. Nichols 454 P.2d 163 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Arizona Cotton Ginning Co. v. Nichols 454 P.2d 163 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
However, it is evident that the trial court believed both parties, although it need not do so
Brewer v. Peterson 453 P.2d 966 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Brewer v. Peterson 453 P.2d 966 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
In re O’Connor’s Estate, , In re Pitt’s Estate
Oana v. Haskell 441 P.2d 259 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
Oana v. Haskell 441 P.2d 259 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
first reason given by the trial court for granting a new trial was that: “ * * * the Court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of Mr. Cady as to the 3i4 seconds time lag from the stop sign to the pavement of South Park Avenue; * * In supporting this order, reliance is taken by the defendants upon the decisions of In re O’Connor’s Estate
Peterson v. Feldman 436 P.2d 169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
Peterson v. Feldman 436 P.2d 169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
State Ex Rel. Herman v. Wilson 420 P.2d 992 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
State Ex Rel. Herman v. Wilson 420 P.2d 992 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wash.2d 122
Norvelle v. Lucas 415 P.2d 478 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Norvelle v. Lucas 415 P.2d 478 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wash.2d 122
Jacobs v. Jacobs 415 P.2d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Jacobs v. Jacobs 415 P.2d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wash.2d 122 , People v. Paramount Citrus Association, 147 Cal.App.2d 399
Anderson v. Kalkbrenner 356 P.2d 408 Ariz. 1960
In Re Pitt's Estate 356 P.2d 408 Ariz. 1960
In Re Pitt's Estate 356 P.2d 408 Ariz. 1960
Anderson v. Kalkbrenner 356 P.2d 408 Ariz. 1960
Mitchell v. Emblade 301 P.2d 1032 Ariz. 1956
Mitchell v. Emblade 301 P.2d 1032 Ariz. 1956
the court properly ignored the law concerning speed in business districts for the reason that there was evidence tending to rebut that the excessive speed was not prudent.