Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Dorsey v. State, 213 P. 1011.
- State v. Geschwind 666 P.2d 460 Ariz. 1983
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State v. Geschwind
666 P.2d 460
Ariz. 1983
Rules of Evidence, rule 404, 213 P. 1011, 1012 (1923).
- State v. Geschwind 666 P.2d 480 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
- State v. Geschwind 666 P.2d 480 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
- State v. Greenawalt 624 P.2d 828 Ariz. 1981
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State v. Greenawalt
624 P.2d 828
Ariz. 1981
213 P. 1011, 1012 (1923): “The general rule is that, in the prosecution of one accused of a particular offense, evidence showing or tending to show the commission by accused of another crime entirely distinct and independent of that for which he is on trial, * * * is neither relevant nor admissible.” While we a
- State v. Dugan 608 P.2d 771 Ariz. 1980
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State v. Dugan
608 P.2d 771
Ariz. 1980
“The general rule in Arizona has long been: * * in the prosecution of one accused of a particular offense, evidence showing or tending to show the commission by accused of another crime entirely distinct and independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same class, is neither relevant nor admissible.’ 213 P. 1011, 1012 (1923).”
- State v. Rose 589 P.2d 5 Ariz. 1978
- State v. Rose 589 P.2d 5 Ariz. 1978
- State v. Swinburne 569 P.2d 833 Ariz. 1977
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State v. Swinburne
569 P.2d 833
Ariz. 1977
The general rule in Arizona is well established: “ * * * in the prosecution of one accused of a particular offense, evidence showing or tending to show the commission by accused of another crime entirely distinct and independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same class, is neither relevant nor admissible.” , 213 P. 1011, 1012 (1925).
- State v. Johnson 569 P.2d 829 Ariz. 1977
- State v. Johnson 569 P.2d 829 Ariz. 1977
- State v. Henderson 569 P.2d 252 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
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State v. Henderson
569 P.2d 252
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
213 P. 1011, 1012 (1923); -17 , -47 (1972).
- State v. Williams 554 P.2d 646 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
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State v. Williams
554 P.2d 646
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
See, e. g., , 213 P. 1011 (1923)
- State v. Jones 546 P.2d 45 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
- State v. Jones 546 P.2d 45 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
- State v. Wehrhan 542 P.2d 1157 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1975
- State v. Wehrhan 542 P.2d 1157 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1975
- State v. Tuell 541 P.2d 1142 Ariz. 1975
- State v. Tuell 541 P.2d 1142 Ariz. 1975
- State v. Latino 540 P.2d 1285 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1975
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State v. Latino
540 P.2d 1285
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1975
a presumption of guilt, on the ground that, having committed one crime, the depravity it exhibits makes it likely he would commit another.” 213 P. 1011, 1012 (1923).
- State v. Miller 537 P.2d 965 Ariz. 1975
- State v. Miller 537 P.2d 965 Ariz. 1975
- State v. Finn 528 P.2d 615 Ariz. 1974
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State v. Finn
528 P.2d 615
Ariz. 1974
criminal nature of which Officer Saccocia was aware.” The general rule in Arizona is : “ * * * in the prosecution of one accused of a particular offense, evidence showing or tending to show the commission by accused of another crime entirely distinct and independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same class, is neither relevant nor admissible.” , 213 P. 1011, 1012 (1923).
- State v. Jaramillo 522 P.2d 1079 Ariz. 1974
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State v. Jaramillo
522 P.2d 1079
Ariz. 1974
1380 (1950); , , 213 P. 1011 (1923).
- State v. Petralia 521 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1974
- State v. Petralia 521 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1974
- State v. Green 518 P.2d 116 Ariz. 1974
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State v. Green
518 P.2d 116
Ariz. 1974
The general rule in Arizona has long been: “* * * in the prosecution of one accused of a particular offense, evidence showing or tending to show the commission by accused of another crime entirely distinct and independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same class, is neither relevant nor admissible.” , 213 P. 1011, 1012 (1923).
- State v. Brewer 507 P.2d 1009 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
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State v. Brewer
507 P.2d 1009
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
213 P. 1011 (1923) for the general rule that other bad acts or crimes cannot be used as evidence to prove the crime at issue, and cites State v. Mercer, 13 Ariz.App.
- State v. Hays 496 P.2d 628 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
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State v. Hays
496 P.2d 628
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
There the court said: “This court has allowed evidence of recent acts or crimes of the accused by the same means or similar manner before or after the commission of the crime charged which are provable for the purpose of showing scheme, plan, intent, and knowledge.” 104 Ariz. at 470 , 455 P.2d at 444 # , 213 P. 1011, 1012 (1923): “[I]n the prosecution of one accused of a particular offense, evidence showing or tending to show the commission by accused of another crime entirely distinct and indep
- State v. Moore 495 P.2d 445 Ariz. 1972
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State v. Moore
495 P.2d 445
Ariz. 1972
The general rule in Arizona has long been: “* * * in the prosecution-'of one aecuséd of a particular offense, evidence showing or tending to show the commis *217 sion by accused of another crime entirely distinct and independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same class, is neither relevant nor admissible.” , 213 P. 1011, 1012 (1923).
- State v. White 494 P.2d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
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State v. White
494 P.2d 714
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
distinct and independent of the one for which he is on trial is inadmissible, , 213 P. 1011 (1923), appellants contend that reversible error was committed in the admission of evidence that White had stolen the car after the es *517 cape.
- State v. Verrue 475 P.2d 939 Ariz. 1970
- State v. Verrue 475 P.2d 939 Ariz. 1970
- State v. Enriquez 475 P.2d 486 Ariz. 1970
- State v. Enriquez 475 P.2d 486 Ariz. 1970
- State v. Parker 470 P.2d 461 Ariz. 1970
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State v. Parker
470 P.2d 461
Ariz. 1970
13 , , that: “ * * * There is no question but that the general rule is 'that, in the prosecution of one accused of a particular offense, evidence showing or tending to show the commission by accused of another crime entirely distinct and independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same class, is neither relevant nor admissible.’ , 213 P. 1011, 1012 .