In Re Abrams

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

In the Matter of: ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. JC-11-0001
HONORABLE THEODORE ABRAMS )
Tucson Municipal Court ) Commission on Judicial
Pima County, State of ) Conduct
Arizona ) No. 10-286
)
)
Respondent. )
)
) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)

Review from the Commission on Judicial Conduct

CENSURE AND SUSPENSION ORDERED
________________________________________________________________

OSBORN MALEDON PA Phoenix
By Mark I. Harrison
Mark P. Hummels
Attorneys for Theodore C. Abrams

COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT Phoenix
By Jennifer M. Perkins
Attorney for Commission on Judicial Conduct

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA Phoenix
By Maret Vessella, Chief Bar Counsel
Shauna R. Miller, Senior Bar Counsel
Attorneys for State Bar of Arizona

________________________________________________________________

P E L A N D E R, Justice

¶1 On May 25, 2011, we entered an order censuring

Theodore Abrams for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct,

permanently enjoining him from serving as a judicial officer in
Arizona, and suspending him from the practice of law for two

years, with an opinion to follow. This is that opinion.

¶2 Abrams was admitted to the Arizona bar in 1990. He

was appointed as a Tucson City Court Magistrate in 2002. In

December 2010, the Commission on Judicial Conduct (“Commission”)

brought formal disciplinary charges against Abrams based on

allegations of sexual harassment. In January 2011, Abrams and

the Commission entered into a Stipulated Resolution in which he

“acknowledge[d] that his conduct warrants removal from the

bench” and agreed to the imposition of a censure and to resign

his judicial position and never again seek or hold judicial

office.

¶3 We granted sua sponte review of the Commission’s

recommendation that we approve the Stipulated Resolution.

Pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 46(d), we invited Abrams

and the State Bar to submit briefs on whether attorney

discipline should be imposed and, if so, the appropriate

sanction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6.1, Section

4 of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona Supreme Court Rule 46(d),

and Commission Rule 29.

I. Facts

¶4 In June 2008, Abrams began an intimate, consensual

relationship with a lawyer (“Attorney A”) whose private practice

included criminal defense work. They engaged in sexual contact

2
for several months and maintained a close personal relationship

through April 2009. During and after the affair, Attorney A

appeared often in cases before Abrams, who neither disqualified

himself nor disclosed the relationship to the parties or other

counsel.

¶5 Attorney A introduced Abrams to an assistant public

defender (“Attorney B”) in July 2008.1 In August 2009, Attorney

B, a recently admitted lawyer, was assigned to cover cases in

Abrams’ courtroom.

¶6 For more than a year, Abrams repeatedly pursued a

sexual relationship with Attorney B, who persistently rebuffed

his advances. Abrams initially made lewd comments and “slurping

noises” to Attorney B. On one occasion, Abrams groped Attorney

B under a table at which they were sitting with others after

work. Between November 2009 and October 2010, Abrams left

Attorney B at least twenty-eight voicemail messages and sent her

at least eighty-five text messages, many of which included

sexual innuendos or explicit sexual content. At least three

voicemail messages contained references to cases in which

Attorney B had appeared before Abrams.

1
Attorney A also introduced Abrams to an assistant
prosecutor (“Attorney C”) in February 2009. Abrams contacted
Attorney C at work to request her personal email address and
subsequently sent her sexually explicit emails. Although
Attorney C appeared before Abrams a few times, she did not
appear before him after February 2009.
3
¶7 In December 2009, Abrams left Attorney B a voicemail

message that even he characterized as “obscene,” in which he

described a sexual act he wanted to perform on her. The next

day, Abrams asked Attorney B to come to his chambers to pick up

some paperwork. While in chambers, Abrams asked Attorney B if

she had received the voicemail message and asked to take her to

a friend’s condominium for sex. She declined. Abrams then

inappropriately touched Attorney B and called her later that day

to repeat the explicit voicemail message.

¶8 Attorney B rejected Abrams’ overtures, telling him

“that a sexual relationship would be improper because of his

position as a judge, her routine appearances in his court, and

the fact that he is married.” At some point, Abrams reminded

Attorney B of her probationary employment status and his

connections in the community.

¶9 In October 2010, Attorney B appeared before Abrams in

her first jury trial. At the end of the state’s case, she moved

to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Abrams became upset in the

courtroom and accused Attorney B of wasting judicial resources,

violating her duty of candor, and committing a fraud on the

court. He denied the motion and declared a mistrial. During an

unrelated proceeding several days later, Abrams criticized

Attorney B in front of court staff and the prosecutor. At

another, unrelated in-court conference, Abrams told Attorney B

4
that he would require her to confirm jurisdiction in future

cases, even though the state bears the burden of establishing

jurisdiction.

¶10 The uncharacteristically harsh and inappropriate

treatment of Attorney B prompted an investigation that resulted

in the Tucson City Attorney’s office filing a sexual harassment

complaint against Abrams in October 2010. A Pima County

Superior Court investigator found that Abrams’ actions against

Attorney B were in retaliation for her rejecting his sexual

advances and telling a mutual friend about them.

¶11 The superior court’s presiding judge upheld the claims

of sexual harassment and retaliation in December 2010. Later

that month, the Tucson City Council voted to remove Abrams from

the bench, effective January 19, 2011. Soon thereafter, the

Commission charged Abrams with judicial misconduct and

instituted formal proceedings. On January 18, 2011, Abrams

resigned from the bench.

II. Judicial Discipline

¶12 The Arizona Constitution authorizes the Commission to

recommend judicial discipline. Ariz. Const. art. 6.1, §§ 3, 4.

Although “we give serious consideration to the Commission’s

findings,” the ultimate authority to discipline a judge lies

with this Court. In re Lorona, 178 Ariz. 562, 563, 875 P.2d

795, 796 (1994).

5
¶13 Because Abrams resigned, the harshest sanction

available in judicial discipline proceedings is censure, see In

re Fleischman, 188 Ariz. 106, 113, 933 P.2d 563, 570 (1997), to

which Abrams agreed in the Stipulated Resolution. Accordingly,

we accept the Commission’s recommendation to approve the

Stipulated Resolution, censure Abrams, and permanently enjoin

him from holding judicial office in Arizona.

III. Attorney Discipline

¶14 In recommending the Stipulated Resolution, the

Commission observed that Abrams’ conduct also “reflects upon his

capacity to practice law.” When a judge resigns from office as

the result of judicial discipline, the judge and State Bar may

recommend “whether lawyer discipline . . . should be imposed

based on the record in the judicial proceeding, and if so, the

extent thereof.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 46(d).2 Abrams argues that

2
For purposes of Rule 46(d), the “record” includes “all
documents filed in a case involving formal [judicial
disciplinary] proceedings.” Ariz. R. Comm’n on Jud. Conduct,
Terminology. Contrary to Abrams’ contention, that record is not
limited to the Stipulated Resolution. Rather, under the
Commission’s rules, the record includes all items presented to
the Commission and later transmitted to this Court (including
the City of Tucson’s sexual harassment complaint, the memoranda
prepared by the Pima County Superior Court’s investigator and
presiding judge, and the compact disc that contains voicemail
messages left by Abrams on Attorney B’s cellular phone). In
contrast, on the State Bar’s motion, this Court previously
struck a declaration by Abrams’ wife, which was attached to a
filing by Abrams in this Court, because it was not before the
Commission, filed in the judicial disciplinary proceeding, or
otherwise part of the record.
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“the most appropriate sanction would be a reprimand and

probation.” The State Bar urges us to impose a lengthy

suspension of Abrams’ license to practice law.

¶15 “The purpose of professional discipline is twofold:

(1) to protect the public, the legal profession, and the justice

system, and (2) to deter others from engaging in misconduct.”

In re Scholl, 200 Ariz. 222, 227 ¶ 29, 25 P.3d 710, 715 (2001).

Attorney discipline also aims “to instill public confidence in

the Bar’s integrity.” In re Phillips, 226 Ariz. 112, 117 ¶ 28,

244 P.3d 549, 554 (2010). Although not meant to punish the

attorney, discipline may have that incidental effect. In re

White-Steiner, 219 Ariz. 323, 325 ¶ 9, 198 P.3d 1195, 1197

(2009); Scholl, 200 Ariz. at 224 ¶ 8, 25 P.3d at 712.

¶16 In assessing sanctions, the Court is guided by the

American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) (2005). Phillips, 226 Ariz. at 117

¶ 29, 244 P.3d at 554 (citing In re Van Dox, 214 Ariz. 300, 303

¶ 11, 152 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007)). ABA Standard 5.2 is

“appropriate in cases involving public officials who engage in

conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”

Under that standard, suspension is appropriate “when a lawyer in

an official or governmental position knowingly fails to follow

proper procedures or rules, and causes injury or potential

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injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.”

ABA Standard 5.22.

¶17 ABA Standard 3.0 prescribes four relevant factors for

determining the appropriate sanction: “(1) the duty violated,

(2) the lawyer’s mental state, (3) the potential or actual

injury caused by the lawyer’s conduct, and (4) the existence of

aggravating or mitigating factors.” Phillips, 226 Ariz. at 117

¶ 29, 244 P.3d at 554. In addition, the Court may “look to

other, similar cases in determining whether the sanction imposed

is proportionate to the misconduct charged.” Van Dox, 214 Ariz.

at 307 ¶ 39, 152 P.3d at 1190 (quoting In re Alcorn, 202 Ariz.

62, 76 ¶ 49, 41 P.3d 600, 614 (2002)).

A. Duty Violated

¶18 Abrams concedes having violated Arizona Supreme Court

Rule 41(c) (failing to “maintain the respect due to courts of

justice”) and Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct (“ER”) 8.4(d)

(engaging in conduct that is “prejudicial to the administration

of justice”). See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42 (containing Arizona

Rules of Professional Conduct). Abrams also violated Rule 41(g)

(unprofessional conduct) and ER 8.4(c) (dishonest and deceitful

conduct).

¶19 In the Stipulated Resolution, Abrams also admitted

that his misconduct violated various provisions in the Code of

Judicial Conduct: Rules 1.2 (failing to “avoid impropriety” and

8
“promote[] public confidence in the independence, integrity, and

impartiality of the judiciary”), 1.3 (“abus[ing] the prestige of

judicial office to advance the [judge’s] personal . . .

interests”), 2.3 (failing to perform judicial duties “without

bias or prejudice” and refrain from sexual harassment), 2.4

(permitting extrajudicial “interests or relationships to

influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment”), 2.9

(engaging in improper ex parte communications), 2.11 (failing to

disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which the judge’s

impartiality might reasonably be questioned”), and 3.1 (engaging

in extrajudicial activities that “interfere with the proper

performance of the judge’s judicial duties” and that “appear

. . . to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or

impartiality or demean the judicial office”). See Ariz. R. Sup.

Ct. 81 (containing Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct). These

violations are grounds for attorney discipline. See Ariz. R.

Sup. Ct. 54(b).

B. Mental State

¶20 “A lawyer’s mental state affects the sanction imposed

for ethical violations.” White-Steiner, 219 Ariz. at 325 ¶ 13,

198 P.3d at 1197. “Because intentional or knowing conduct

threatens more harm than does negligent conduct, it is

sanctioned more severely.” Id.

¶21 Because mental state generally is a question of fact,

9
we normally defer to a hearing officer’s findings. Van Dox, 214

Ariz. at 304 ¶¶ 14-16, 152 P.3d at 1187; see also Ariz. R. Sup.

Ct. 59(l) (“In reviewing findings of fact, the court shall apply

a clearly erroneous standard.”). We are, however, always the

“ultimate trier of fact and law” in disciplinary proceedings.

In re Zawada, 208 Ariz. 232, 236 ¶ 11, 92 P.3d 862, 866 (2004)

(quoting In re Brady, 186 Ariz. 370, 373, 923 P.2d 836, 839

(1996)). Here, the Commission did not conduct an evidentiary

hearing or make findings of fact because of the Stipulated

Resolution. Thus, we may examine the record before the

Commission and, in the first instance, make findings of fact to

determine an appropriate sanction.

¶22 “Knowledge” is “the conscious awareness of the nature

or attendant circumstances of the conduct.” Van Dox, 214 Ariz.

at 305 ¶ 21, 152 P.3d at 1188 (quoting ABA Standards at 13).

Abrams concedes that “he knowingly failed to inform the parties

before him on more than one occasion of his intimate

relationship with [Attorney A,] who appeared before his court on

behalf of criminal defendants.” Abrams does not expressly

concede that his sexual harassment and retaliation against

Attorney B were knowingly committed. Nonetheless, the record

establishes that he knowingly engaged in that misconduct. As

the Pima County Superior Court investigator reported, Abrams

“began to treat [Attorney B] differently in the courtroom” as

10
she “continued to reject his advances.” Attorney B not only

declined those advances, but also warned Abrams that a sexual

relationship would be improper. Abrams was thus aware that his

sexual overtures were both unwelcome and wrong, yet persisted in

calling and harassing Attorney B over an extended time frame.

C. Actual or Potential Injury

¶23 We next consider “the extent of the actual or

potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.” ABA

Standards at 9. “Injury” is the “harm to a client, the public,

the legal system, or the profession which results from a

lawyer’s misconduct.” Id. at 13.

¶24 Abrams’ conduct caused actual injury in several ways.

He subjected Attorney B to repeated, unwanted sexual advances,

which undoubtedly caused stress and anxiety. When she rejected

his overtures and confided in a mutual friend about them, Abrams

retaliated by questioning Attorney B’s competence and

professional integrity in open court, embarrassing, demeaning,

and humiliating her.

¶25 Moreover, Abrams injured the legal system by

exploiting his judicial position in pursuit of sexual

gratification. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 81, Rule 1.3. He

maintained an intimate relationship with Attorney A while she

was appearing in cases before him, despite the obvious conflict

and impropriety and without disclosing the conflict to opposing

11
attorneys and their clients. See id., Rule 2.11. And after

Attorney B repeatedly rebuffed Abrams’ sexual propositions, he

abused his power by retaliating against her from the bench.

“Such misuse of public office destroys public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary . . . .” In re

Jett, 180 Ariz. 103, 108, 882 P.2d 414, 419 (1994).

D. Presumptive Sanction

¶26 Because Abrams knowingly engaged in misconduct that

directly conflicted with his role as a judge, adversely affected

at least one attorney who regularly appeared before him, and

undermined the integrity of the legal system, suspension is the

presumptive sanction. See ABA Standard 5.22. This presumption,

however, may be overcome by “[t]he presence of aggravating or

mitigating factors.” Van Dox, 214 Ariz. at 306 ¶ 31, 152 P.3d

at 1189. We next turn to those factors.

E. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

¶27 ABA Standards 9.2 and 9.3 list aggravating and

mitigating factors to consider in deciding an appropriate

sanction. These factors “need only be supported by reasonable

evidence.” In re Peasley, 208 Ariz. 27, 36 ¶ 36, 90 P.3d 764,

773 (2004).

¶28 The record establishes three aggravating factors.

First, Abrams engaged in a pattern of misconduct over a

significant period of time. See ABA Standard 9.22(c). Second,

12
Abrams committed multiple offenses. See ABA Standard 9.22(d).

Finally, because Attorney B was a new lawyer who regularly

appeared in Abrams’ court, she was a particularly vulnerable

victim. See ABA Standard 9.22(h).

¶29 With respect to mitigation, the record clearly

establishes several mitigating factors, including Abrams’ lack

of a prior disciplinary record, ABA Standard 9.32(a), his

character and prior reputation, ABA Standard 9.32(g), and the

imposition of other penalties, ABA Standard 9.32(k).

¶30 Abrams’ full and free disclosure to the Commission and

cooperative attitude in the judicial disciplinary proceedings

also constitute a mitigating factor. See ABA Standard 9.32(e).

The State Bar challenges this factor because Abrams’ cooperation

enabled him to minimize the Commission’s development of the

record and spared him the embarrassment of a formal hearing.

But Abrams nevertheless settled the case quickly, and by doing

so avoided subjecting his victims to a lengthy, embarrassing

disciplinary process. In addition, Abrams’ cooperation with the

Commission, resignation from his judicial office, and

willingness to expeditiously resolve the judicial disciplinary

charges did not necessarily prevent the Commission from further

investigating the charges and developing a more extensive record

before stipulating to a resolution.

¶31 Based on his uncontroverted averments in the

13
Stipulated Resolution, Abrams claims his misconduct arose from

personal and emotional problems. See ABA Standard 9.32(c). In

2007, Abrams underwent open-heart surgery, after which he became

addicted to pain medication and developed severe depression.

Abrams argues that these problems made it difficult for him to

control his impulses, “affected his judgment,” and “led to

inappropriate relationships and communications.”

¶32 Assuming the factual accuracy of these assertions, we

give them little mitigating weight unless a causal nexus exists

between Abrams’ personal and health issues and his misconduct.

See In re Bowen, 178 Ariz. 283, 287, 872 P.2d 1235, 1239 (1994)

(giving personal and emotional problems “little, if any, weight”

when “no direct causation [existed] between [the attorney’s]

alcoholism and his misconduct”); see also Scholl, 200 Ariz. at

226-27 ¶¶ 25-27, 25 P.3d at 714-15. Other than Abrams’ own

uncorroborated statements, the record contains no evidence of

any such causal link. See In re Augenstein, 178 Ariz. 133, 137-

38, 871 P.2d 254, 258-59 (1994) (concluding that absent any

“medical evidence to corroborate” attorney’s allegation that

personal and “emotional problems caused his misconduct,” record

did not support claim that such “problems constitute a

mitigating factor”).

¶33 Various steps that Abrams took to treat his disorders,

however, show an effort to rectify his misconduct, a mitigating

14
factor. See ABA Standard 9.32(d). In the Stipulated

Resolution, Abrams averred that he sought psychiatric treatment

before the allegations of sexual harassment came to light. And

once Abrams was charged with wrongdoing, he admitted himself to

an intensive substance abuse and psychiatric treatment program.

¶34 Three additional mitigating factors Abrams proposes

are not supported by the record. He asserts that he did not

have a dishonest or selfish motive. See ABA Standard 9.32(b).

But he clearly displayed a selfish motive by pursuing his own

sexual interests without regard for his oath and duties to the

legal system. Abrams claims mental disability and chemical

dependency. See ABA Standard 9.32(i). But this mitigator

requires evidence of a “sustained period of successful

rehabilitation,” id., which is not established here.

¶35 Finally, Abrams asserts remorse as a mitigating

factor. See ABA Standard 9.32(l). Abrams stipulated that his

actions violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and alleged in the

Stipulated Resolution “[d]eep remorse and embarrassment” as a

mitigating factor. But the record does not clearly reflect that

he is remorseful. Cf. Augenstein, 178 Ariz. at 137, 871 P.2d at

258 (“Those seeking mitigation relief based upon remorse must

present a showing of more than having said they are sorry.”

(quotation and alteration omitted)). The memoranda of Pima

County Superior Court’s investigator and presiding judge note,

15
based on that court’s investigation, that “Abrams claims that

[Attorney B] did not necessarily object to [his] sexual

comments,” and “continues to maintain that he does not feel he

was harassing her.”

¶36 Abrams’ mitigation evidence does not overcome the

presumptive sanction of suspension. He admitted to suffering

serious drug addiction and mental health problems, but the

record contains no evidence suggesting he has overcome these

disorders. We do not doubt the sincerity of his efforts to seek

treatment, but the absence of evidence of the success of Abrams’

efforts at rehabilitation diminishes the weight of this alleged

mitigator. See In re Stout, 122 Ariz. 503, 504, 596 P.2d 29, 30

(1979) (“Our primary concern must be the fulfillment of proper

professional standards, whatever the unfortunate cause,

emotional or otherwise, for the attorney’s failure to do so.”

(quotation omitted)); see also Jett, 180 Ariz. at 108, 110, 882

P.2d at 419, 421 (“[U]sing the power of . . . judicial office

for purely personal reasons is grossly improper,” and

“regardless of the reasons, still constitutes willful

misconduct.”).

F. Proportionality Review

¶37 “We may consider the sanctions imposed in similar

cases ‘to preserve some degree of proportionality, ensure that

the sanction fits the offense, and avoid discipline by whim or

16
caprice.’” Phillips, 226 Ariz. at 118-19 ¶ 37, 244 P.3d at 555-

56 (quoting In re Dean, 212 Ariz. 221, 225 ¶ 24, 129 P.3d 943,

947 (2006)).

¶38 No reported Arizona decision addresses the nature and

extent of appropriate attorney sanctions for the type of

judicial misconduct at issue here. But several analogous out-

of-state cases are helpful. In People v. Biddle, a judge who

had an affair with a prosecutor who “occasionally appeared” in

his court and “engaged in various trysts [with that attorney]

both inside and outside the . . . [c]ourthouse” was suspended

from the practice of law for three years after he resigned from

the bench. 180 P.3d 461, 462-63, 465 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2007).

And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, a judge who made lewd

and offensive comments to attorneys, engaged in sexual

harassment in open court, and made sexual advances toward an

attorney during an in-chambers meeting was suspended from the

practice of law for one year. 623 N.E.2d 24, 25-28 (Ohio 1993).

¶39 In arguing against suspension, Abrams cites several

Arizona cases that he claims involved comparable misconduct.

But most of these cases dealt only with judicial discipline and

are thus inapposite. See Fleischman, 188 Ariz. at 113, 933 P.2d

at 570; Jett, 180 Ariz. at 111, 882 P.2d at 422; In re Gumaer,

177 Ariz. 280, 283, 867 P.2d 850, 853 (1994); In re Marquardt,

161 Ariz. 206, 217-18, 778 P.2d 241, 252-53 (1989); In re Ackel,

17
155 Ariz. 34, 43, 745 P.2d 92, 101 (1987), overruled in part by

Jett, 180 Ariz. at 109, 882 P.2d at 420; In re Morales, Ariz.

Comm’n on Jud. Conduct No. 06-154 (Mar. 13, 2007).

¶40 The two Arizona cases Abrams cites in which attorney

discipline was imposed for judicial misconduct also are not

particularly helpful. In Dean, we noted that no attorney

discipline was imposed on a judge for his two-year affair with a

prosecutor who appeared regularly in his court, but that result

was due to a procedural error that deprived us of jurisdiction

to impose attorney discipline, not from a reasoned decision that

such discipline was not appropriate. 212 Ariz. at 221-22 ¶¶ 2-

4, 223-24 ¶¶ 15-22, 129 P.3d at 943-46. And in Scholl, we

suspended a former judge from the practice of law for six months

after his convictions of filing false tax returns and illegal

structuring of currency transactions, offenses committed during

Scholl’s judgeship that arose from his gambling addiction. 200

Ariz. at 223 ¶ 1, 228 ¶ 40, 25 P.3d at 711, 716. In Scholl,

however, the judge’s crimes, although serious, were not

committed in his judicial capacity, the offenses occurred

several years before the disciplinary proceedings, and the judge

had successfully rehabilitated himself from his gambling

addiction. Id. at 223 ¶ 1, 224 ¶ 12, 228 ¶ 40, 25 P.3d at 711-

12, 716.

¶41 The out-of-state cases remain the best yardstick for

18
measuring proportionality. Abrams’ proposal of a reprimand

fails to acknowledge the seriousness of his misconduct and the

harm it inflicted on the legal system. He placed his own sexual

desires above his obligation to “exhibit the highest standards

of honesty and integrity.” In re Savoy, 181 Ariz. 368, 371, 891

P.2d 236, 239 (1995).

¶42 Suspension is thus an appropriate and proportionate

sanction for Abrams’ misconduct, despite his resignation from

the bench and agreement to never again seek or hold judicial

office. See, e.g., Biddle, 180 P.3d at 465; cf. Florida Bar v.

Corbin, 540 So. 2d 105, 106-07 (Fla. 1989) (suspending attorney

for three years after he resigned from the bench, based on his

criminal conviction of attempted sexual activity with a minor

while serving as a judge); In re Brooks, 449 S.E.2d 87, 88 (Ga.

1994) (suspending attorney for three years after he left the

bench, based on multiple misdemeanor convictions of sexual

battery while serving as a judge); In re Higgins, 436 N.Y.S.2d

71, 71-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (suspending attorney for two

years after he resigned from the bench, based on his soliciting

and agreeing to accept sexual favors from a woman whom he

suggested would receive in return favored treatment in his

family court).

G. Length of Suspension

¶43 “Judges are held to higher standards of integrity and

19
ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested

with the public trust . . . . Even in a judge’s personal life,

he or she must adhere to standards of probity and propriety far

higher than those deemed acceptable for others.” James J.

Alfini, Steven Lubet, Jeffrey M. Shaman & Charles Gardner Geyh,

Judicial Conduct and Ethics, at 1-4 (4th ed. 2007). The

judiciary’s authority fundamentally rests “on its reputation for

impartiality.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407

(1989). Nothing threatens public confidence in the courts and

the legal system more than a judge who abuses his power and

exploits the prestige of his office for personal benefit.

¶44 “[T]he judge’s role is so intimate a part of the

process of justice that misbehavior as a judge must inevitably

reflect upon” that person’s fitness to practice law. In re

Mattera, 168 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. 1961); see also ER 8.4 cmt. 5

(Effective Dec. 1, 2003) (“Lawyers holding public office assume

legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A

lawyer’s abuse of public office can suggest an inability to

fulfill the professional role of lawyers.”).

¶45 In their oath of admission, Arizona attorneys pledge

to “maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial

officers,” “abstain from all offensive conduct,” and “at all

times faithfully and diligently adhere to the rules of

professional responsibility and a lawyer’s creed of

20
professionalism.” See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31 (The Oath of

Admission to the Bar), 37(b). The oath of office for Arizona

judges similarly includes a solemn commitment to “faithfully and

impartially discharge the duties of [one’s] office to the best

of [one’s] ability.” Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 26. Abrams’

misconduct violated both oaths, and “[a] violation of his

judicial oath aggravates the offense of disregarding his oath as

a lawyer.” In re Hasler, 447 S.W.2d 65, 65-66 (Mo. 1969)

(quoting State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Conover, 88

N.W.2d 135, 138 (Neb. 1958)) (ordering disbarment of attorney

based on his private meetings and conversations with party while

presiding as judge over her divorce proceeding).

¶46 Abrams engaged in “conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice that brings the judicial office into

disrepute.” Ariz. Const. art. 6.1, § 4. His misbehavior

severely tarnished the justice system and the legal profession.

By abusing his office, Abrams struck at the very heart of the

judiciary’s legitimacy, injuring not just his victims, but the

law as an institution.

¶47 “Faith in public officials is difficult to restore.”

In re Koch, 181 Ariz. 352, 354, 890 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1995).

Judicial misconduct erodes public confidence in our justice

system, and we must help restore the public’s faith in our legal

institutions and deter attorneys from similar misbehavior, two

21
of the primary purposes of professional discipline. To properly

protect the public, we must also ensure that attorneys suffering

from serious mental health issues or drug addiction rehabilitate

themselves before resuming the practice of law. A reprimand or

shorter term of suspension would not adequately address these

objectives. For all of these reasons, we conclude that an

appropriate sanction for Abrams’ misconduct is a two-year

suspension from the practice of law.

IV.

¶48 Having accepted the Commission’s recommendation to

approve the Stipulated Resolution between the Commission and

Abrams, we censure him and permanently enjoin him from again

serving as a judicial officer in Arizona. We also suspend

Abrams’ license to practice law in this state for two years,

effective June 1, 2011.

_____________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice

CONCURRING:

_____________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice

_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice

_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

22
_____________________________________
Robert M. Brutinel, Justice

23