In the Matter of April Arlene Sponsel

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER
OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

APRIL ARLENE SPONSEL,
ATTORNEY N O. 23009,
Respondent.

No. SB-24-0007-AP
Filed April 11, 2025

Appeal of Hearing Panel Opinion and Disciplinary Order from the
Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
The Honorable Margaret H. Downie, Presiding Disciplinary Judge (Ret.)
No. PDJ20239018
AFFIRMED

COUNSEL:

Jonathan A. Dessaules, David E. Wood, Dessaules Law Group, Phoenix,
Attorneys for April Arlene Sponsel

Craig D. Henley, Stacy L. Shuman, State Bar of Arizona, Phoenix, Attorneys
for State Bar of Arizona

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ and JUSTICES BOLICK,
KING, BRUTINEL (RETIRED), * and JUDGE PERKINS* * joined.

* Although Justice Robert M. Brutinel retired prior to the issuance of this
Opinion, he participated in the decision of the Court.
** Justice William G. Montgomery has recused himself from this case.

Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, Judge Jennifer
 IN THE MATTER OF APRIL ARLENE SPONSEL
Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 April Sponsel appealed from a disciplinary panel’s (the
“panel”) decision and order imposing sanctions as a result of her conduct
while employed as a prosecutor. The panel concluded that Sponsel violated
Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct (“ERs”) 1.1 (competence), ER 1.3
(diligence), ER 3.1 (good faith), and ER 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice). The panel, however, did not find that Sponsel
violated ER 3.2 (reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), ER 3.4(a)
(obstruction), ER 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of obligations), ER 3.8(a)
(prosecuting a case the attorney knows is not supported by probable cause),
and ER 3.8(d) (failure to make timely disclosure of exculpatory or
mitigating evidence). The panel suspended Sponsel from the practice of
law for two years and ordered her to pay the State Bar’s costs.

¶2 By decision order, we affirmed the panel’s suspension of
Sponsel from the practice of law for two years and stated that an
explanatory opinion would follow. We agree with the panel that Sponsel
violated ERs 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, and 8.4(d). Although we affirm the panel’s finding
that Sponsel violated ER 3.1, we conclude that it erred in its analysis. We
also affirm the panel’s order requiring Sponsel to pay the State Bar’s costs.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Sponsel worked as a prosecutor at the Maricopa County
Attorney’s Office (“MCAO”) from May 2004, when she was admitted to
practice law in Arizona, until she was placed on administrative leave in
March 2021.

I. October 2020 Protest Cases

¶4 On October 17, 2020, in response to the deaths of George
Floyd in Minnesota and Dion Johnson in Arizona, approximately twenty
individuals gathered in downtown Phoenix to protest the police as part of

M. Perkins of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, was designated
to sit in this matter.
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the “No Justice No Peace Rally” organized by “Freedom 4 The People.” As
this group marched, they chanted phrases such as “Black Lives Matter,”
“All Cops Are Bastards,” “No Fascist USA,” and “No Racist USA.”

¶5 Some protesters wore black clothing and marched in the
middle of streets because the police had barricaded several adjoining roads.
During the march, several protesters carried umbrellas, shined flashlights
at police officers, and moved numerous barricades onto the protest route.
The protesters used the umbrellas “to obscure their identities” and “shield
their activities.” After failing to comply with the police orders to disperse,
eighteen individuals were arrested, including three juveniles. Sponsel was
assigned to charge and prosecute the adult arrestees.

¶6 On October 20, the Phoenix Police Department (“PPD”)
submitted to MCAO over 250 pages of police reports relating to the October
17 protest. Many of these reports, however, were incomplete and had “cut
and paste” characteristics. Later that day, Sponsel filed a direct complaint
in the superior court charging all fifteen adult arrestees with riot, hindering
prosecution, and aggravated assault—each offense a class 5 felony. The
only videos that Sponsel reviewed before filing the complaint were a “short
video compilation prepared by PPD and an AZ Patriots video of the
protest.” 1

¶7 On October 27, Sponsel appeared before a grand jury to add
gang-related charges against all fifteen defendants. Sponsel alleged that the
protesters were members of a gang called “ACAB” (an acronym for the
protest chant “All Cops Are Bastards”). See A.R.S. § 13-105(8) (defining
“[c]riminal street gang”). However, the alleged gang—ACAB—was not
listed in the law enforcement database that documents known gangs, and
the October 17 cases were not provided to PPD’s Gang Enforcement
Unit—a “specialized team of police responsible for identifying and
investigating criminal street gangs and their members.” A City of Phoenix
investigation later “found no credible evidence to support the assertion that
ACAB [was] a criminal street gang, that it organized the protest of
October 17, or was prone to violence.” The investigation also concluded
that law enforcement and prosecutors conflated various social justice
groups and forums “to construct a singular ‘ACAB group.’”

1 AZ Patriots is a self-described conservative organization that conducts
counterprotests.
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¶8 In fact, before filing the charges, Sponsel reviewed several
police reports that expressly indicated that no gang was involved in the
October 17 protest. Sponsel also later admitted that this was the first time
MCAO had sought criminal street gang charges against protesters, and that
charging the protesters with gang offenses “was a novel approach” that
“would likely be newsworthy.”

¶9 During the grand jury presentation, Sponsel compared ACAB
to well-known, violent criminal street gangs such as the Bloods, Crips, Hells
Angels, and Mexican Mafia. Although the grand jury was presented with
gang-related charges against fifteen defendants, Sponsel only referenced
four defendants in detail to the grand jury.

¶10 Sponsel had access to surveillance footage and approximately
150 body-worn camera recordings, but she did not review any of that
footage before the grand jury presentation. Over 100 hours of recordings
were captured from the October 17 protest; however, she only presented an
eight-minute video compilation of the incident prepared by PPD to the
grand jury. Nonetheless, the grand jury returned a true bill and Sponsel
filed an indictment charging each of the fifteen defendants with: conspiracy
to commit aggravated assault, a class 2 felony; 2 riot, a class 5 felony;
unlawful assembly, a class 1 misdemeanor; and obstructing a public
thoroughfare, a class 3 misdemeanor.

¶11 On October 30, MCAO leadership met to review the charges
filed against the October 17 defendants. The meeting focused on the
propriety of indicting the fifteen defendants for gang offenses. After
Sponsel obtained the indictment, several other prosecutors expressed
serious misgivings over the viability of pursuing gang charges. In response
to her colleagues’ concerns, Sponsel stated, among other things, that the
October 17 defendants had participated in previous “riots” in Phoenix, that
photographs of the protesters’ hands with sharpened fingernails were
taken, and an umbrella with a sharpened tip was seized from the
protesters—evidence that purportedly would establish collusion among

2 Regarding this charge, the indictment alleged that each defendant
conspired to commit the offense of participating in a criminal street gang;
assisting a criminal street gang; threatening or intimidating in furtherance
of a criminal street gang; aggravated assault; and/or hindering
prosecution.
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the October 17 defendants and their intent to injure police officers.
Sponsel’s colleagues found these representations to be critically important
to the viability of the gang charges.

¶12 One of the individuals arrested and later named in the
indictment was Ryder Collins, a nurse from Prescott Valley who had
traveled to Phoenix on October 17 to take pictures of the city at sunset. After
taking pictures of various downtown buildings, Collins watched the
protest. As he did this, he walked down a street with two members of the
AZ Patriots. The AZ Patriots members were videotaping the protest, and
their video captured Collins’s conversation with them. On the video, he
explained he was “just doing street photography” when he “saw this shit
pop off.” Sponsel acknowledged that she viewed the AZ Patriots’s video
before filing the criminal charges against Collins.

¶13 After the police arrested Collins, he immediately advised
them that he was unaffiliated with the protest and that he did not hear the
police commands to disperse. While officers booked Collins into custody,
he spoke with several of the other arrestees. One of these individuals
informed police officers that Collins was not part of the protest. In a video
that captured the booking process, a police officer can be heard saying that
Collins was not with the protesters and should not be charged.

¶14 Collins was charged with one count of rioting, along with
other offenses, and spent the night in custody. He appeared in court the
next day and when the judge failed to find probable cause regarding the
riot charge, he was released on his own recognizance.

¶15 In January 2021, Collins’s attorney moved to dismiss, or in the
alternative, to remand to the grand jury for a redetermination of probable
cause. Thereafter, a local television station aired several news stories
critical of MCAO’s decision to charge the October 17 defendants with gang
offenses. Several experienced MCAO prosecutors were concerned by the
media’s criticisms, which prompted further review of the evidence that
Sponsel claimed supported the gang charges.

¶16 Ryan Green, an experienced MCAO gang prosecutor,
reviewed the evidence in the October 17 protest cases and found that,
contrary to Sponsel’s earlier assurances, there were no pictures of protesters
with sharpened fingernails, and the umbrella taken from the protesters did

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not have a sharpened tip. Green also discovered that the October 17
defendants possessed “protest-related signs” and “political
stickers”— evidence that undermined Sponsel’s claim of gang activity and
supported the claim that the October 17 defendants were engaged in a
lawful protest.

¶17 On February 12, 2021, Sponsel gave a presentation to MCAO
leadership and argued that there was sufficient evidence to continue with
the gang charges. Green disagreed with Sponsel’s assessment of the
evidence and later testified at her disciplinary hearing that he “was never
presented with any evidence that would satisfy that [MCAO] had sufficient
evidence to prove the gang charges.” The information presented by
Sponsel suggested that various individuals had simply shown up at the
October 17 protests in response to social media postings.

¶18 After Sponsel’s presentation, MCAO leadership concluded
that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with the gang offenses.
Accordingly, the County Attorney decided to request dismissal of all
charges against the October 17 defendants.

¶19 The superior court dismissed all charges against the
October 17 defendants without prejudice on February 18, 2021. The next
day, MCAO moved to dismiss the charges against Ryder Collins with
prejudice. Shortly thereafter, MCAO placed Sponsel on administrative
leave and began an investigation into other cases she prosecuted in 2020.

II. Other 2020 Cases

A. Charles Walker

¶20 In June 2020, a Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”)
deputy responded to a call about a person who was carrying a pipe and
was suspected of shoplifting sunglasses and a pen. When the deputy
approached a person who matched the description, the person ran away.
After a chase and a struggle, Charles Walker was arrested.

¶21 The arresting deputy had a small puncture wound to his hand
and a pen was found at the location of the arrest. MCSO video footage of
the arrest does not show either a pen or a stabbing, but there were
photographs of the minor injury to the deputy’s hand. When asked how he
was injured, the deputy stated he did not know.
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¶22 MCSO requested that Walker be charged with aggravated
assault, either a class 4 or class 5 felony, depending on the severity of the
deputy’s injury. Sponsel, however, filed a direct complaint charging
Walker with: aggravated assault, a class 2 dangerous felony; resisting
arrest, a class 6 felony; and shoplifting, a misdemeanor.

¶23 The alleged aggravated assault charge required that Walker
intentionally place an officer in reasonable apprehension of imminent
physical injury using a dangerous instrument. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2),
-1204(A)(2), -1204(G). “Dangerous instrument” means “anything that
under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or
threatened to be used is readily capable of causing death or serious physical
injury.” A.R.S. § 13-105(12). Sponsel asserted that the pen found on the
ground after Walker’s arrest was a “dangerous instrument.” Sponsel later
admitted that she did not review the MCSO video or photographs from
Walker’s arrest before filing the direct complaint.

¶24 In August 2020, Sponsel’s colleague presented Walker’s case
to a grand jury using materials Sponsel prepared for him. However,
Sponsel had not reviewed the body camera footage or photographs in
preparing for the grand jury presentation even though they had been
available to her for almost two months. Sponsel also failed to provide
Walker’s counsel with photographs of the deputy’s injury.

¶25 An MCAO review of the case determined that there was no
evidence that Walker used the pen to stab the deputy. And while an
inference from circumstantial evidence could be made that Walker stabbed
the deputy, MCAO concluded that the dearth of evidence did not establish
an adequate basis justifying the class 2 dangerous felony charge.

¶26 Maricopa County Attorney Rachel Mitchell (“Mitchell”) later
reviewed Walker’s case and concluded that it had been overcharged.
Mitchell stated that although the deputy sustained a “small injury” to his
hand, the evidence did not support a class 2 dangerous felony charge.

¶27 On August 5, 2021, MCAO moved to dismiss the aggravated
assault charge against Walker, which the superior court granted. Walker’s
attorney then moved to modify Walker’s release conditions so he could be
released. By that time, Walker had been incarcerated for 412 days.

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B. Richard Villa

¶28 In August 2020, a protest was held in downtown Phoenix.
During the protest, PPD made several arrests that resulted in multiple
individuals being charged with criminal offenses, including Richard Villa.

¶29 Initial law enforcement reports indicated that Villa threw
fencing at police officers. Law enforcement requested that Villa be charged
with a class 6 felony for assaulting a police officer. However, based on those
same reports, Sponsel charged Villa with four counts of aggravated assault,
class 2 dangerous felonies, alleging that he used a fence as a dangerous
instrument. As previously noted, the statutory definition of “dangerous
instrument” is “anything that under the circumstances in which it is used,
attempted to be used or threatened to be used is readily capable of causing
death or serious physical injury.” § 13-105(12).

¶30 Later, PPD body camera video reflected that Villa did not
throw the fence at police. Rather, the video showed that Villa pushed the
fence while the police officers attempted to put it back in place. A section
of the fence fell over, but it did not cause any significant injuries to the
police officers. Sponsel, however, failed to dismiss the class 2 dangerous
felony charges or amend the indictment to support lesser offenses.

¶31 Mitchell testified at Sponsel’s disciplinary hearing that the
grand jury presentation was inaccurate and that the body camera footage
did not support the description of Villa’s conduct that Sponsel provided to
the grand jury. Mitchell stated that the evidence did not support charging
Villa with a class 2 felony.

III. State Bar Disciplinary Proceedings

¶32 In June 2022, following an internal ethics investigation,
MCAO terminated Sponsel’s employment. The results of the investigation
showed that Sponsel engaged in “a disturbing pattern of excessive charging
and a failure to review available evidence.”

¶33 The State Bar filed a two-count disciplinary complaint against
Sponsel in December 2022. In count one, the State Bar alleged that she
violated ERs 1.3, 3.2, 3.3(a), 3.4(a), 3.8(d), and 8.4(d), which involved

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allegations of ethical misconduct pertaining to discovery and disclosure in
criminal proceedings brought several years before the October 2020 protest.
In count two, the State Bar asserted that Sponsel violated ERs 1.1, 1.3, 3.1,
3.2, 3.4(a), 3.4(c), 3.8(a), 3.8(d), and 8.4(d) in prosecuting both the October
2020 protest cases and the cases involving Walker and Villa. The State Bar
and Sponsel moved for partial summary judgment. The presiding
disciplinary judge denied both motions.

¶34 After a seven-day disciplinary hearing in which thirty
witnesses testified, including Sponsel, the panel found that the State Bar
failed to prove the allegations in count one. Regarding count two, the panel
found that Sponsel violated ERs 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, and 8.4(d), but determined that
the State Bar did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that she
violated ERs 3.2, 3.4(a), 3.4(c), 3.8(a), or 3.8(d).

¶35 In considering the appropriate sanction for these violations,
the panel found four aggravating factors and three mitigating factors. With
respect to the aggravating factors, the panel found that Sponsel engaged in
multiple offenses of ethical misconduct, that she refused to acknowledge
the wrongful nature of her conduct, the vulnerability of the victims, and her
substantial experience in the practice of law. The three mitigating factors
consisted of absence of a prior disciplinary record, her character or
reputation, and the imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The panel
found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and
suspended Sponsel from the practice of law for two years.

¶36 Sponsel appealed the panel’s various findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the sanction. 3 In a decision order, we affirmed the
panel’s imposition of a two-year suspension from the practice of law. We
also indicated this Opinion would follow. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to article 3 and article 6, sections 1, 5(3), and 5(6) of the Arizona
Constitution.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review

¶37 “We review the panel’s conclusions of law de novo and its
findings of fact by a clearly erroneous standard.” In re Martinez, 248 Ariz.

3 The State Bar filed a cross-appeal disputing the panel’s disposition
regarding count one but later withdrew its cross-appeal.
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458, 462 ¶ 6 (2020); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 59(j). “Findings are clearly erroneous
if they are not supported by reasonable evidence.” In re Alexander, 232 Ariz.
1, 5 ¶ 11 (2013). Regardless of this deferential standard, “this [C]ourt retains
the ultimate authority to find facts, make conclusions of law, and impose
discipline.” In re Marquardt, 161 Ariz. 206, 215 (1989); see also In re Levine,
174 Ariz. 146, 149 (1993) (“In reviewing disciplinary proceedings . . . we are
an independent trier of both fact and law . . . .”).

II. Professional Misconduct

¶38 The State Bar must prove misconduct by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. at 462 ¶ 6; Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 58(j)(3).
Accordingly, the State Bar must show that it is “highly probable” that the
allegations are true. In re Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 5 ¶ 11.

A. ER 1.1: Competence

¶39 ER 1.1 provides that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.” Comment 5 to ER 1.1 emphasizes that the competent
handling of a legal matter “includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual
and legal elements of the problem,” and that “complex transactions
ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser
complexity and consequence.”

¶40 The panel found that “Sponsel’s knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation were clearly deficient” in the prosecution of
the October 17 defendants, Walker, and Villa. Sponsel asserts that the
panel’s conclusion should be vacated because it adopted the heightened
“reasonable likelihood of conviction” standard in its analysis of the alleged
ER 1.1 violation. We agree with the panel’s determination that Sponsel’s
conduct violated ER 1.1.

¶41 As to the October 17 defendants, the panel correctly found
that Sponsel failed to present individualized evidence to the grand jury as
to each of the fifteen defendants. See Willis v. Bernini, 253 Ariz. 453, 460–61
¶ 24 (2022) (“For a grand jury to return an indictment, it must be convinced
‘from all the evidence taken together . . . that there is probable cause to
believe the person under investigation is guilty of [a] public offense.’”

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(alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting A.R.S. § 21-413)). Here,
Sponsel only mentioned the names of four defendants during her grand
jury presentation, thus failing to provide the personalized consideration
that is required for ethical representation under ER 1.1. Sponsel relied on
an eight-minute PPD video compilation in the grand jury proceedings, and
she admitted that she could not identify each individual in this video
compilation. Sponsel made her presentation in broad terms: she referred to
the defendants as “these guys” and admitted that she “didn’t get into that
much specifics with the grand jury because [she] didn’t feel like [she]
needed to.” There is no indication in the record or even her own testimony
that she presented individualized evidence as to the majority of the
October 17 defendants.

¶42 Sponsel’s preparation before presenting evidence to the
grand jury was similarly deficient. Although over 140 body camera videos
from the October 17 protest were available to Sponsel before her grand jury
presentation, she admitted to only reviewing seven videos. This type of
conduct also lacks the thoroughness required by ER 1.1.

¶43 The panel also properly concluded that Sponsel violated this
ethical rule by failing to carefully assess the unique and untested theory of
seeking criminal street gang charges against the October 17 defendants. A
novel, complex criminal prosecution demands a heightened level of
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation. See In re Wolfram, 174
Ariz. 49, 57 (1993) (“We note and consider that these violations occurred in
the course of representation in a very serious criminal matter. What might
be excusable in handling a traffic violation is not to be tolerated in a charge
such as this.”). Here, the panel correctly determined that, given the novel
and untried theory of charging the October 17 defendants with criminal
street gang charges, ER 1.1 required Sponsel to be “more cautious, more
thorough, and more circumspect” in her preparation of this unique
prosecution.

¶44 Sponsel’s conduct concerning the Walker and Villa
prosecutions suffered from the same deficiencies. In the Walker case,
Sponsel admitted that she did not review the MCSO video or photographs
from that incident before filing the direct complaint. Similarly, in preparing
to present Walker’s case to the grand jury, Sponsel failed to review the body
camera video footage or photographs even though they had been available
to her for approximately two months.

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¶45 Regarding the Villa prosecution, Sponsel eventually agreed
that the body camera video of the incident established that Villa did not
throw the fencing at the police but rather pushed the fencing while the
officers attempted to put it back in place—conduct that did not result in any
significant injuries to the police officers. Had she reviewed the footage
before charging Villa, she would have learned that she lacked a basis for
charging him with a class 2 felony. Generally, a lawyer’s failure to
investigate facts and law necessary to present a claim “crosses the fine line
between simple neglect and conduct warranting discipline.” In re Curtis,
184 Ariz. 256, 262 (1995). Again, this type of conduct is bereft of the
thoroughness required by ER 1.1.

¶46 Sponsel argues that, even in light of these facts, the panel
erred by finding an ER 1.1 violation because it applied incorrect legal
standards, thereby denying her due process. First, she claims that the panel
should have limited its analysis to whether there was “probable cause”—as
articulated in ER 3.8(a)—to charge the October 17 defendants, Walker, and
Villa. Second, she asserts that the panel erroneously adopted the
“reasonable likelihood of conviction” standard—MCAO’s policy for
charging a case. Sponsel misreads the panel’s findings.

¶47 First, Sponsel asserts that the “probable cause” standard
found in ER 3.8(a) is the sole criterion that the panel should apply when
reviewing a prosecutor’s charging decisions for alleged ethical violations.
We disagree.

¶48 To be sure, a prosecutor who charges a case knowing that it is
not supported by probable cause violates ER 3.8(a). See In re Aubuchon, 233
Ariz. 62, 72 ¶ 49 (2013). ER 3.8(a) provides that “[t]he prosecutor in a
criminal case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor
knows is not supported by probable cause.” Sponsel is incorrect, however,
in asserting that we assess all alleged ethical violations regarding a
prosecutor’s charging decision solely for whether the prosecutor’s decision
is supported by “probable cause.” As previously noted, the State Bar
alleged that Sponsel violated ER 1.1’s competence requirement by failing to
act with “thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
representation” regarding the prosecutions of the October 17 defendants,
Walker, and Villa. Whether probable cause supported Sponsel’s charging

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decisions—a debatable proposition—is not part of the analysis in
determining whether her conduct violated ER 1.1.

¶49 Second, Sponsel’s claim that the panel erred when it adopted
the heightened “reasonable likelihood of conviction” standard when
analyzing the ER 1.1 violation is equally unavailing. Sponsel assumes that
because the panel mentioned MCAO’s charging standard in its findings of
fact, it necessarily relied on this standard in concluding that Sponsel
engaged in misconduct. Not so.

¶50 In its order, the panel correctly concluded that “Sponsel did
not competently or diligently evaluate the evidence or competently or
diligently reassess the existence of ‘a reasonable likelihood of conviction’ as
to each individual.” The panel mentioned MCAO’s charging standard only
to illustrate what MCAO’s policy required to proceed with a prosecution
and what was stated in Sponsel’s termination letter—not as an independent
basis for finding ethical misconduct. The panel did not make its finding
that Sponsel violated ER 1.1 because her charging decisions failed to meet
the “reasonable likelihood of conviction” standard; rather, it concluded that
her conduct regarding the prosecutions of the October 17 defendants,
Walker, and Villa was deficient in light of the considerable authority that
prosecutors wield and the concomitant duty to competently evaluate the
propriety of all charges, but particularly those that are new or novel.

¶51 Although the panel found Sponsel’s conduct to be “deficient”
under ER 1.1, we conclude—under our authority to make factual findings
in disciplinary proceedings—that the facts presented here support a finding
that Sponsel’s behavior was more than merely “deficient.” See In re
Marquardt, 161 Ariz. at 215 (stating that this Court retains authority “to find
facts, make conclusions of law, and impose discipline”). Her dilatory
conduct in each of the cases—together with her admissions regarding
failing to review evidence—showed that these prosecutions lacked an
adequate evaluation of existing facts and evidence and an objective
consideration of each of the defendant’s conduct. Sponsel’s conduct here
goes well beyond “deficient”—it constituted a complete disregard of her
ethical obligation to provide competent representation. Sponsel did not
simply stray into an ER 1.1 violation; she engaged in repeated, affirmative
conduct in disregard of her competence obligation. Consequently, there is
clear and convincing evidence that Sponsel violated ER 1.1.

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B. ER 1.3: Diligence

¶52 ER 1.3 states: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client.” “Diligence requires the exercise
of caution and care in the handling of legal matters.” In re Wolfram, 174
Ariz. at 55.

¶53 The panel concluded that, as to the October 17 defendants, the
State Bar proved an ER 1.3 violation because Sponsel “failed to promptly or
diligently assess the propriety of adding gang-related charges, and she
failed to promptly or diligently review information and evidence after the
defendants were indicted.” We agree.

¶54 As noted above, Sponsel appeared before the grand jury to
add gang-related charges against the October 17 defendants. Sponsel
alleged that the protesters were members of a gang called “ACAB”—a
group she informed the grand jury was similar to other violent criminal
street gangs such as the Hells Angels and the Mexican Mafia. The record
here, however, belies that assertion. The police reports about the
October 17 protest that Sponsel reviewed prior to her grand jury
appearance contained no information that linked the protesters to a gang.
In fact, “ACAB” was not listed in the law enforcement database that
documents known criminal street gangs and gang members.

¶55 The panel considered additional evidence that supports its ER
1.3 finding. Collins—one of the October 17 defendants—was charged with
a gang-related offense because he allegedly possessed “ANTIFA
paraphernalia.” During the disciplinary hearing, however, Sponsel
admitted that the ANTIFA paraphernalia seized by police that she
attributed to Collins belonged to another person that was arrested on
October 17—a fact she knew before the charges were dismissed against
Collins in February 2021.

¶56 Concerning Walker and Villa, the panel found that Sponsel
contravened ER 1.3 because she “failed to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in reviewing information available to her—both before and
after she filed the class 2 felony charges.” Once again, we agree.

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¶57 It is uncontroverted that Sponsel did not review the MCSO
video or photographs from Walker’s arrest before charging him with a class
2 dangerous felony offense. Similarly, Sponsel did not review the body
camera video footage or photographs before preparing the grand jury
checklist and draft indictment that was provided to the grand jury in
Walker’s case, even though the evidence had been available to her for
nearly two months.

¶58 It is also undisputed that the body camera video that formed
the basis for Villa’s arrest does not show that he threw the fencing at police.
Rather, the video shows that Villa pushed the fencing while the officers
attempted to put it back in place, and the portion of the fence that fell over
onto the police officers did not result in any significant injuries.
Nonetheless, Sponsel charged Villa with four counts of aggravated assault,
each offense a class 2 dangerous felony.

¶59 We also reject Sponsel’s claim that her heavy caseload
justifiably prevented her from diligently and competently handling the
October 17 protester cases. Though a lawyer’s workload may assist us in
understanding why an attorney lacked diligence in a case, it does not
excuse an attorney’s unethical conduct. See In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. at 56.

¶60 Here, Sponsel’s claim that her workload prevented her from
diligently handling the October 17 protester cases is suspect in light of her
request for the assignment. The panel correctly concluded that if Sponsel
was too busy to provide diligent and prompt representation regarding the
October 17 protester cases, she should not have asked that these cases be
assigned to her. See ER 1.3, cmt. 2 (“A lawyer’s work load must be
controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.”).

¶61 We further conclude, as we did regarding the ER 1.1 violation,
that Sponsel’s behavior in each of these cases constituted more than mere
failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness. Proceeding with
gang-related charges against the October 17 defendants without evidence
to support these offenses constitutes a complete abdication of her
prosecutorial duties. And we reach a similar conclusion regarding the
Walker and Villa prosecutions; her actions here go beyond mere
inadvertent conduct. Thus, there is clear and convincing evidence that
Sponsel violated ER 1.3.

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C. ER 3.1: Meritorious Claims and Contentions

¶62 ER 3.1 prohibits a lawyer from bringing or defending a
proceeding or asserting issues therein “unless there is a good faith basis in
law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which may include a good
faith and nonfrivolous argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law.” The panel found, with little explanation, that Sponsel’s ER
3.1 violation regarding the October 17 defendants “began at the grand jury
stage,” and that she violated the same rule concerning Walker and Villa
because “she lacked a good faith basis for charging them with class 2
[dangerous] felony offenses.”

¶63 In determining whether a lawyer violated ER 3.1, “[w]e apply
an objective standard to assess whether a legal proceeding is frivolous, but
we use a subjective standard to determine whether the lawyer acted in good
faith.” In re Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 5 ¶ 13. “To warrant suspension, the
evidence must demonstrate that the lawyer knowingly violated ER 3.1.” Id.

¶64 We concur in the panel’s determination that Sponsel violated
ER 3.1; however, its analysis is flawed. Specifically, the panel erred by
failing to find that the prosecutions against the October 17 defendants,
Walker, and Villa were frivolous and not brought in good faith. The panel
should also have found that Sponsel knowingly violated ER 3.1.

¶65 Ample evidence supports the finding that Sponsel’s
prosecutions against the October 17 defendants, Walker, and Villa were
frivolous and not brought in good faith. As previously indicated, Sponsel
indicted Collins—an October 17 defendant—on gang-related charges
without any evidence indicating that ACAB was a criminal street gang or
that Collins was a member of this or any other alleged gang. In fact, after
Sponsel indicted the October 17 defendants on gang-related offenses,
several of her colleagues questioned the validity of these charges. Further
investigation into Sponsel’s claims that ACAB constituted a criminal street
gang and that the protesters had sharpened umbrella tips and fingernails at
the October 17 protest revealed that her representations were false and
there was no evidentiary support for the gang charges.

¶66 Regarding the Walker prosecution, Sponsel later admitted
that she indicted him for a class 2 dangerous felony without reviewing the
extant body camera evidence. And as to the Villa prosecution, Sponsel later

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conceded that the event supporting the dangerousness allegation—the
throwing of the fence at police officers—did not occur.

¶67 Lawyers must “inform themselves about the facts of their
clients’ cases and the applicable law and determine that they can make good
faith and nonfrivolous arguments in support of their clients’ positions.” ER
3.1 cmt. 2. Sufficient evidence supports a finding that the charges against
the October 17 defendants, Walker, and Villa were frivolous, and that by
neglecting to review existing evidence before indicting each individual,
Sponsel failed to act in good faith.

¶68 Sponsel argues that the panel erred in its ER 3.1 finding
because a violation of that rule cannot be found unless the prosecutor also
violates ER 3.8(a)’s prohibition against proceeding with a charge
unsupported by probable cause. Sponsel is mistaken. As noted above, ER
3.8(a) prohibits a prosecutor from bringing a charge that is not supported
by probable cause. ER 3.1, however, constitutes a distinct ethical violation.
This rule prohibits a lawyer from bringing an action when she failed to
inform herself about the facts of the case and the applicable law and lacked
a good faith basis and nonfrivolous argument in support of the case.
Sponsel’s interdependent reading of ERs 3.1 and 3.8(a) would preclude a
finding of misconduct by a prosecutor for failing to properly investigate a
case or improperly continuing the prosecution of a case—as she did
here—without a contemporaneous ER 3.8(a) violation. Sponsel’s conflation
of these two rules is improper.

¶69 The evidence also supports a finding that Sponsel’s conduct
against the October 17 defendants, Walker, and Villa constituted a knowing
violation of ER 3.1. “To warrant suspension, the evidence must
demonstrate that the lawyer knowingly violated ER 3.1.” Id. at 5 ¶ 13. “A
lawyer’s motives and knowledge can be inferred from the frivolousness of
a claim.” Id. Recently, we clarified the definition of “knowingly” as it
applies to the rules of professional conduct. In re Witt, 257 Ariz. 39, 50 ¶ 49
(2024). In In re Witt, we adopted the American Bar Association Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) definition of “knowingly,”
which is “the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances
of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish
a particular result.” Id. at 50–51 ¶ 49. Although the definition is not a model
of clarity, we conclude it provides that a lawyer can act “knowingly”

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regardless of whether the lawyer knows that his or her actions violate a
specific ethical rule. Id.

¶70 Here, Sponsel was aware of the nature and attendant
circumstances of her conduct concerning the October 17 defendants that
constituted a violation of ER 3.1. Sponsel went before the grand jury on
October 27 for the purposes of adding gang-related charges to all fifteen
adults arrested on October 17. Before her grand jury appearance, however,
Sponsel knew that no PPD report regarding the October 17 protest
contained facts that reflected gang involvement. In fact, the police reports
that Sponsel reviewed expressly indicated in a designated box that there
was no gang involvement. Sponsel also knew that there was no police
report stating that Collins ran toward officers in an attempt to impede their
arrest of the protesters—the alleged conduct justifying his arrest and
imposition of felony charges.

¶71 In addition, before the grand jury proceeding, Sponsel had
access to surveillance videos and over 148 body camera recordings from the
protest yet failed to review any of this evidence. Out of the 100+ hours of
footage captured at the October 17 protest, Sponsel only presented the
grand jury with an eight-minute compilation video created by law
enforcement. Although witnesses at the disciplinary hearing agreed that
Sponsel likely could not have reviewed all the video footage from the
October 17 protest by October 27, she was not required to seek an
indictment by that date. Even if the constitutional protections for
in-custody defendants compelled Sponsel to present the gang charges to
the grand jury on October 27, nothing prevented her from delaying the
grand jury presentation on the remaining defendants until she had
conducted a more thorough and individualized review.

¶72 Sponsel’s conduct in the Walker and Villa prosecutions also
demonstrates that she knowingly violated ER 3.1. As discussed above,
Sponsel admitted that she did not review the available MCSO video or
photographs from Walker’s arrest before filing the direct complaint. She
also admitted that, before preparing the case to be presented to the grand
jury, she failed to review the evidence despite having nearly two months to
do so. Similarly, Sponsel failed to examine the evidence in the Villa
prosecution. Although she charged Villa with multiple class 2 dangerous
felonies, Sponsel later acknowledged that the factual predicate supporting

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the dangerousness allegation—throwing the fence at police officers—never
occurred.

¶73 The failure to examine evidence before seeking charges
against a defendant, and after obtaining an indictment, is inexcusable for
any prosecutor, much less a prosecutor of Sponsel’s experience. In these
prosecutions, Sponsel repeatedly failed to review existing evidence and
instead proceeded to indict individuals without conducting a complete and
thorough assessment of each individual’s case. And in the October 17
protester cases, Sponsel continued this prosecution in contravention of ER
3.1 even after being confronted with the well-founded concerns about the
case from her experienced colleagues. For all these reasons, we find that
Sponsel knowingly commenced and maintained frivolous prosecutions in
violation of ER 3.1. 4

D. ER 8.4(d): Misconduct

¶74 ER 8.4(d) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
“ER 8.4(d) does not require a mental state other than negligence.” In re
Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 11 ¶ 40. An Arizona lawyer may violate the rule
without committing any other ethical violation. See In re Clark, 207 Ariz.
414, 418 ¶¶ 16–17 (2004). A lawyer’s conduct violates ER 8.4(d) if it causes
injury or potential injury. Id. at 416 ¶ 9 n.3; see id. at 418 ¶ 17.

¶75 The panel found that Sponsel violated this ethical rule
regarding the October 17 defendants, Walker, and Villa by “engag[ing] in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Specifically, the
panel concluded that Sponsel “violated duties owed to her client, to
members of the public, to the legal system, and to the [legal] profession.”
In reaching this conclusion, the panel noted the harm suffered by Collins
and Amy Kaper. 5 Collins testified that he was “terrified” after being
arrested, that this incident “shook his faith in law enforcement,” and
described his arrest and subsequent prosecution as the “hardest time of

4 Although Sponsel’s “knowing” conduct may have also constituted an ER
3.8(a) violation—a claim the panel rejected—the State Bar did not appeal
the panel’s ruling. Accordingly, we do not address this issue.
5 Kaper was also arrested and charged with the same felony offenses as

Collins for participating in the October 17 protest.
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[his] life.” Kaper recounted how this incident diminished her faith in the
justice system. She also stated that she lost her job as a result of her arrest
and prosecution, received death threats because of her alleged involvement
in the October 17 protests, and now suffers from post-traumatic stress
disorder. The eventual dismissal of the cases against Collins and Kaper
does not assuage the lasting and profound harm Sponsel caused in the
process. Additionally, Walker was incarcerated for 412 days before his case
was dismissed, and Villa was charged with a crime without any supporting
evidence and would have served a lengthy prison sentence if convicted.

¶76 The panel also credited County Attorney Mitchell’s
statements that Sponsel’s actions “affected the morale” of the office and
portrayed MCAO as “lacking integrity.” At bottom, the panel found that
“the administration of justice was hampered in these cases by a failure to
thoroughly review the available evidence and/or to make sound decisions
after reviewing such evidence.”

¶77 Sponsel contends that the panel erred by blaming her for
MCAO’s reputational and morale harm and insists that MCAO’s injuries
are the result of its decision to dismiss the case against the October 17
defendants, which she contends was for “optics” purposes.

¶78 We agree that Sponsel’s conduct violated ER 8.4(d). The panel
correctly determined that Sponsel’s actions caused injury to the lives of the
October 17 defendants, Walker, and Villa. By bringing charges without first
reviewing the evidence, and by failing to review the charges as the litigation
progressed, Sponsel caused significant injury to the defendants in these
cases—especially Collins and Kaper. And contrary to Sponsel’s claim,
MCAO’s dismissal of these cases did not cause the harm to its morale or the
public perception of the office. Instead, it is more likely that MCAO’s
subsequent dismissal of the October 17 protest cases rehabilitated its
reputation. Sponsel’s failure to review relevant evidence before bringing
unsupported charges caused injury to the October 17 defendants, Walker,
Villa, the public, and the justice system, and thus there is clear and
convincing evidence that she violated ER 8.4(d).

III. Alleged Due Process and Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 47 Violation

¶79 Sponsel also asserts that the panel violated her due process
rights and Arizona Supreme Court Rule 47(b) by “changing the allegations

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regarding the Walker and Villa prosecutions into entirely different charges
of misconduct.” 6 We disagree.

¶80 Sponsel did not raise this argument to the panel; therefore,
she waived these issues unless the alleged error was fundamental. See
Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 411, 420 (1988). “The
doctrine of fundamental error is sparingly applied in civil cases . . . .” Id.
Fundamental error occurs if it “goes to the very foundation of a case, or
takes an essential right from a party, or deprives a party of a fair trial,
or . . . deprives a party of a constitutional right.” Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 176 Ariz. 383, 387
(App. 1993) (internal citations omitted). To prevail under this standard, the
proponent of the error must establish that both fundamental error and
prejudice occurred. See State v. Strong, 555 P.3d 537, 553 ¶ 45 (Ariz. 2024).

¶81 Because “state bar disciplinary proceedings are adversarial
and quasi-criminal in nature, . . . the requirements of procedural due
process must be met.” In re Brady, 186 Ariz. 370, 373 (1996). “These
requirements include fair notice of the charges made and opportunity for
explanation and defense.” Id. In addition, Arizona Supreme Court Rule
58(a) provides that complaints in state bar disciplinary proceedings must
“be sufficiently clear and specific to inform a respondent of the alleged
misconduct.” See also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1) (incorporated in disciplinary
hearings by Arizona Supreme Court Rule 48(b)).

¶82 Count two of the State Bar’s complaint sets forth the
allegations regarding Sponsel’s misconduct in the Walker prosecution. As
noted above, the State Bar asserts that Sponsel obtained an indictment
against Walker for aggravated assault, a class 2 dangerous felony, among
other charges, in violation of several ethical rules. The complaint specifies
the ethical rules that the State Bar alleges Sponsel violated in the Walker
prosecution.

¶83 The State Bar’s allegations regarding Sponsel’s misconduct in
the Villa prosecution are also described in count two of the complaint. As

6 Rule 47(b) addresses amending pleadings in a disciplinary hearing. Rule
47(b) provides in part that “[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.”
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in the Walker case, the State Bar argues that Sponsel obtained an indictment
against Villa for four counts of aggravated assault, each a class 2 dangerous
felony, in contravention of several ethical rules. The complaint also
indicates the specific ethical rules that Sponsel allegedly violated in the
Villa prosecution.

¶84 Before the disciplinary hearing, Sponsel filed a motion for
more definite statement. In the motion, she argued that the complaint was
lacking specificity and required her to “guess which [e]thical [r]ule
applies . . . and to guess what facts led to alleged violations.”

¶85 In denying Sponsel’s motion, the presiding disciplinary judge
(“PDJ”) concluded:

The State Bar’s 63-page, 272-paragraph complaint is
extremely detailed. After setting forth the factual allegations
pertaining to each count, the State Bar identifies the alleged
ethical violations and offers a concise description of the
conduct corresponding to the alleged rule violation.

¶86 The PDJ added that “[t]he Bar’s complaint is not one that
states only legal conclusions, without any supporting factual allegations”
and noted that Sponsel was able to file a detailed answer to the complaint,
thereby contradicting her claim that the complaint was vague or
ambiguous. Lastly, the PDJ stated that through the discovery and
disclosure process, the parties’ claims and defenses could be further
explored. Thus, Sponsel could “propound discovery requests or seek
additional information” if she could not discern the basis for an alleged
violation. Sponsel, however, never sought further clarification of the
complaint.

¶87 We conclude that the State Bar’s complaint was sufficiently
clear and specific to inform Sponsel of the alleged misconduct and that the
charges were not altered during the proceeding. The alleged ethical
violations were sufficiently pleaded in the complaint, and the State Bar
specifically identified the conduct it deemed actionable throughout the
complaint. Sponsel was not asked to defend against any charges that were
not identified in the complaint, and she was provided an opportunity to
present a defense to each charge. Accordingly, no error, much less
fundamental error, occurred here.

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IV. Alleged Separation of Powers Violation

¶88 Sponsel also contends that the panel violated the separation
of powers doctrine, see Ariz. Const. art. 3, by finding misconduct based
upon its application of an incorrect legal standard. We disagree.

¶89 Article 3 of the Arizona Constitution prohibits any
department of the government from exercising the powers of the other
departments. Ariz. Const. art. 3; Mecham v. Gordon, 156 Ariz. 297, 300 (1988).
Thus, the critical question in a separation of powers claim is whether the
exercise of power by one branch of government usurps the power from
another branch of government. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182
(1992); Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 322 ¶ 105 (App. 1999). The power
to discipline attorneys belongs to the judicial department. See Ariz. Const.
art. 6, § 3; In re Shannon, 179 Ariz. 52, 76 (1994).

¶90 Sponsel correctly notes that the executive branch has
exclusive authority to decide what criminal charges to file. State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85 (1989). She also accurately states that the ethical rules
prohibit a prosecutor from advancing a charge that the prosecutor knows
is not supported by probable cause. See ER 3.8(a). Here, however, Sponsel
incorrectly argues that the panel violated the separation of powers doctrine
by adopting the findings from her MCAO termination letter, which stated
that her charging decisions regarding Walker and Villa failed to meet the
executive branch standard of “reasonable likelihood of conviction,” rather
than focusing on whether her charging decisions were supported by
probable cause.

¶91 Sponsel’s claim fails because, as discussed earlier, the panel
did not base its findings of ethical violations on Sponsel’s failure to meet
MCAO’s “reasonable likelihood of conviction” standard. See supra ¶¶ 40,
46, 49–51. Sponsel’s argument once again incorrectly assumes that, because
the panel’s findings of fact mentioned MCAO’s higher charging standard,
it necessarily relied on that standard when it concluded that she engaged
in misconduct. As noted above, the panel concluded that Sponsel violated
ERs 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, and 8.4(d) because her conduct contravened the specific
requirements set forth in each of those ethical rules. See supra ¶ 50. Thus,
the panel did not usurp an executive branch power when it concluded that
Sponsel had engaged in ethical misconduct.

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V. Sanction Imposed

¶92 The State Bar requests that we affirm the panel’s sanction
suspending Sponsel from the practice of law for two years. Sponsel
contends that she did not engage in ethical misconduct and, therefore, no
sanction is warranted.

¶93 The imposed disciplinary sanction is a question of law that we
review de novo. In re Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 13 ¶ 48. We independently
review the panel’s sanction and do not defer to the panel because this Court
is responsible for deciding the appropriate sanction. Id. In determining the
appropriate sanction, we are guided by the ABA Standards and, when
appropriate, a proportionality analysis. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 58(k); In re
Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 13 ¶ 49.

¶94 “The sanction . . . is tailored to the unique circumstances of
the case.” In re Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 13 ¶ 49. “[ABA] Standard 3.0 lists
four factors for courts to examine in deciding an appropriate sanction: ‘(a)
the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the potential or actual
injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.’” Id.

A. Duty

¶95 We recognize that prosecutors have a “unique role in the
justice system.” In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 8. As a prosecutor,
Sponsel’s duty was “not to seek convictions and sentences but rather to seek
justice.” Id. ¶ 7. She had a duty to “refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction [and] to use all proper
methods to bring about a just conviction.” Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz.
98, 103 (1984). Here, Sponsel failed to carry out this responsibility.

¶96 Accordingly, we concur with the panel’s conclusion that
Sponsel violated her duty to the public by violating ERs 1.1 and 1.3. She
also violated her duty to the justice system by violating ERs 3.1 and 8.4(d).
Consequently, ABA Standards 4.4 (lack of diligence), and 7.2 (violations of
duties owed as a professional) are applicable.

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B. Mental State

¶97 Sponsel’s mental state when she violated her duties to the
public and the justice system affects the presumptive sanction. In re Witt,
257 Ariz. at 49 ¶ 42. The ABA Standards “recommend more severe
sanctions for intentional or knowing misconduct than negligent
misconduct, which threatens less harm.” In re Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 13–14
¶ 52.

¶98 The relevant standards, as identified by the panel, are ABA
Standards 4.42, 7.2, and 7.3. We agree that, applying these standards,
suspension is appropriate. First, Sponsel knowingly filed frivolous
complaints. See ABA Standard 4.42; supra ¶¶ 69–73. Second, Sponsel’s
actions with regards to the October 17, Walker, and Villa cases demonstrate
a pattern of misconduct. See ABA Standard 4.42; supra ¶¶ 69–73. Sponsel
not only failed to review the evidence in one case but failed to do so on
numerous occasions. And third, Sponsel’s knowing violations caused
injury to the public and the justice system. See ABA Standard 7.2.

¶99 Sponsel also asserts that the two-year suspension is improper
and realleges that the panel erred in concluding that she violated ER 3.1
absent a violation of ER 3.8(a). For the reasons previously explained in
discussing Sponsel’s ER 3.1 violation, we reject her argument and again
conclude that Sponsel knowingly violated ER 3.1. See supra ¶ 68.

C. Potential or Actual Injury

¶100 ABA Standards 4.42 and 7.2 each provide that suspension is
the presumptive sanction if a lawyer’s knowing misconduct injures a client
or party. ABA Standard 7.2 also states that suspension is warranted if the
misconduct causes injury to “the public, or the legal system.” The panel
determined that Sponsel’s maintenance of the prosecutions against the
October 17 defendants, Walker, and Villa caused injury to these individuals
and the legal process.

¶101 Sponsel argues that her conduct did not constitute ethical
misconduct and that any injury suffered by MCAO was not caused by her
conduct but was instead the result of MCAO’s decision to dismiss the
October 17 protest cases. She also asserts that the harm to MCAO’s office

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morale and image of integrity was self-inflicted—a result of MCAO’s
dismissal of the cases for “optics” purposes. We disagree.

¶102 As previously explained, Sponsel’s misconduct had
widespread and harmful consequences. See supra ¶¶ 75–78. Collins and
Kaper described the harm they suffered along with their diminished faith
in the justice system. County Attorney Mitchell testified how Sponsel’s
actions damaged office morale and portrayed MCAO as “lacking integrity.”
Gang Bureau Chief Heather Livingstone testified about how Sponsel’s
conduct sowed mistrust about the gang bureau, despite the fact the bureau
had nothing to do with the protester prosecutions. Finally, the record
supports the panel’s finding that “the administration of justice was
hampered in these cases by a failure to thoroughly review the available
evidence and/or to make sound decisions after reviewing such evidence.”
Thus, ample evidence supports the panel’s finding that Sponsel’s
misconduct injured a party and the legal process.

D. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

¶103 Because Sponsel engaged in knowing misconduct that injured
the October 17 defendants, Walker, and Villa, the presumptive sanction in
this case is suspension. See ABA Standards 4.42, 7.2. Imposition of a
sanction, however, requires consideration of any pertinent aggravating and
mitigating factors. In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. at 471 ¶ 54; see also ABA
Standard 9.1.

¶104 The panel found, without elaboration, the existence of four
aggravating factors: (1) “multiple offenses” (ABA Standard 9.22(d)); (2)
“refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct” (ABA Standard
9.22(g)); (3) “vulnerability of victim” (ABA Standard 9.22(h)); and (4)
“substantial experience in the practice of law” (ABA Standard 9.22(i)). It
also found three mitigating factors: (1) “absence of prior disciplinary
record” (ABA Standard 9.32(a)); (2) “character or reputation” (ABA
Standard 9.32(g)); and (3) “imposition of other penalties or sanctions” (ABA
Standard 9.32(k)). Aggravating factors need only be supported by
reasonable evidence. In re Abrams, 227 Ariz. 248, 252 ¶ 27 (2011).

¶105 Sponsel challenges the findings of all aggravating factors
asserting that the claimed misconduct “did not exist,” but she does not offer
any arguments that were not previously rejected. We agree with the panel’s

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findings regarding the applicable aggravating factors. We also concur in
the panel’s finding of mitigating factors. We further observe that the
absence of a prior disciplinary record is often afforded substantial
mitigating weight but that this factor’s weight is diminished when the
lawyer refuses to recognize the wrongfulness of her conduct. See ABA
Standard 9.32(a); see also In re Bemis, 189 Ariz. 119, 122–23 (1997). As the
panel correctly noted, Sponsel refused to acknowledge any misconduct.

VI. Proportionality Review

¶106 When sanctioning lawyers, we may consider the sanctions
imposed in similar cases “to preserve some degree of proportionality,
ensure that the sanction fits the offense, and avoid discipline by whim or
caprice.” In re Dean, 212 Ariz. 221, 225 ¶ 24 (2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting In re Struthers, 179 Ariz. 216, 226 (1994)). We remain
mindful that “our primary obligation is to tailor the discipline according to
the facts in each case.” In re Levine, 174 Ariz. at 174.

¶107 Here, the panel analyzed four attorney discipline cases
involving prosecutors for comparison purposes: In re Peasley, 208 Ariz. 27
(2004); In re Zawada, 208 Ariz. 232 (2004); In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62 (2013);
and In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458 (2020). The panel determined that
Sponsel’s misconduct was not as egregious as the misconduct that resulted
in the disbarment of the prosecutors in Peasley and Aubuchon. The panel
found, however, that Sponsel’s misconduct was substantially more serious
than the misconduct addressed in Zawada and Martinez—in which the
imposed sanctions were suspension and reprimand, respectively.

¶108 After determining that the aggravating factors outweighed
the mitigating factors, the panel found that, given the “immense harm”
caused by Sponsel’s misconduct, a two-year suspension was warranted. It
concluded that this sanction was “necessary to achieve the purposes of the
attorney discipline system—particularly the goals of instilling public
confidence in the integrity of the legal system and deterring similar
misconduct.”

¶109 In arguing against suspension, Sponsel contends that the
panel erroneously relied on Zawada because the six-months-and-a-day
suspension in that case was based on the prosecutor’s intentional

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conduct—a determination the panel failed to make here. Sponsel
misapplies our reasoning in Zawada.

¶110 In addressing Zawada’s mental state for purposes of an
appropriate sanction, this Court found that his conduct was “highly
improper” and provided evidence that his actions were “intentional and
knowing.” Zawada, 208 Ariz. at 238 ¶ 18. Sponsel is correct that the panel
did not find her actions to be intentional, but the evidence presented at the
disciplinary hearing established that Sponsel knowingly failed to assess
relevant evidence—on multiple occasions—before seeking to indict
individuals on serious felony charges. And in one instance, her unethical
conduct resulted in what the panel determined to be “immense harm” to
Walker, who was incarcerated for 412 days before MCAO filed a motion to
dismiss the charges in his case. Although Sponsel did not act intentionally,
she acted knowingly and her actions in these cases were improper and
indefensible.

¶111 Proportionality review is an “imperfect process.” See In re
Owens, 182 Ariz. 121, 127 (1995). However, we agree with the panel’s
analysis and conclude that Sponsel’s sanction is tailored to the unique
circumstances of this case, especially in light of the widespread and harmful
consequences noted above. See supra ¶ 102. Thus, suspension from the
practice of law for two years is a proportionate sanction.

VII. Appropriate Sanction

¶112 In determining an appropriate sanction, we must remember
that the primary objectives of lawyer discipline are “(1) to protect the public
and the courts and (2) to deter the [disciplined] attorney and others from
engaging in the same or similar misconduct.” In re Alexander, 232 Ariz. at 15
¶ 63 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Zawada, 208 Ariz. at 236 ¶ 12). We
have recognized that “[f]ulfilling these objectives promotes confidence in
the integrity of the disciplinary process.” Id. Importantly, though, “[t]he
sanction is not intended to punish the disciplined lawyer.” Id.

¶113 After considering the aggravating and mitigating factors
involved, and comparing similar cases, we conclude that the presumptive
sanction of suspension is warranted. We are also convinced that Sponsel
should be suspended for two years. Such a lengthy suspension is
“necessary to achieve the objectives of lawyer discipline.” Id. at 16 ¶ 65.

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Indeed, nothing less than this sanction would suffice given the
egregiousness of the conduct and the impact on those who were wronged.
Sponsel acted knowingly and should not have engaged in this conduct
given her experience and the concerns raised by her colleagues.

¶114 Unlike the lawyer in In re Alexander, Sponsel did not rely on a
supervising attorney in maintaining a lawsuit that lacked legal and factual
merit. See id. at 7 ¶ 21. Sponsel was a veteran prosecutor for seventeen
years. Her substantial experience made her well aware of the grave
consequences of overcharging a case. Moreover, Sponsel’s misconduct was
not confined to one discrete case. Rather, Sponsel’s ethical violations stem
from multiple cases involving several defendants. For these reasons, we
conclude that the two-year suspension is warranted, and Sponsel must
demonstrate her rehabilitation before reinstatement.

CONCLUSION

¶115 We affirm the panel’s general findings that Sponsel
committed misconduct by violating ERs 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, and 8.4(d). We further
find that Sponsel knowingly violated ER 3.1. We therefore affirm the
panel’s sanction and suspend her from the practice of law for two years.
Sponsel shall also pay the costs and expenses of these proceedings.

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