Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Ceja, 612 P.2d 491.

67 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Edward Littleton McCauley Ariz. 2026
in a wanton, insensate or vindictive manner” or “sadistic”; and “depraved” as “marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deterioration.” Id.; see also, –40 (1980) (using the definitions provided in Knapp to determine whether a murder was especially heinous, especially cruel, or especially depraved).
State v. Murdaugh 97 P.3d 844 Ariz. 2004
State v. Murdaugh 97 P.3d 844 Ariz. 2004
Sansing, 206 Ariz. at 237, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 35 ( , ).
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
Maiming a victim beyond the point necessary to fulfill a defendant’s criminal purpose, , or beyond the point necessary to kill, constitutes gratuitous violence.
State v. Doerr 969 P.2d 1168 Ariz. 1998
State v. Doerr 969 P.2d 1168 Ariz. 1998
1091 , 137 L.Ed.2d 224 (1997)
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
796 , 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980); , ).
State v. Mata 916 P.2d 1035 Ariz. 1996
State v. Mata 916 P.2d 1035 Ariz. 1996
796 , 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980); , ).
State v. Scott 865 P.2d 792 Ariz. 1993
State v. Scott 865 P.2d 792 Ariz. 1993
State v. Kiles 857 P.2d 1212 Ariz. 1993
State v. Kiles 857 P.2d 1212 Ariz. 1993
depraved nature so as to set it apart from the ‘usual or the norm.’ ”
State v. Rossi 830 P.2d 797 Ariz. 1992
State v. Brewer 826 P.2d 783 Ariz. 1992
State v. Brewer 826 P.2d 783 Ariz. 1992
Such conditions “differ in degree from a slow, dull, brain-damaged defendant whose judgment and rationality are marginal.” Walton, 159 Ariz. at 588 , 769 P.2d at 1034 , , (because defendant was not a slow, brain-damaged individual, his personality defects did not require leniency).
State v. Greenway 823 P.2d 22 Ariz. 1991
State v. Greenway 823 P.2d 22 Ariz. 1991
“[t]his is not the slow, dull, [retarded] individual with [a] significantly impaired mental capacity which counsel [seeks] to depict,” but rather, an individual who planned two weeks in advance to rob the victims and carried out this plan.
State v. Lavers 814 P.2d 333 Ariz. 1991
State v. Lavers 814 P.2d 333 Ariz. 1991
See Gillies, 142 Ariz. at 570 , 691 P.2d at 661 (rejecting an argument that we may not consider events before the murder on the issue of cruelty, and noting that “[w]e feel it essential to inquire into the totality of circumstances surrounding the murder to determine whether aggravating factors exist”); -40 , -96 (1980) (rejecting a request to examine each part of the killings as separate and apart, and noting that “it is in the totality of the circumstances” of the killings that we find the kil
State v. Jimenez 799 P.2d 785 Ariz. 1990
State v. Jimenez 799 P.2d 785 Ariz. 1990
State v. Comer 799 P.2d 333 Ariz. 1990
State v. Comer 799 P.2d 333 Ariz. 1990
State v. Robinson 796 P.2d 853 Ariz. 1990
State v. Robinson 796 P.2d 853 Ariz. 1990
re done for pecuniary gain and in a depraved manner); State v. McCall, supra (no mitigating circumstances found; death penalty affirmed upon findings that killings were done for pecuniary gain and in a heinous, cruel, or depraved manner); State v. Gillies (Gillies I), supra (despite defendant’s youth, death penalty affirmed upon finding that the killing was done in a cruel manner); , (no mitigating circumstances shown; death penalty affirmed upon finding that killings were done in a heinous and
State v. Walton 769 P.2d 1017 Ariz. 1989
State v. Walton 769 P.2d 1017 Ariz. 1989
State v. Johnson 710 P.2d 1050 Ariz. 1985
State v. Johnson 710 P.2d 1050 Ariz. 1985
State v. Leslie 708 P.2d 719 Ariz. 1985
State v. Leslie 708 P.2d 719 Ariz. 1985
State v. Gerlaugh 698 P.2d 694 Ariz. 1985
State v. Gerlaugh 698 P.2d 694 Ariz. 1985
State v. Roscoe, supra, 145 Ariz. at 148 , 700 P.2d at 1327 ; State v. Graham, supra, 135 Ariz. at 213, 660 P.2d at 464 (defendant’s prior record revealed no predisposition toward violent crime); , (defendant’s prior record revealed no tendency toward violent crime).
State v. Carriger 692 P.2d 991 Ariz. 1984
State v. Carriger 692 P.2d 991 Ariz. 1984
State v. Clabourne 690 P.2d 54 Ariz. 1984
State v. Clabourne 690 P.2d 54 Ariz. 1984
Gretzler, supra, 135 Ariz. at 51 , 659 P.2d at 10
State v. Chaney 686 P.2d 1265 Ariz. 1984
State v. Chaney 686 P.2d 1265 Ariz. 1984
2988 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1977), and find the sentence in this case to be proportional to the penalties in other cases, see
State v. McCall 677 P.2d 920 Ariz. 1983
State v. McCall 677 P.2d 920 Ariz. 1983
d struck her twice on the head, where any one of the attacks was potentially fatal); , (defendant murdered two girls by asphyxiation but also mutilated their breasts and their genital areas); , (after strangling his victim, defendant carved the word “Bonzai” into the victim’s back); , (defendant repeatedly shot and kicked his victims after they were unconscious or dead).
State v. Lambright 673 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1983
State v. Smith 673 P.2d 17 Ariz. 1983
State v. Lambright 673 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1983
In State v. Jeffers, supra, , , , cert.
State v. Smith 673 P.2d 17 Ariz. 1983
For the reasons stated in State v. Lambright, we find the disposition in this case to be proportional to the disposition of the following similar cases in which the death penalty was imposed, , , , , cert.
State v. Richmond 666 P.2d 57 Ariz. 1983
State v. Richmond 666 P.2d 57 Ariz. 1983
State v. Gretzler, supra; State v. Clark, supra; State v. Jordan, supra; , , sentence aff’d, , , cert.