Cited by

See State v. McCall , , 163, , 936 (1983) (stating in a capital case that "[f]ailure to argue a claim constitutes abandonment"); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

(explaining that a party’s failure to argue a claim constitutes abandonment and waiver of the claim); Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

–57, –30 (1983) (allowing the court to draw reasonable conclusions from facts given, even when those conclusions were not expressly stated by the warrant affidavit).

See Lamar, 205 Ariz. at 441 ¶ 52, 72 P.3d at 841

(finding the victims suffered uncertainty as to their ultimate fate, and thus mental anguish, where defendants herded victims throughout their home at gunpoint).

ongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” In other words, other-act evidence is generally inadmissible for the purpose of “ ‘showing] that the defendant is a bad person or has a propensity for committing crimes.’”

¶10 Evidence of a defendant’s prior or subsequent acts is not admissible “to show that the defendant is a bad person or has a propensity for committing crimes.” (prior acts); (subsequent acts).

See Prion, 52 P.3d at 193; see also Myers, 117 Ariz. at 84-85, 570 P.2d at 1257-58 (“‘[w]henever possible, the fact that witnesses were previously unable to identify a defendant should properly go to the credibility and not to the admissibility of subsequent positive in-court identifications’”), quoting People v. Belenor, 246 N

The defendant must also “intend that the victim suffer or reasonably foresee that there is a substantial likelihood that the victim will suffer as a consequence of the defendant’s acts.”

11 (1983) (“The defendant must intend that the victim suffer or reasonably foresee that there is a substantial likelihood that the victim will suffer as a consequence of the defendant's acts.”).

31 in the “zone of danger”), see Wood, 180 Ariz. at 69, 881 P.2d at 1174; (2) whether the defendant’s actions were during “the murderous act itself,” (3) whether the defendant intended to kill the third party, see Tison, 129 Ariz. at 542, 633 P.2d at 351; and (4) whether the defendant engaged in sufficiently risky behavior toward the third person, -29, -30 (1983).

In State v. McCall, this Court held that, “[i]n each of the Arizona cases where the finding of this aggravating circumstance has been affirmed, the murderous act itself put other people in a zone of danger.” , , 933 (1983).

(Defendant waived issue “by failing to sufficiently argue this claim on appeal.”); (“Failure to argue a claim constitutes abandonment and waiver of that issue.” ( )).

See, , (defendant cut victims several times before stabbing them, and one of the victims saw his own mother stabbed in the back prior to murder); , (defendant drove victim to desert, forced victim to lie on ground while captors debated victim’s fate); , (armed defendants broke into victims’ home, victims listened while defendant shot family members and waited for their turn).

¶ 33 In response, the state asserts that while a defendant has a due process right to a fair identification procedure, , he has no constitutional right to a physical line-up.

Mitigating evidence is “any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less than death might be appropriate.” , ( , ) (emphasis added).

§ 13-703(G), the sentencing judge must consider “any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less than death might be appropriate.”

1635 , 128 L.Ed.2d 358 (1994), , see also A.R.S.

§ 13-703(G), the sentencing judge must consider “any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less than death might be appropriate.”

The sentencing judge must consider “any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less than death might be appropriate.” , , 935 (1983), cert.

The “grave risk of death to another” factor applies only if the defendant’s “murderous act itself put other people in a zone of danger.” See, -61 , -34 (1983) (citing cases), cert.

We note, however, that a sentencing judge has a duty to consider “any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less than death may be appropriate.” , , cert.

Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 166 , 823 P.2d at 33 ; , cert.

The sentencing judge must consider “any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less than death might be appropriate.” , cert.

343 , 116 L.Ed.2d 282 (1991)

§ 13-703(G), the sentencing court must consider “any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less than death might be appropriate.” , cert.

than death might be appropriate,” , but “it is within the discretion of the trial judge how much weight should be given to the proffered mitigating factors.” , citing Jeffers v. Ricketts, 627 F.Supp.

161 n. 4, , 934 n. 4 (1983) (elimination of one aggravating factor “does not mandate a remand to the trial court”).

See also Correll, 148 Ariz. at 479-80 , 715 P.2d at 732 ; , cert.