Cited by

–66, ¶¶ 17–18 (App. 2004).

-66, ¶¶ 17-18 (App. 2004) (noting no separate dangerousness finding required when dangerousness inherent in offense).

¶ 18 (App. 2004), the court of appeals held that arson of an occupied structure justifies a “greater term of imprisonment” precisely because it involves the risk of serious injury to a person inside.

Over Torres-Sosa’s objection, the court found that dangerousness was inherent in those three counts

App. 2007) (determining that defendant who knowingly possessed child pornography satisfied the DCAC statute because the jury “implicitly found that his conduct focused on the children”); cf. (Bernard) Smith, 146 Ariz. at 498–99 (explaining that a jury is not required to separately find dangerousness where an element of the offense charged requires proof of its dangerous nature); –66 ¶¶ 17–18 (App. 2004) (to same effect).

¶ 38 (App. 2013) (“[A] jury need not make a finding of dangerousness where it is ‘inherent in the crime.’”) ( ¶ 18 (App. 2004)); ¶ 27 (App. 2007) (concluding the DCAC finding was inherent in guilty verdict of “intentional, premeditated, attempted murder of each of the four victims under the age of fifteen years”).

the defendant was convicted of arson of an occupied structure, which requires proof that a human being is either present or likely to be present when the fire occurs.

¶ 12 (App. 2004) (finding no separate dangerousness determination necessary because it was inherent in the jury’s verdict).

¶ 18 (App. 2013); ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (conviction of arson of an occupied structure required proof that fire was dangerous).

Larin, 233 Ariz. at 212, ¶ 38; ¶ 13 (App. 2004).

Accordingly, the determination whether his offenses had been committed on the same occasion pursuant to § 13-703(B) was required to have been submitted to the jury, inherent in the jury’s verdicts, or otherwise excepted from Alleyne and Apprendi.1 ¶¶ 17-18, -85 (App. 2004) (no separate dangerousness finding required under Apprendi when dangerousness inherent in offense).

ding that the offense was “dangerous” because the offense could only be committed if Appellant used a dangerous instrument, something that was “readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.” ¶19 If an element of the offense charged requires proof of the dangerous nature of the felony, a jury is not required to make a separate finding of “dangerousness.” ¶ 17, (-99, -97 (1985)).

At any rate, we do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, ¶ 9, or arguments posited without authority, n.5, ¶ 14, n.5 (App. 2007).

Fire can be a “dangerous instrument.” ¶¶ 14-15

[8] , (jury verdict of arson of occupied structure included implicit finding of dangerousness).