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¶16 “A colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is a claim which, if true, might have changed the outcome.” ¶ 18 (App. 2005).

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); –96, ¶ 18 (App. 2005).

The “strategic decision to ‘winnow out weaker arguments on appeal and focus on’ those more likely to prevail is an acceptable exercise of professional judgment.” ¶ 20 (App. 2005) (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)) (cleaned up).

¶7 The State is correct, as a general matter, that “[f]ailure to predict future changes in the law is not ineffective assistance because clairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective representation.” ¶ 24 (App. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

(claims regarding the voluntariness of a plea are meritless if the record shows the superior court questioned the defendant in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)); ¶ 18 (App. 2005) (to raise a colorable claim, defendant must establish counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable based on applicable professional standards, and counsel’s performance prejudiced defendant); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

(to raise colorable claim and avoid summary dismissal of petition, defendant must establish counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable based on applicable professional standards, and counsel’s performance prejudiced defendant); Ariz. R. Crim.

Similarly, appellate counsel’s “strategic decision to ‘winnow out weaker arguments on appeal and focus on’ those more likely to prevail is an acceptable exercise of professional judgment.” ¶ 20 (App. 2005) (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 746 (1983)).

¶10 “To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” ¶ 18 (App. 2005) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)).

(quotation omitted); ¶ 18 (App. 2005) ("A colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is a claim which, if true, might have changed the outcome."); ("petitioner must offer evidence of a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome

¶ 9 There is "[a] strong presumption" that counsel "provided effective assistance," State v. Febles , , ¶ 20, , 636 (App. 2005), which Smith must overcome by providing evidence that counsel's conduct did not comport with prevailing professional norms, see State v. Herrera , , 647, , 1382 (App. 1995).

¶ 18 (App. 2005) (to raise colorable claim and avoid summary dismissal of petition, defendant must establish, inter alia, counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable based on applicable professional standards); ¶ 21 (App. 2000) (to warrant evidentiary hearing, Rule 32

¶ 9 (App. 2005); Rule 32.4(a).

P. 32.4(a); ¶ 9 (App. 2005).

¶19 (App. 2005) (citation and quotations omitted).

¶ 1 (App. 2005) (Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review).

To prevail on such a claim, a defendant must overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel performed “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” by demonstrating that counsel’s conduct fell below “prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89

¶ 18 (App. 2005) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

And there is a strong presumption that counsel provided effective assistance, ¶ 20, which the defendant must overcome by providing evidence that counsel’s conduct did not comport with professional norms.

Absent any evidence that the failure to raise an issue fell below prevailing professional norms and would have changed the outcome of the appeal, the claim is not colorable.” ¶ 19, (internal citation omitted).