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¶ 23 (App. 1999); ¶ 20-21 (App. 2000).

“But once the State engages in plea bargaining, the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be adequately informed of the consequences before deciding whether to accept or reject the offer.” ¶ 14 (App. 2000).

Maldonado rejected it, ¶ 14 (App. 2000).

The State offered Sierra a plea deal and the superior court held a

(“Rule 32 does not require the trial court to conduct evidentiary hearings based on mere generalizations and unsubstantiated claims that people exist who would give favorable testimony.”); ¶ 17 (App. 2000) (explaining that a colorable claim requires the defendant to “provide specific factual allegations that, if true, would entitle him to relief” supported by “sworn statements” or “a satisfactory explanation of their absence”).

¶ 14 (App. 2000) ("[O]nce the State engages in plea bargaining, the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be adequately informed of the consequences before deciding whether to accept or reject the offer.").

-14, ¶¶ 16, 20 (App. 2000) (citations omitted).

To show deficient performance during the plea-bargaining process, a defendant must prove either that counsel’s advice was erroneous or that counsel did not provide the necessary information for “the petitioner to make an informed decision whether to accept the plea.” ¶ 16 (App. 2000).

“To prove ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner must show both deficient performance and prejudice.” ¶ 15 (App. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

¶ 21 (App. 2000); Amaral, 239 Ariz. at 220, ¶ 11.

Such a holding would surely violate separation of powers.” ¶40 (App. 2000.

To show deficient performance and prejudice in the context of plea bargains, a counsel’s performance is deficient if he “(1) gave erroneous advice or (2) failed to give information necessary to allow the petitioner to make an informed decision whether to accept the plea.” ¶ 16 (App. 2000).

¶ 14 (App. 2000) ("[O]nce the State engages in plea bargaining, the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be adequately informed of the consequences before deciding whether to accept or reject the offer.").

“To establish deficient performance during plea negotiations, a petitioner must prove that the lawyer either (1) gave erroneous advice or (2) failed to give information necessary to allow the petitioner to make an informed decision whether to accept the plea.” ¶ 16 (App. 2000).

We note that in August 2019, Mello’s counsel asked the trial court 3 STATE v. MELLO Decision of the Court to “conduct an advisement” to advise Mello of the State’s plea offer and the potential consequences of proceeding to trial.

hat was not frivolous.1 Vigil was allowed to file a supplemental brief, and he alleged: (1) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct through vouching and improper emotional appeal; (2) the State’s exhibits 1-10 were prejudicial and irrelevant; (3) Juror #13 soiled the jury by expressing bias; (4) Juror #11 could not hear the evidence presented; and (5) hearing.

& n.4 (App. 2000) (implicitly recognizing that advice of counsel as to waiver of constitutional rights is not always effective or accurate, and listing numerous cases where such advice has been found deficient).

The plea agreement was set to expire on April 1, but the court held a Donald hearing1 on May 22 at which it “advise[d] the 1 ¶ 46 (App. 2000).

¶ 21 (App. 2000) (defendant’s claim must present “more than conclusory assertions and be supported by more than regret” to warrant relief).

He rejected a ¶ 14 (App. 2000).

¶10 Higgins states he is entitled to a hearing under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.13, but to “mandate an evidentiary hearing, the defendant’s challenge must consist of more than conclusory assertions and be supported by more than regret.” ¶ 21 (App. 2000) Higgins has not shown unreasonable conduct by his attorneys or that his plea agreement was involuntary or the sentence illegal.

“To establish prejudice in the rejection of a plea offer, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer and declined to go forward to trial.” ¶ 20 (App. 2000) (cleaned up).