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“[T]he court should remove for cause any juror who expresses serious misgivings about the ability to be fair and impartial.” ¶ 12 (App. 2002).

See Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 210 ¶ 32; ¶ 12 (App. 2002).

¶ 76 (App. 2002) (The trial court is in the best position to assess the effect of an argument.).

However, we do not assess arguments in isolation;” in context of closing argument “we decline to characterize an isolated linguistic misstep, in the context of an otherwise wholly proper argument, as error.”); ¶¶ 75–76 (App. 2002) (“We do not believe that the prosecutor’s remarks in this case constituted an impermissible comment on Defendant’s failure to testify.

Reversal is warranted when prosecutorial misconduct “so permeated the trial that it probably affected the outcome and denied [the] defendant his due process right to a fair trial.”

¶ 65 (App. 2002) (noting that the trial court appropriately instructed the jurors that they were not to consider punishment in reaching their verdict); ¶ 9 (App. 2000) (“A lesser-included-offense instruction is proper only if (1) the lesser offense is composed of some, but not

Prosecutorial vouching occurs when (1) “the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness” and when (2) “the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’[] testimony.” ¶ 62 (App. 2002) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

¶6 We review a court’s denial of a motion to sever the trials of co-defendants for an abuse of discretion “in light of the evidence before the court at the time the motion was made.” (citations omitted).

¶ 12 (App. 2002) (holding a court “need not remove jurors who ultimately assure the trial court that they can be fair and impartial.”).

See, ¶ 71 (App. 2002) (“Although counsel may not comment on matters not in evidence before the jury, they may argue reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial.”) (citations omitted).

¶¶ 42, 48 (App. 2002); see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987) (Bruton does not extend "to confession that was not incriminating on its face" but which "became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial.").

The trial court is in the best position “to assess whether prospective jurors should be allowed to sit,” ¶ 13 (App. 2002), because “the trial judge has the opportunity to observe the juror’s demeanor and the tenor of his or her answers first hand.”

“The United States Supreme Court held in Bruton that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to cross examine witnesses when a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is admitted at their joint trial.” ¶ 42

We review a trial court’s severance ruling for an abuse of discretion, “in light of the evidence before the court at the time the motion was made.”