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The court may consider parol evidence when interpreting a written agreement only if “the court finds the writing is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation suggested by the proponent of the extrinsic evidence.” ¶ 28 (App. 2004).

¶ 42 (App. 2004) (disregarding a single city councilman’s testimony about the council’s intention for the use of property).

¶ 42 (App. 2004) (disregarding a single city councilman’s testimony about the council’s intention for the use of property).

¶20 The superior court must “first consider the allegations made by the proponent of the extrinsic evidence as to the appropriate interpretation of the writing in light of the extrinsic evidence alleged.” ¶ 28 (App. 2004).

rested in approving the construction of a guest house before closing “should [Callaway] not be able to exercise the purchase.” He again stated the seller was not interested in approving the construction “should [Callaway] not exercise the option.” ¶19 Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible if it “would actually vary or contradict the meaning of the written words.” ¶ 29 (App. 2004).

We first “consider the allegations made by the proponent of the extrinsic evidence as to the appropriate interpretation of the writing in light of the extrinsic evidence alleged.” ¶ 28 (App. 2004); see Taylor, 175 Ariz. at 154.

¶ 34 (App. 2004) (“[O]ne cannot claim that one is ‘interpreting’ a written clause with extrinsic evidence if the resulting ‘interpretation’ unavoidably changes the meaning of the writing.”).

¶ 28 (App. 2004); accord Taylor, 175 Ariz. at 154.

¶ 22 It is true that Arizona has adopted a permissive approach to the parol evidence rule, Long v. City of Glendale , , ¶ 27, allowing, as noted, extrinsic evidence to aid in contract interpretation.

-32, ¶ 47 (App. 2004); (“In a suit to reform a written instrument a clear and convincing showing of the real agreement of the parties thereto is a requisite.”).

§ 12-821.01(B); ¶ 7 (App. 2007) ( ¶ 9 (App. 2004)).

n.7, ¶ 36, ML et al. v. COLES Opinion of the Court 519, 529 n.7 (App. 2007).

¶ 10, (“The requirement that a 4 The “inequitable or unreasonable consideration” prong is inapplicable to Appellants’ claims in this case because Appellants are not attacking a city contract.

-30, ¶¶ 35-37, -30 (App. 2004) (applying full performance exception to statute of frauds); (same).

§ 12-821.01(B); P.3d 93, supp. op., (definition of accrual in § 12-821.01(B) applies to both filing of notice of claim and filing of action); Long v. City of Glendale, 208 Ariz. 319, ¶¶ 11-16, -26 (App. 2004).

See, -10 , -17 (1977) (holder in due course); ¶ 9 , (knowledge of accrual of claim for purposes of A.R.S.

328 n. 5, ¶27, , 528 n. 5 (App.2004).

Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible if it “would actually vary or contradict the meaning of the written words.” ¶ 29 , 93 P.3d *428 519, 528 (App.2004).