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¶ 14 (App. 2004) (“If the party opposing a motion fails to respond in writing, the trial court may, in its discretion, dispose of the motion summarily.”).

¶ 15 (App. 2004) (“A failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment with a written memorandum or opposing affidavits cannot, by itself, entitle the moving party to summary judgment.”).

This court has explained that, generally, “a party must file a written response whenever a motion is filed.” ¶ 14 (App. 2004) (emphasis added).

-16 (1997) (finding harmless error in failing to attach required affidavits when appellants “have shown no prejudice and merely demand compliance with a technical rule”); ¶ 17 (App. 2004) (applying abuse of 4 BROCK, et al. v. TELLURIAN Decision of the Court discretion review to rulings under Rule 7.1).

¶ 15 (App. 2004) (citation omitted).

P. 56(e); ¶ 16 (App. 2004) (providing that when the non-moving party fails to properly respond the superior court “will presume that any uncontroverted evidence favorable to the movant, and from which only one inference can be drawn, is true”).

The court must consider the entire record before deciding a summary judgment motion, and “[s]ummary judgment is inappropriate where the facts, even if undisputed, would allow reasonable minds to differ.” Nelson, 181 Ariz. at 191; ¶ 15 (App. 2004).

¶¶ 11-12 (App. 2004); accord McKillip v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc.

While we generally disfavor dismissal on hypertechnical grounds, ¶ 11 (App. 2004), we must dismiss a matter if we lack jurisdiction, ¶ 4 (App. 2010).

¶ 45 (App. 2009); ¶ 17 (App. 2004) (noting that rulings under Rule 7.1 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

¶ 17 (App. 2004); Ariz. R. Civ.

We review rulings under Rule 7.1 for abuse of discretion, ¶ 17 (App. 2004), which is discretion that is “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons,” ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

We review whether summary judgment was proper based on the record made in the superior court, “but we determine de novo whether the entry of judgment was proper.” ¶ 17 (App. 2004).

¶7 Simpson first argues the superior court improperly granted a dispositive motion based solely on her failure to respond under Arizona Rule Civil Procedure 7.1(b)

¶ 17 (App. 2004) (court rulings made under Rule 7.1 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

¶ 15, (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS ¶6 We review the superior court’s entry of summary judgment “on the basis of the record made in [that] court, but we determine de novo whether the entry of judgment was proper.” ¶ 17

¶ 17, (“We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of the record made in the trial court, but we determine de novo whether the entry of judgment was proper.”).

¶ 11, (holding that notice of appeal from order denying motion for relief from judgment, rather than the underlying judgment, conferred jurisdiction on 4 MEDLEY v. STATE Decision of the Cou

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, ¶ 17, and examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Husband asserts that Wife’s failure to file a response created “an adverse inference against Wife permissible in that she does not dispute the assertions raised by Husband in his motion.” “Generally, a party must file a written response whenever a motion is filed.” ¶ 14, (citations omitted).

But under Rule 56(e)(4), the superior court may “presume that any uncontroverted evidence favorable to the movant, and from which only one inference can be drawn, is true.” ¶ 16

(“This court generally disfavors hypertechnical challenges to a notice of appeal .

¶ 16 , (“[I]f a moving party’s summary judgment motion fails to show an entitlement to judgment, the nonmoving party need not respond to controvert the motion.”).

§ 12-2101(0; -59, ¶¶ 9-12 , -59 (2004) (recognizing that technical procedural defects generally do not deprive this court of jurisdiction).

¶ 15 , ("A failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment with a written memorandum or opposing affidavits cannot, by itself, entitle the moving party to summary judgment.”).

s claim for injunctive relief moot, in granting summary judgment on its trade secrets claim, and in awarding attorney fees.5 “We review a superior court’s ‘grant of summary judgment on the basis of the record made in [that] court, but we determine de novo whether the entry of [summary] judgment was proper.’” Nat’l Bank, n.3, 180 P.3d at 980 n.3, (alterations in Nat’l Bank).

It is the attorney's responsibility to search the record ....”); , (holding "Itlhe entire record must be examined” by the trial court before granting summary judgment); ¶ 15 , (“The trial court must consider the entire record before deciding a summary judgment motion.”).

60, ¶ 17, , 60 (App. 2004).