Cited by

¶17 –84, ¶¶ 37– 39 (App. 2007), Wife argues that the financial information available to the court was inadequate.

See Dyrek I, 1 CA-CV 23-0237, at *2, ¶ 9; ¶ 13 (App. 2007) (“[W]e determine that whether a separation agreement has merged is of no consequence in determining that the court can reopen its determination that a separation agreement is [or is not] unfair.” (citation modified)); (holding that in the

§ 25-324 seeks to equalize financial disparities between parties, ¶ 17 (App. 2019) (citing cases), and that the prevailing party is not necessarily entitled to an award, ¶ 39 (App. 2007).

Alternatively, the court may grant relief under Rule 85 on grounds that include “fraud,” “mistake,” and “newly discovered evidence.” ARFLP 85(b)(1)-(3); ¶ 17 (App. 2007) (noting that a spouse to a property settlement agreement who discovers “fraud, undue influence, or other misconduct” that would have constituted “ground[s] for the trial court not to initially approve a settlement agreement” may seek relief from the provisions of the settlement agreement by post-

¶ 39 (App. 2007); ¶ 8 (App. 2008).

¶ 39 (App. 2007) (“A.R.S.

7 ¶ 39 (App. 2007), ¶ 1 (App. 2017) (holding pre-marital agreements stipulating to a prevailing-party standard for awarding attorneys’ fees violate public policy per se).

See, –83, ¶¶ 22–31 (App. 2007); –14, ¶¶ 9–23 (App. 1998); Republic Nat.

§ 25-327(A) (“The provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.”); ¶ 17 (App. 2007) (holding a property settlement agreement is subject to relief under the civil counterpart to Rule 85); Schmidt, 158 Ariz. at 498 (same).

See, e.g. , Breitbart-Napp v. Napp , , 79, ¶ 14, , 1029 (App. 2007) ; Cohen v. Frey , , 67, ¶ 14, , 487 (App. 2007) ; Sharp v. Sharp , , 210, , 309 (App. 1994), superseded on other grounds by rule as recognized in Hutki v. Hutki , , 43, , 808 (App. 2018) ; Keller

82, ¶¶ 2, 27–30 (App. 2007).

Moreover, “§ 25-324 does not establish a prevailing party standard for awarding fees.” ¶ 39, (citation omitted).