Cited by

¶ 62 (App. 2009); ARCAP 13(a)(7).

Ct. 106(A) (applying ARCAP 13 to juvenile appeals); ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (holding that failure to comply with ARCAP 13 can constitute waiver of that claim).

¶ 45 (App. 2009) (applying abuse of discretion standard for trial court’s exclusion of evidence based on lack of foundation).

She argues we should dismiss his appeal, treat his arguments as waived, see, ¶ 62 (App. 2009), or strike and disregard all noncompliant portions of his brief, see, e.g., Flood Control Dist.

See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A); ¶ 62 (App. 2009).

¶ 62 (App. 2009) (noting that arguments may be waived by failure to provide citation to authorities and the record).

See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A) (stating an opening brief “must contain” each of the appellant’s “contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies”); ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (explaining the failure to develop and support an argument on appeal results in waiver of the issue); ¶ 25 n.5 (App. 2000) (holding issues raised for the first time

See ARCAP 13(a)(6)–(7); ¶ 62 (App. 2009).

See ARCAP 13(a)(6); ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (observing that appellant is required “to provide ‘citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on[]’ [and] [f]ailure to do so can constitute abandonment and waiver of that claim.” ( ¶ 101 n.9 (2004)).

¶ 62 (App. 2009) (failure to present significant arguments in opening brief can result in waiver of issue on appeal).

See ARCAP 13(a)(7); ¶ 62 (App. 2009).

¶ 62 (App. 2009) (noting that a party’s failure to present significant arguments on a particular issue may constitute abandonment and waiver of that issue).

See ARCAP 13(a)(7); ¶ 62 (App. 2009).

“Failure to do so can constitute abandonment and 9 BOYLE v. MALTA Decision of the Court waiver of that claim.” ¶ 62 (App. 2009).

App. P. 13(a)(6)–(7); ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (failure to present and address argument supported by authority can constitute waiver and abandonment of the argument).

¶ 62 (App. 2009) (holding that the failure to comply with ARCAP 13 can constitute waiver of that claim); see also Dep’t ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (“[C]onsideration of the child’s best interests permeates dependency and severance proceedings.”).

Although causation is generally a question of fact for the jury to resolve, ¶ 9 (2007), the court may resolve the issue if the evidence is insufficient to allow a jury to reasonably infer that “the negligent conduct on the part of the defendant was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” ¶ 23 (App. 2009); (“The question of proximate cause is usually for the jury and it is only when reasonable persons could not differ that the court may direct a verdict on the issue.”).

Accordingly, Mark may be deemed to have waived this argument, see generally Andrew Brown Co. v. Painters Warehouse, Inc., ¶ 51 (App. 2009), and in any event, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in denying Mark’s motion to compel.