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¶11 We generally review the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 15 (App. 2010), but we review de novo whether a default judgment is void and should be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), BYS Inc. v. Smoudi, 228 Ariz 573, 578, ¶ 18 (App. 2012).

However, we view the facts “in the light most favorable to upholding the [superior] court’s ruling.” ¶¶ 2, 15 (App. 2010).

ARCAP 21(a)(2); ¶ 31 (App. 2010).

App. P. 21(a)(2); ¶¶ 28–31 (App. 2010).

See ARCAP 21(a)(2) ("A claim for fees under this Rule must specifically state the statute, rule, decisional law, contract, or other authority for an award of attorneys' fees."); ¶ 31 (App. 2010) (explaining ARCAP 21 "is a procedural rule that does not provide a substantive basis for an appellate court to consider an award of attorneys' fees").

There is No Evidence the Club Acted with Unclean Hands ¶26 The court also determined the Club did “not come to the Court with completely clean hands.” To constitute unclean hands, a plaintiff’s bad acts “must relate to the same activity that is the basis for [the] claim.” ¶ 26 (App. 2010).

But “a complaint need not be technically sufficient to support a default judgment.” ¶ 19 (App. 2010) ( BRITT v. ADVANCED BUSINESS, et al. Decision of the Court 234 (1980)).

536, ¶¶ 2, 15 (App. 2010).

¶ 26 (App. 2010) (citation omitted) (alteration in original).

“We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment.” ¶ 2 (App. 2010).

B. Rule 60(b)(1) Motion ¶14 Alternatively, Adams argues the judgment should be set aside under Rule 60(b)(1), which states the court may set a judgment aside based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Generally, a denial of a Rule 60 motion is reviewed for “clear abuse of discretion.” ¶ 15 (App. 2010).

See ARCAP 21(a)(2) (“A claim for fees under this Rule must specifically state the statute, rule, decisional law, contract, or other authority for an award of attorneys’ fees.”); ¶ 21 (2007) (holding a party “must state the statutory or contractual basis” for an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to ARCAP 21); ¶ 31 (App. 2010) (explaining ARCAP 21 “is a procedural rule that does not provide a substantive basis for an appellate court to consider an award of attorneys’ fees”).

Nonetheless, “[w]e view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment.” ¶ 2 (App. 2010).

¶ 19 (App. 2010) (); see also Master Fin., ¶ 19 (App. 2004) (“A judgment or order is void if the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, over the person, or over the particular judgment or order entered.”).

536, ¶¶ 2, 15 (App. 2010).

We generally review the denial of a motion under Rule 60 for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 15 (App. 2010), but we "review de novo whether a default judgment is void and should be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4)," ¶ 18 (App. 2012) (as amended).

¶ 23 (App. 2010) ( ¶ 29 (App. 2009)).

4 In reviewing a denial of a motion to set aside, “[w]e view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling.” ¶ 2 (App. 2010) ( ¶ 2 (App. 2010), ).

¶ 31 (App. 2010); see also Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 21(a)(2).

"Generally, we uphold a trial court's denial of a motion for relief under Rule 60 [ (b) ] absent a clear abuse of discretion," Ezell v. Quon , , 536, ¶ 15, , 649 (App. 2010) (citing Rosen v. Bd.

¶ 15 (App. 2010) (de novo review of denial of motion to vacate void judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(4)); Ariz. R. Fam.