Cited by

¶ 16 (App. 2009); ¶ 18 (App. 2015).

Noftsinger, whether a relocation request is made in good faith; • the prospective advantages and a parent’s motive for requesting or opposing relocation; • the likelihood of a parent’s compliance with parenting time orders; • whether relocation allows a realistic opportunity for parenting time with each parent; • whether relocation enhances the custodial parent’s quality of life.

¶3 Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s ruling, ¶ 17 (App. 2015) (citation omitted), the evidence shows that the parties stopped following their “equal time” parenting schedule in 2017 when, Mother later explained, Father’s exercise of parenting time “dwindled.” By “about 2020,” Mother went on, Father’s exercise of parenting time had declined to “basically ev

“[T]he family court is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting evidence.” ¶ 18 (App. 2015) (citation omitted).

¶ 17 (App. 2015) (citation omitted).

¶ 17 (App. 2015) (“We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the family court’s findings, and we also determine whether evidence in the record reasonably supports the family court’s findings.”).

“We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the family court’s findings, and we also determine whether evidence in the record reasonably supports the family court’s findings.” ¶ 17 (App. 2015); ¶¶ 16, 19 (App. 2009).

The superior court is in the best position to reach factual conclusions or resolve factual disputes, ¶ 18 (App. 2015), and a summary leaves appellate courts trying to divine its findings.

¶¶ 16–17 (App. 2015) (involving legal decision-making and parenting 3 DAVEY v. ROBERTS Decision of the Court time).1 The court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law or when the record “is devoid of

¶ 18 (App. 2015) (noting the superior court “is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting evidence”).

¶16 While Mother may disagree about the weight the superior court should give the evidence, “[w]e will not substitute our judgment by reweighing the evidence underlying the court’s best-interests analysis.” Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 27; ¶ 18 (App. 2015) (Appellate courts defer to the superior court’s credibility determinations and resolution of conflicting evidence.).

¶ 7 (App. 2003); ¶ 17 (App. 2015).

¶ 18 (App. 2015) (“[T]he family court is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting evidence, and appellate courts generally defer to the findings of the family court.”).

¶ 18 (App. 2015) (“[T]he family court is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses.”); (holding that when the appellate record is incomplete, “we presume that the record before the trial court supported its decision”).

at 347, ¶ 13; ¶ 18 (App. 2015).

Sec., ¶ 8 (App. 2004); ¶ 18 (App. 2015) (“[T]he [superior] court is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting evidence, and appellate courts generally defer to the findings of the [superior] court.”).

¶ 17 (App. 2015) 2 We use a pseudonym to protect the minor’s identity.

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s rulings, ¶ 14 (App. 2019), given it “is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting evidence,” ¶ 18 (App. 2015).

DISCUSSION ¶7 To modify a parenting time order, the superior court must determine whether there has been a “material change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.” ¶ 17 (App. 2015) ().

¶ 17 (App. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).