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If the language is unambiguous, we “give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction,” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017), and construe it “sensibly to avoid reaching an absurd conclusion.” State ex rel.

If the language is unambiguous, the court “must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

If the statute’s plain language is unambiguous, the court “must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017); see also Special Fund Div. v. Indus.

If the plain language is unambiguous, the court “must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

If the statute’s plain language is unambiguous, the court “must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

If the statute’s plain language is unambiguous, this Court 4 VOHLAND v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al. Opinion of the Court “must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

See Benson v. Casa De Capri Enterprises, LLC, ¶ 13 (2022) (“Since garnishment is a creature of statute, garnishment proceedings are necessarily governed by the terms of those statutes and courts may not allow garnishment proceedings to follow any course other than that charted by the legislature.” (cleaned up)); see also Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Services, ¶ 11 (App. 2017) (“When [a] statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language without employing other

If the statute’s plain language is unambiguous, this court “must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

See Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

“When the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

If the statute’s plain language is unambiguous, this court “must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

See Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs.

¶75 “In reviewing the superior court’s ruling affirming an agency’s order, [this court] ‘independently examines the record to determine whether the evidence supports the judgment,’ under a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 10 (App. 2017) (quoting Webb v. State ex rel.

This court first looks “to the statute’s plain language as the best indicator of [legislative] intent[,]” and if the language is clear and unambiguous, this court “must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

§ 8-533.B.8(c) and § 8-533.B.3 with § 8-533.B.4; see also Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017) (this court first looks “to the statute’s plain language as the best indicator of [legislative] intent[,]” and if the language is clear and unambiguous, this court “must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction”); Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 24

See Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017) (this court first looks “to the statute’s plain language as the best indicator of [legislative] intent”).

¶20 When interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, using the statute’s “plain language as the best indicator of that intent.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

“When the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017) (citing Indus.

(“Parsons I”), ¶ 17 (App. 2017).

¶7 When interpreting a statute, the primary goal “is to give effect to legislative intent.” See Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

¶13 When interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, using the statute’s “plain language as the best indicator of that intent.” See Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

§ 12- 910(E); Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., ¶ 10 (App. 2017); Shorey v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 11 (App. 2015); Nutek Info.

We review de novo the interpretation of statutes and “are not bound by the agency’s or the superior court’s legal conclusions or statutory interpretations.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., -23, ¶ 10 (App. 2017).

Parsons v. Arizona Dep't of Health Services , , 324, ¶ 15, , 713 (App. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Serv., ¶ 11 (App. 2017).