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to simply second-guess the decision of a fit parent as to visitation rights.” ¶ 43 (App. 2009).

(“[W]e presume that when the legislature uses different wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a different meaning and consequence to that language.”).

¶¶ 24-25 (App. 2009) (The court rejected the argument that a non-parent’s “significant relationships” with the child placed her in a different legal position from other non-parents.).

See ACLU of Ariz. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 20 (2021) (“[W]hen the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.” (quoting Arpaio v. Citizen Publ’g Co., ¶ 9 (App. 2008))); ¶ 37 (App. 2009) (“[W]e presume that when the legislature uses different wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a different meaning and consequence to that language

¶ 37 (App. 2009) (recognizing the presumption that “when the legislature uses different wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a different meaning and consequence to that language”).

¶ 37 (App. 2009) (“[W]e presume that when the legislature uses different wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a different meaning and consequence to that language.”).

¶ 16 (App. 2009) (“States may regulate the well- being of children and thus restrict the control of parents in a number of areas, including .

Sec., -49, ¶¶ 5-11 (App. 2013) (foster parents stood in loco parentis and were allowed to intervene in dependency hearing under predecessor to § 25-409 because they cared for the children for 20 months while the children's mother struggled with drugs and their father was incarcerated in another state); ¶ 2 (App. 2009) (partner in a same-sex relationship who jointly raised a child for seven years with the mother stood in loco parentis under § 25-409).

§ 25-318(A) (requiring the superior court to divide community property "equitably, though not necessarily in kind"); , 239, ¶ 37, , 1223 (App. 2009) ("[W]e presume that when the legislature uses different wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a different meaning and consequence to that language.").

The drafters of the AMMA chose different words to define “marijuana” than those used within the criminal code, and the court must “presume those distinctions are meaningful and evidence an intent to give a different meaning and consequence to the alternate language.” ¶ 19 (App. 2015) ( ¶ 37 (App. 2009)).

§ 25-410(A) ; see Egan v. Fridlund-Horne , , 239, ¶ 37, , 1223 (App. 2009) ("[W]e presume that when the legislature uses different wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a different meaning and consequence to that language.").

–41, ¶ 43 (App. 2009); ¶ 7 (App. 2003); ¶ 6 (App. 2001).

Moreover, the only Arizona Court of Appeals opinion discussing the doctrine, ¶ 27, “sharply disagree[d]” with In re Parentage of L.B., which Susan contends is her strongest authority for applying the equitable theory in this case.

¶ 8 (App. 2009); Allstate Indem.

“Consistent with the constitutional right to parent, the legislature has provided nonparents with fewer rights than parents.” ¶ 31

¶ 37 , (“[W]e presume that when the legislature uses different wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a different meaning and consequence to that language.”) (citing Comm, for Pres, -50, ¶ 8

¶19 Moreover, when the legislature chooses different words within a statutory scheme, we presume those distinctions are meaningful and evidence an intent to give a different meaning and consequence to the alternate language.4 ¶ 37, (citing Comm.

-41, ¶ 43, -25 (App. 2009).

(when legislature 1 Fikes notes the requirement that a stop lamp “not project a glaring or dazzling light” is not at issue in this appeal.

We presume that the legislature intended that these two provisions be treated differently and that “fifteen years of age or under” describes a different age classification than “under fifteen years.” ¶ 37 , (noting that when the legislature uses different wording within a statutory scheme, presumption exists that it intended to give a different meaning and consequence to that language).