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The Arizona Supreme Court recently held that the Title 13 Commitment scheme “is commensurate with the civil commitment 7 STATE v. JAMES Decision of the Court schemes” for sex offenders upheld in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)

¶ 53 (App. 1999) (explaining the rational-basis test is applied to equal-protection claims in civil commitment cases).

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992); ¶ 105 (App. 1999).

Where a legislative restriction is part of the State’s power to regulate public health and safety, it will be considered evidence of its “intent to exercise that regulatory power, and not a purpose to add to the punishment.” Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960); ¶ 74 (App. 1999) (“[P]rotecting the public from sex offenders is a paramount governmental interest.”).

is fundamental fairness.’” ¶ 66 (App. 1999) ().

n.28 (App. 1999) (Kleinschmidt, J., dissenting) (“Judicial notice as to matters of common knowledge is a broad concept in Arizona.”).

reflects a heightened standard of proof that indicates that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.”) (cleaned up); ¶ 68 (App. 1999) (noting that “likely” is defined as “probable”).

§ 41–161(2); ¶ 74 (App. 1999) (“[P]rotecting the public from sex offenders is a paramount governmental interest.”).

Shephard has offered “no support for the proposition that the Arizona Constitution provides greater protection than the United States Constitution.” ¶ 76 (App. 1999).

Ct. 32(c) (outlining parameters for membership in the State 4 An exception exists where the law’s “potential deterrent effect on First Amendment activities is ‘both real and substantial.’” ¶ 78 (App. 1999) (quoting Maricopa Cty.

¶20 But the physician-patient privilege is not absolute, and the legislature has imposed limitations when “the public good requires [the privilege to] give way to serve a greater good.” ¶ 96 (App. 1999); –95 ¶ 11 (App. 2001).

" Martin v. Reinstein , , 313-14 ¶ 66, , 799-800 (App. 1999).

To satisfy due process requirements, statutes must “contain explicit standards of application so as to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” ¶ 79 (App. 1999) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); -52 (1949)).

at 395, ¶ 11, n.3 (listing exceptions); ¶ 96 (App. 1999) ("the legislature has, in several instances, determined that the public good requires that statutory or rule-based confidentiality give way to serve a greater good.").

Although discretionary, special action jurisdiction is appropriate to address “purely legal questions.” ¶ 9 (1999).

¶8 Substantive due process ensures that the government’s actions are fundamentally fair, “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990); see also U.S. Const. amend.

¶ 44, (holding that ex post facto prohibitions do not apply to the civil commitment provisions of the SVP Act).

§ 13-1406(A) (sexual assault requires “sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact” without consent).1 ¶13 “The state and federal equal protection guarantees are designed to secure equal opportunity for those who are similarly situated.” Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, ¶ 49, see also U.S. Const. amend.

We review de novo the constitutionality of the statute and "begin with a strong presumption that laws are constitutional.” ¶ 16