Cited by

Comm’n, we decline to “read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself,” Town of Scottsdale v. State ex rel.

Comm’n, (“[W]hat the Legislature means, it will say.”).

Comm’n, (a fundamental principle of statutory construction is that “what the Legislature means, it will say”); cf. A.R.S.

Comm'n , , 106, , 1137 (1976) ("[W]hat the Legislature means, it will say.").

Comm’n, (“[W]hat the Legislature means, it will say.”).

Comm’n, , (“Equally fundamental is the presumption that what the Legislature means, it will say.”).

Comm’n, , (stating that courts must adhere to “the presumption that what the Legislature means, it will say”); ¶ 11 , (“We generally ‘presume the legislature is aware of existing statutes when it enacts new statutes.’ ”)

Comm’n, , (“We do not presume the prerogative of rewriting a statute which is clear and unambiguous.”).

Comm’n, , (explaining that fundamental to statutory intei’pretation “is the presumption that what the Legislature means, it will say.”).

Bowslaugh, 126 Ariz. at 519 , 617 P.2d at 27 , quoting Padilla v. Industrial Comm’n, , (noting that “‘courts will not enlarge the meaning of simple English words in order to make them conform to their own peculiar sociological and economic views’ ” or to avoid “ ‘harsh and uncompassionate’ ” results).

Padilla v. Industrial Comm’n, , , (legislature is presumed to express itself in “as clear a manner as possible” and that “it accorded words their natural and obvious meanings unless stated otherwise”).

Yet, “[e]qually fundamental is the presumption that what the Legislature means, it will say.” Padilla v. Industrial Comm’n, , , , -44 (1953).

cited in Padilla v. Industrial Comm’n

Padilla v. Industrial Comm’n

See Padilla v. Industrial Comm’n, , (“equally fundamental is the presumption that what the legislature means, it will say”).