Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Bouldin v. Turek, 607 P.2d 954.

84 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Marcos Isaac Danner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
State of Arizona v. Marcos Isaac Danner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
But a procedural statute has no such restriction if it “does not affect an earlier established substantive right.” (); see also Krol
Vande Krol v. superstition/benchmark Ariz. 2025
Vande Krol v. superstition/benchmark Ariz. 2025
Even if a statute does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it may still be applied if merely procedural because litigants have no vested right in a given mode of procedure.” Aranda, 198 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 11 (internal citations omitted); San Carlos Apache Tribe, 193 Ariz. at 205 ¶ 15.
Norton v. Phonejockey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Norton v. Phonejockey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Newman v. Select Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Newman v. Select Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(declaring that a “statute providing for an award of attorney fees is similar in effect to one changing the measure of damages .
NICKERSON v. GREEN VALLEY RECREATION, INC. 265 P.3d 1108 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
NICKERSON v. GREEN VALLEY RECREATION, INC. 265 P.3d 1108 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Although a statute nonetheless may have retroactive application if “it is merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right,” -79, -56 (1979), that exception does not apply here 2.
AIDA RENTA TRUST v. Maricopa County 212 P.3d 941 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
AIDA RENTA TRUST v. Maricopa County 212 P.3d 941 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
A statute applies retroactively, however, “if it is merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right.”
Lake v. City of Phoenix 207 P.3d 725 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Lake v. City of Phoenix 207 P.3d 725 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
§ 39-121.02(B)); , (holding that statutory provision governing attorney’s fees in contract cases, A.R.S.
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Questar Southern Trails Pipeline Co. 161 P.3d 620 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Questar Southern Trails Pipeline Co. 161 P.3d 620 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Gum 153 P.3d 418 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Gum 153 P.3d 418 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Brunet v. Murphy 135 P.3d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Brunet v. Murphy 135 P.3d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
¶ 15 After surveying several Arizona cases discussing this point, the Hall court concluded, “[t]he clear import of Abrams [v. Horizon Corp., , ], like Bouldin [v. Turek, , ], is that ‘an earlier established substantive right’, [sic] once vested by the filing of a lawsuit, may not be impaired---- As with Crawford [v. Superior Court in and for Pima Cty., , ] the date we identified as controlling was the filing date.” 149 Ariz. at
State v. Griffin 58 P.3d 516 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Griffin 58 P.3d 516 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
Under a judicially created exception to § 1-244, a statute does not have an impermissible retroactive effect if it is “‘merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right.’” Shane B.
Aranda v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 11 P.3d 1006 Ariz. 2000
Aranda v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 11 P.3d 1006 Ariz. 2000
In Re Shane B. 7 P.3d 94 Ariz. 2000
In Re Shane B. 7 P.3d 94 Ariz. 2000
Under [this] exception, a statute does not have [impermissible] retroactive effect if it is merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right.” , ( , ).
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 851 P.2d 95 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 851 P.2d 95 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
St. Joseph's Hospital & Medical Center v. Superior Court 793 P.2d 1121 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
West Valley Camelback Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court 793 P.2d 1124 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
West Valley Camelback Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court 793 P.2d 1124 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Where the legislature fails to provide for retroactive application, we may not so provide unless we determine that the statutes involved are “merely procedural and [do] not affect an earlier established substantive right.”
St. Joseph's Hospital & Medical Center v. Superior Court 793 P.2d 1121 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
If it did not, we must determine whether the statute is “merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right.” Bouldin v. Turek, 125 Ariz: 77, 78
Wilson v. Arizona Registrar of Contractors 780 P.2d 450 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
Wilson v. Arizona Registrar of Contractors 780 P.2d 450 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
Sallomi v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 771 P.2d 469 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
Sallomi v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 771 P.2d 469 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
London v. Green Acres Trust 765 P.2d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
London v. Green Acres Trust 765 P.2d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Rowe v. Rowe 744 P.2d 717 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1987
Rowe v. Rowe 744 P.2d 717 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1987
Pioneer Roofing Co. v. Mardian Construction Co. 733 P.2d 652 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Pioneer Roofing Co. v. Mardian Construction Co. 733 P.2d 652 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Stuart v. Insurance Co. of North America 730 P.2d 255 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Stuart v. Insurance Co. of North America 730 P.2d 255 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
A statute may operate retroactively if it is merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right, , but as a general rule a statute will be given prospective effect only, absent a plain indication of an intent that it operate retroactively.
Rapp v. Olivo 718 P.2d 489 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Rapp v. Olivo 718 P.2d 489 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc. 717 P.2d 434 Ariz. 1986
Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc. 717 P.2d 434 Ariz. 1986
Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 709 P.2d 573 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 709 P.2d 573 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
In view of the express provisions of § 3 of the Act, , are simply not applicable.