Cited by

3 SARKIS v. MARICOPA, et al. Decision of the Court ¶10 To support his argument, Sarkis notes that our supreme court generally rejected “the rule of governmental immunity from tort liability.” Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, (“Employing the spirit of the Stone decision, we propose to endorse the use of governmental immunity as a defense only when its application is necessary to avoid a severe hampering of a governmental function or thwarting of established public policy.”).

-10 (1982) (“[T]he parameters of duty owed by the state will ordinarily be coextensive with those owed by others.”) (citing Stone v. Ariz. Highway 3 Although Spooner suggests the grand jury testimony could have been admitted with a limiting instruction regarding its proper purpose, rather than excluded alto

See § 12-802(2); Pritchard , 163 Ariz. at 431 , 788 P.2d at 1182 ("the state and its agents will be subject to the same tort law as private citizens" (quoting Ryan v. State , , 311, , 600 (1982) ) ).

Because the proprietary/govemmen-tal distinction is murky and unhelpful in resolving disputes of this kind, we do not view it as an appropriate factor in determining whether a state law relates to a matter of “statewide or purely local interest.” Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 176 ¶ 20, 273 P.3d at 628 ; , (abolishing as an unnecessary, “speculative exercise” the “public/private duty doctrine” in determining governmental immunity issues).

.”); modified by 1984 Ariz. Session Laws ch. 285 § 3 (codified at A.R.S.

But that argument sweeps too broadly, in contravention of the tenet that immunity “should be bestowed only when and at the level necessary.” Grimm, 115 Ariz. at 265–66; (“[W]e propose to endorse the use of governmental immunity as a defense only when its application is necessary to avoid a severe hampering of a governmental function or thwarting of established public policy.”).

In response to our supreme court’s the legislature passed “Actions Against Public Entities or Public Employees” (codified as A.R.S.

superseded by statute as stated in Clouse ex rel.

(also encouraging the Legislature to address the issue), superseded by the Act as stated in Clouse ex rel.

Clouse, 199 Ariz. at 198-99, ¶¶ 9, 12 , 16 P.3d at 759 -60 ( , modified by 1984 Ariz. Session Laws ch. 285 § 3 (codified at A.R.S.

2, § 18 ("The Legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the State."); , ("We do not recoil from the thought that the legislature may in its wisdom wish to intervene in some aspects of this development.").

Austin, 140 Ariz. at 581 , 684 P.2d at 153 , *314

Clouse, 199 Ariz. at 198-99, ¶ 9, ¶ 12 , 16 P.3d at 759 -60 ( , ).

¶21 Finally, Wertheim suggests that an analysis of whether a “special relationship” existed between Dillard, the defendants, and/or Carter under Restatement § 315 is 12 P.2d 597 (1982).

See Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, P.2d 107 (1963); (“the parameters of duty owed by the state will ordinarily be coextensive with those owed by others,” subject to legislative regulation); see also Dickey ex rel.

Moreover, we invited the legislature to enact laws to protect the public and those it deemed “necessary to avoid a severe hampering of a governmental function or thwarting of established public policy.” -11 , -600 (1982) (modified by statute as stated in Tucson Unified Sch.

A. ¶ 3 , we held that, as a matter of common law, governmental tort liability is coextensive with the liability of private actors.

B. ¶ 12 , we considered how to define the parameters of the state’s immunity.

B. ¶ 12 , we considered how to define the parameters of the state’s immunity.

which had facts rather similar to those here.

¶ 8 Moreover, the duty imposed by § 23-424 is consistent with Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm’n, , , and the legislative purpose set forth in the immunity statute, A.R.S.