Cited by

(recognizing that “breach of a statute intended as a safety regulation is not merely evidence of negligence but is negligence per se”).

2004) (criminal statutes may establish “minimum standards of conduct”); (violation of criminal statutes may constitute negligence per se).

-67, ¶¶ 18-20 (2018); see, -17 (1983) (Liquor licensees have a duty under statutes prohibiting underage drinking not to sell alcohol to minors.); Thomas v. Baker Fam.

¶19 That rule of nonliability changed in July 1983, however, when the Arizona Supreme Court decided both Ontiveros and a companion case, in which the court abolished the common law doctrine of tavern owner nonliability in Arizona and for the first time recognized a common law cause of action for dram shop liability.

of Regents, 255–56 (1994) (holding that statutes proscribing underage drinking give rise to a duty by non-licensees to refrain from furnishing alcohol to minors); –17 (1983) (stating that statutes barring minors from consuming alcohol create a duty prohibiting liquor licensees from furnishing alcohol to minors); Cobb v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, –57 (1941) (noting a local ordinance gave rise to a duty by adjacent property owners to avoid dischar

Id.; superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Carrillo v. El Mirage Roadhouse, Inc., n.1 (App. 1990).

“It is the prevailing rule, recognized in Arizona, that a breach of a statute intended as a safety regulation is not merely evidence of negligence but is negligence per se.”

-17, - 17 (1983); Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 510-11, 667 P.2d at 210-11; see also A.R.S.

¶ 12 In 1983, however, the Arizona Supreme Court decided Ontiveros v. Borak and a companion case, , in which the court abolished the common law doctrine of tavern owner nonliability in Arizona.

These include, but are not limited to, the landowner-invitee relationship, Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 212 , 941 P.2d at 224 ; Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 357 , 706 P.2d at 369 ; Coburn, 143 Ariz. at 52 , 691 P.2d at 1080 , the tavern owner-patron relationship, , Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 511 , 667 P.2d at 211 , and those “special relationships” recognized by § 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) that create a duty to control the actions of another, Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 508-09 , 667 P.2d at

inen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., ¶ 18 , (applying Article 18, Section 5 to a medical malpractice case); -24 , -91 (1990) (applying Article 18, Section 5 in suit for defendant’s negligent furnishing of alcohol to man who subsequently shot plaintiff in defendant’s parking lot); , (applying Article 18, Section 5 to a case in which the parents of three underage boys who died in a one-car accident filed wrongful death actions against the establishment that provided the boys with alcohol).

Martin claims the special relationship arises because the Schroeders knew Matt was incompetent to own a gun, given that they knew that Matt previously had been addicted to marijuana and that he was using marijuana at the time of the incident, relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965)

ew to us. We do not minimize the difficulties of ascertaining damages, but as this court has stated before in another context: ‘We acknowledge that the system will not handle each case perfectly, but we think it better to adopt a rule which will permit courts to attempt to achieve justice in all cases than to continue to rely on one which guarantees injustice in many cases.” , (discussing difficulties in ascertaining causation).

e do not minimize the difficulties of ascertaining damages, but as this court has stated before in another context: “We acknowledge that the system will not handle each case perfectly, but we think it better to adopt a rule which will permit courts to attempt to achieve justice in all cases than to continue to rely on one which guarantees injustice in many cases.” (discussing difficulties in ascertaining causation).

Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 517, ( ).

“In civil actions, Arizona law has always been ‘that unless otherwise stated, a court opinion operates retroactively as well as prospectively.’” , (quoting Chevron Chem.

-90 , -49 (App.1988); -18 , -18 (1983) (illegal sale of alcohol to minors is negligence per se); cf. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 530 (3d Cir. 1979) (sale of interchangeable ammunition violated Delaware law and was negligence per se).

“[A] breach of a statute intended as a safety regulation is not merely evidence of negligence but is negligence per se.”

Ontiveros, , ; , (extending licensee’s duty of care *398 to a minor who was furnished alcohol and, as a result, injured himself).