Cited by

(Test of what is excusable and, hence, sufficient to set aside a default judgment is “whether the neglect or inadvertence is such as might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances.”); (carelessness is not synonymous with

“The pretrial statement controls the subsequent course of the litigation,” ¶ 19 , (quotation omitted), and is intended to avoid unfair surprise at trial, , 356

Ellman, 180 Ariz. at 340; –60 (1984) (legal error in believing an answer is not required when an action is filed in a county other than county of residence is not excusable neglect); – 51, ¶¶ 22–23 (App. 2005) (a failure to serve based on ignorance of Rule 4(i) is not excusable neglect); Jarostchuk v. Aric

Additionally, “whether or not an illness or disability merits the setting aside of a default judgment must be evaluated in an ad hoc manner, and is a question directed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (citation omitted).

See Bryan, 178 Ariz. at 477; Jimenez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., ¶ 5 (App. 2003).3 ¶7 "The pretrial statement controls the subsequent course of the litigation," ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (quotation omitted), and is intended to avoid unfair surprise at trial, ("[T]rial by ambush is a tactic no longer countenanced in Arizona courts.").

-58 (1984); see also Brush Wellman, ¶ 12 (App. 2000).

v. Fields, (noting the trial court is “in a better position in a particular case to balance the principle of finality of judgments and the principle of resolving issues on the merits”) ( and Hirsch v. Nat’l Van Lines, Inc., ).

(stating that a judgment will not be disturbed if acquired because of a party’s mere neglect).

Moreover, we presume “the legislature, when it passes a statute, knows the existing laws.” , (citing Ariz. State Bd.

§ 25-403.09(A), and the parties listed child support as a contested issue in the joint pretrial statement, which had “the effect of amending the pleading,” we treat Father’s request to modify parenting time as a petition to modify child support.

Although he failed to make his request in a formal petition, the joint “pretrial 3 FLYNN v. BROWN Decision of the Court statement controls the subsequent course of the litigation” and has “the effect of amending the pleading.” see also Ariz. R. Fam.

“[I]gnorance of the rules of procedure is not the type of excuse contemplated in rule 60(c).”

(“[T]rial by ambush is a tactic no longer countenanced in Arizona courts.”).

Neglect may be excusable if “the neglect or inadvertence is such as might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances.” (citation omitted).

Recchia cites no rule or other authority that prescribes a length of time for either an initial or rebuttal closing statement in a criminal trial, and the civil cases on which he relies, P.2d 907 (App. 1983), P.2d 173 (1975), are unavailing.

And this court has noted “trial by ambush 7 is a tactic no longer countenanced in Arizona courts.” Carlton v. Emhardt, 138 Ariz. 353, 355, (noting “amended [civil disclosure] rules attempt to change a culture of advocacy in which ‘hiding the pea’ has too frequently been the objective”).

(appellate courts presume the legislature is aware of existing ease law when it enacts a statute) ( , ).

¶ 37 , *129 1049 (App.2007).

Standard of Review ¶ 7 Although default judgments are not favored, Harper v. Canyon Land Dev., L.L.C., , -34 (App.2008), we review a trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment for an abuse of discretion

("[W]e presume that the legislature ...

See Daou v. Harris, 139 * (defendant’s failure to timely answer a complaint resulted in a default judgment); Cook v. Indus.

(recognizing that the trial court shall determine special damages as it deems just and reasonable before entering default judgment).