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¶ 8 Although we have occasionally said that procedural rulemaking power is vested “exclusively” in this Court, , 289 ¶ 9, -58 , -39 (1984), this statement is in some respects an oversimplification.

“The substantive law is that part of the law which creates and defines rights.”

-64 , -200 (App.1984) (client could not set aside default judgment based on attorney’s advice to disregard served pleadings); , (erroneous legal advice about need to file an answer could not serve as basis for setting aside default judgment).

(applying presumption that the legislature knows of existing laws when it enacts or modifies a statute).

(“[W]e presume that the legislature, when it passes a statute, knows the existing laws.”).

(trial court must weigh these competing interests).

¶ 20 Substantive law “creates and defines rights,” while “procedural law prescribes the method by which a substantive law is enforced or made effective.” , , (“[Substantive law ...

Because we presume the supreme court was aware of the content of its own pre-existing rules when it adopted Administrative Order No. 2005-22, (legislature presumed to be aware of existing laws when passing new legislation), we assume it fully intended presiding justices of the peace to perform the duties enumerated for presiding judges under those rules, including those duties specified in Rule 10.5(a).

“The pretrial statement controls the subsequent course of the litigation.”

(“We presume that the legislature ...

(“The pretrial statement controls the subsequent course of the litigation otherwise modified at trial to prevent manifest injustice.”).

(“The pretrial statement controls the subsequent course of the litigation otherwise modified at trial to prevent manifest injustice.”).

[often] excusable”) quoting D , see also Coconino Pulp & -21 , -53 (1957) (granting relief based on attorney’s reasonable reliance on secretary to notify him of due date for answering complaint when “through some inadvertent clerical error the lawyer [had not

2 For a statute to *73 divest the superior court of jurisdiction, even in the broader sense of authority to act, the legislature must declare its intent to create divestiture “explicitly and clearly.” -57 , -38 (1984) (non-jurisdictional statute requiring referral of medical malpractice claims to medical review panel did not divest trial court of “jurisdiction” to enter a default judgment for failure to timely answer complaint under appropriate rules of civil procedure).

1 (pretrial order shall control subsequent course of action but may be modified to prevent manifest injustice); , (same); S. Pac.

F. Alderete General Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 1476 (Fed.Cir.1983); Atlantic Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 907 (1st Cir. 1962); , , American Smelting & , Whitfield Transp.

(a joint pre-trial memorandum that omitted a lack of personal jurisdiction defense removed the defense from the case).

(we will not infer that legislature intended to divest superior *630 court of jurisdiction; it must enunciate such intent explicitly and clearly).

Randall, 67 Ariz. at 372 , 196 P.2d at 479 ; , (legislature presumed to know of existing law).

§ 12-109(A); , Rosner, 188 Ariz. at 433 , 937 P.2d at 355 .

But, contrary to AMS’s repeated assertions, the evidence relating to this issue is far from “undisputed.” Rather, “[v]iewing the facts in the strongest light possible in favor of supporting the trial court’s decision,” , we find substantial evidence that the Hilgemans properly served AMS through its agent, Bache.

Id If mere neglect, inadvertence, or forgetfulness without a reasonable excuse is not enough, , it is axiomatic that one who has knowingly and intentionally perpetrated a fraud on another party and the court can never be entitled to relief under the rule.