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Pool v. Superior Ct. In & For Pima Cnty.

The double jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecutor engages in intentional conduct which he “knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial or reversal.” –09 (1984).

“this ruling is subject to the evidence presented at trial which may either allow this evidence to be presented or make the evidence subject to objection.” ¶10 “[W]here one party injects improper or irrelevant evidence or argument, the ‘door is open,’ and the other party may have a right to retaliate by responding with comments or evidence on the same subject.”

("[W]here one party injects improper or irrelevant evidence or argument, the 'door is open,' and the other party may have a right to retaliate by responding with comments or evidence on the same subject."); cf. Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876, 884-85 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding counsel's unsupported insurance r

Prosecutorial misconduct is defined as “intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.” ¶ 36 (App. 2009) (–09 (1984)).

erely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.’” –39 ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (–09 (1984)).

(quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).

¶35 As “a representative of a government whose obligation to govern fairly is as important as its obligation to govern at all,” a prosecutor may not “engage in abusive, argumentative, and harassing conduct.”

¶44 When “one party injects improper or irrelevant evidence or argument, the ‘door is open,’ and the other party may have a right to retaliate by responding with comments or evidence on the same subject.” (citations omitted).

State v. 6 ¶ 36 (App. 2009) (-09 (1984)).

¶12 Prosecutorial misconduct is “intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial” and that “is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety.” (-09 (1984)).

Instead, to challenge the sufficiency of a grand jury indictment, “a defendant must seek relief by 3 STATE v. DUNBAR Decision of the Court way of special action prior to trial.” Id.; 102 (1984).

Pool v. Superior Court , , 108, , 271 (1984).

.’“ -39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (-09 (1984)).

intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.’” -39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (-09 (1984)).

¶12 Eshaya analogizes the prosecutor’s asserting they were (1) an argument masquerading as questions and (2) intended to “punish him by showing the jury that the state was free to humiliate and demean him.” We agree the questions were argumentative but Eshaya’s attempt to equate them with the circumstances in Pool is inapt.

See Pool v. Superior Court , , 108, , 271 (1984) ("The decisions of the United States Supreme Court are binding with regard to the interpretation of the federal constitution; interpretation of the state constitution is, of course" the province of Arizona's courts); see also Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC , , ¶¶ 8, 1

She further argues, that the state’s alleged misconduct was so egregious and intentional that it warrants vacating her conviction and ordering dismissal of the case with prejudice, barring retrial under the double jeopardy clause.

Prosecutorial misconduct is “intentional conduct” that the “prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose.” Pool v. Superior Court (State), -09 (1984).

But see Pool v. Superior Court , , 108, , 271 (1984) (state courts interpret Arizona constitution).

39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (“Prosecutorial misconduct ‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.’” (–09 (1984))).

¶12 Prosecutorial misconduct is “not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety.”