Cited by

mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial,” and which she “pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial or reversal,” and (3) prejudice to the defendant results “which cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial.” –09 (1984).

ismiss charges with prejudice if a prosecutor engaged in (1) improper conduct, (2) which is “not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial,” (3) and prejudice results “which cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial.” –09 (1984).

(Arizona courts obligated to follow Supreme Court precedent “with regard to the interpretation of the federal constitution”).

(“[A] prosecutor’s duty to avoid a conflict of interest is prime because his paramount duty is to the principle of ‘fairness.’ In other words, his interest is not so much to prevail as to ensure that ‘justice shall be done.’” ()).

mproperly asked the jury: “If you were a suspect in a murder case, and you knew the police were looking for you, what would you do with the murder weapon?” ¶26 Any “[s]uggestion by question or innuendo of unfavorable matter which is not in evidence and which would be irrelevant, or for which no proof exists is improper and can constitute misconduct.” See Pool v. Superior Court (State)

assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a good faith basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”); see also In re Sponsel, No. SB-24-0007-AP, 2025 WL 1477523, at *14–15 ¶¶ 90–91 (Ariz. May 22, 2025) (discussing the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office’s policy, which requires a “reasonable likelihood of conviction” to charge a defendant); (“It is the prosecutor’s duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction just as it is his duty to

She had a duty to “refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction [and] to use all proper methods to bring about a just conviction.”

Arizona courts must follow United States Supreme Court precedent “with regard to the interpretation of the federal constitution.” see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997) (saying courts should not conclude the United States Supreme Court has overruled its earlier precedent by implication, “[r]ather, lower courts should follow the case which directly controls”).

STEINLAGE/STATE Decision of the Court ¶4 -09 (1984) (barring retrial if mistrial is caused by prosecutorial misconduct).

(stating general rule that “where evidence adduced or comments made by one party make otherwise irrelevant evidence highly relevant,” such party opens the door to the other party “responding with comments or evidence on the same subject”); –05 (1981) (holding that the def

“[S]uch conduct is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.” Pool v. Superior Ct. In & For Pima Cnty.

n.11 (App. 2019) (where appeal had been filed and fully briefed by another criminal defendant challenging similar statements made by the same prosecutor, remarks in later case “may have been a calculated strategy deployed by this prosecutor”); (“The conduct of the prosecutor was egregiously incorrect to the extent that we must infer that the questions were asked with knowledge that they were improper.”).

–79, ¶ 73 (2012) (allowing the admission of prior acts when the defendant “opened the door to such evidence”); (“We recognize that where one party injects improper or irrelevant evidence or argument, the ‘door is open,’ and the other party may have a right to retaliate by responding with comments or evidence on the same subject.”) (citation omitted).

Pool v. Superior Court (State)

A party opens the door for otherwise improper evidence to be introduced when “comments made by one party make otherwise irrelevant evidence highly relevant or require some response or rebuttal.”

(“The decisions of the United States Supreme Court are binding with regard to the interpretation of the federal constitution.”); ¶ 15 n.4 (2004) (“The courts of this state are bound by the decisions of this court and do not have the authority to modify or disre

¶ 51 (2009) (stating that due process requires that a defendant be given “notice of the specific charge” (quoting Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948))); n.4 (1984) (emphasizing that “the indictment gave clear notice to the defendant that the crime alleged was a violation of either or both” subsections of a statute (emphasis added)).

Under the “open door” doctrine “where one party injects improper or irrelevant evidence or argument, the ‘door is open,’ and the other party may have a right to retaliate by responding with comments or evidence on the same subject.”

¶50 The superior court has “discretion to determine and control the method of interrogation,” and it should reasonably exercise that discretion “so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment,” Ariz. R. Evid.

(“[W]here one party injects improper or irrelevant evidence, the ‘door is open,’ and the other party may retaliate with evidence on the same subject.”).

(“The decisions of the United States Supreme Court are binding with regard to the interpretation of the federal constitution; interpretation of the state constitution is, of course, our 7 WILLIS V. HON.

Prerequisite to such a dismissal, the prosecution must engage in misconduct—“conduct that ‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or significant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.’” ¶ 36 (App. 2009) (-09 (1984)).

(holding that a party’s injection of improper evidence may open to the door for the other party to retaliate with evidence on the same subject (citation omitted)).