Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261.

327 citing documents.

  • State v. Marquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    ¶12 Prosecutorial misconduct is “not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety.”
  • Soza v. Marner 430 P.3d 1265 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
  • Soza v. Marner 430 P.3d 1265 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
    1188 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state."); see Pool v. Superior Court , , 108, , 271 (1984) (decisions of United States Supreme Court are binding with regard to interpretation of federal constitution; interpretation of state constitution is the province of state courts).
  • State v. Barnes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Barnes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    ich 7 STATE v. BARNES Decision of the Court the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.” -39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (-09 (1984)).
  • State v. Buttita Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Buttita Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    See Pool v. Superior Court In & For Pima County, (giving trial court discretion to declare mistrial).
  • State v. Weber Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Weber Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    –09 (1984) (holding prosecutorial misconduct is not merely error, negligence, or mistake, but "intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial" (emphasis added)).
  • State v. Risner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Risner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Griego Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Griego Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    Prosecutorial misconduct is not “merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety.” ¶ 36 (App. 2009) ().
  • State v. Taylor Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Taylor Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    Pool v. Superior Court (State), –09 (1984).
  • State v. Cook Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Cook Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    Prosecutorial misconduct is not merely “legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.” Pool 8 (footnote omitted).
  • State v. Ogle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Ogle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    ¶10 Prosecutorial misconduct is not “merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety.” Pool v. Superior Court (Pima Cty.)
  • State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    ¶32 “[W]here one party injects improper or irrelevant evidence or argument, the ‘door is open,’ and the other party may have a right to retaliate by responding with comments or evidence on the same subject.”
  • State v. Juarez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Juarez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    (“[W]here one party injects improper or irrelevant evidence or argument, the ‘door is open,’ and the other party may have a right to retaliate by responding with comments or evidence on the same subject.”).
  • Brumett v. Mga Home Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Brumett v. Mga Home Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    “[W]here one party injects improper or irrelevant evidence or argument, the ‘door is open,’ and the other party may have a right to retaliate by responding with comments or evidence on the same subject.”
  • State v. Gurrieri Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Gurrieri Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶26 Prosecutorial misconduct is not “merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety.”
  • Hall v. Elected Officials' Retirement Plan 383 P.3d 1107 Ariz. 2016
  • Hall v. Elected Officials' Retirement Plan 383 P.3d 1107 Ariz. 2016
    (noting that interpreting the state constitution is this Court’s responsibility).
  • State v. Stewart Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Stewart Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ( STATE v. STEWART Decision of the Court (1973), and 1 M. Udall & J. Livermore, Arizona Practice, Law of Evidence § 11 at 11 (2d ed. 1982)); see also State v. Fish
  • State v. Democker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Jernigan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Democker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    The Arizona Constitution’s double jeopardy provision bars a retrial when the mistrial is caused by “intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial or reversal.” –09 (1984).
  • State v. Jernigan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    Prosecutorial misconduct is not merely “legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which 8 STATE v. JERNIGAN Decision of the Court the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.” Pool v. Superior Court (State of Arizona), -09 (1984).
  • State v. Whitlock Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Whitlock Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    Prosecutorial misconduct is not “merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety.”
  • State v. Clary Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Clary Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    Prosecutorial misconduct is not merely “legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.” (footnote omitted).
  • State v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    -09, -72 (1984) (prosecutorial misconduct is not merely “legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.”).
  • State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    rely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.’” -39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (-09 (1984)).
  • State of Arizona v. Mark Goudeau 372 P.3d 945 Ariz. 2016
  • State of Arizona v. Mark Goudeau 372 P.3d 945 Ariz. 2016
    Additionally, “[t]rial judges have inherent power and discretion to adopt special, individualized procedures designed to promote the ends of justice in each case that comes before them.” ( (Feldman, J., specially concurring)); –04, –67 (1984) (“The trial judge is armed with both discretionary power and rules which he may use to control proceedings.”); Fed.
  • State v. Hon. padilla/simcox Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla ex rel. County of Maricopa 371 P.3d 642 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla ex rel. County of Maricopa 371 P.3d 642 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    Arizona Rule of Evidence 611(a) empowers the court to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” , (holding Rule 611(a) “gives the court discretion to determine and control the method of interrogation”); Padilla, 237 Ariz. at 270, ¶ 24 , 349 P.3d at 1107 (“If the State belie
  • State v. Hon. padilla/simcox Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    Arizona Rule of Evidence 611(a) empowers the court to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” (holding Rule 611(a) “gives the court discretion to determine and control the method of interrogation”); Padilla, 237 Ariz. at 270, ¶ 24 (“If the State believes that a personal c
  • State v. Hollingsworth Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016