Cited by

It follows that we will rarely review the court of appeals’ discretionary refusal to accept jurisdiction of a special action challenging the denial of a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.”); (“We acknowledge that special action relief from the denial of summary judgment is almost always inappropriate.”); (“[B]ecause relief by special action is largely discretionary, we follow a general policy of declining jurisdiction when relief by special action is sought to obtain review of ord

Ct., (“[P]etitioners claim that the respondent trial judge is proceeding with the action in excess of or without jurisdiction, so that special action relief is appropriate.”).

so long as its application is consistent with the will of Congress.” ¶ 12 (1999) (“[A]ll Indian reservations in Arizona are within the political and governmental, as well as geographical, boundaries of the state.” (citation omitted)).

And due process of law contemplates a “fair trial in a fair tribunal.” (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).

We will not apply “fine semantic or grammatical distinctions” or “parse sentences,” however, as doing so “may lead us to results quite different from the objectives which the framers intended to accomplish.” See Saban Rent-a-Car LLC, 246 Ariz. at 95 ¶ 21 (–76 (1985)).

United States v. Superior Court , , 275-76, , 668-69 (1985).

§ 45-257(B)(1) (2016); cf. United States v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cty., (citations omitted) (finding A.R.S.

See U.S. v. Superior Court (Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res.)

Although adjudication of claims for waters in those two river systems continues, it is well known that “the amount of surface water available [in Arizona] is insufficient to satisfy all needs.”

340 (1908)); , (“In the scheme of priorities, the claims ...

and Source (Gila River V), 201 Ariz. 307, 311 ¶ 9, (discussing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)); (“In the scheme of priorities, the claims .

at 84 , 786 P.2d at *166 935 ( , ).

ing of statutes and court rules, “[c]ourts should avoid hypertechnical constructions that frustrate legislative intent.” ¶ 19, ( ¶ 20, ); see also United States v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 275-76, -69 (1985) (noting that constitutional provisions should be interpreted “with an eye to syntax, history, initial principle, and extension of fundamental purpose”)

¶24 Due process requires a “‘fair trial in a fair tribunal.’” quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625, 99 L. Ed. 942, 946 (1955).

& Source, -85, -39 (1993); Gila I, 171 Ariz. at 232-33, 830 P.2d at 444-45; -71, -64 (1985) (subsection entitled “The Controversy”).

Also, “due process requires that a party be given a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal.’” (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).

¶21 Due process of law contemplates a “‘fair trial in a fair tribunal.’” quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625, 99 L. Ed. 942, 946 (1955).

.” United States v. Superior Court (In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source), 144 Ariz. 265, 269

(“We must interpret the statute with common sense and, if possible, in a manner consistent with constitutional principle.”).

3201, 3209-10 , 77 L.Ed.2d 837 (1983) (subsection entitled “The Arizona Cases”); -33 , -45 (1992); -71 , -64 (1985) (subsection entitled “The Controversy”).

¶2 The Adjudication has been pending for some twenty-five years, , and was initially assigned to the Honorable Stanley Goodfarb.

(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 , 75 S.Ct.